Dismantling Implausibility Structures:
Plantinga's Ontological Argument

Joe

H'mm, living a time zone or two ahead has certain effects.

Good post again.

My observation is that though there is a basis for presenting the arguments and discussing them one by one, there is need to be aware that they gain their full force like a rope gains strength:

* Each fibre is weak and short.

* But as fibres are twisted together, they rub up against each other and grab a hold, so we gain both length and strength

* When such strands are counter-twisted together, or braided, twist and counter-twist interact and the rope gains durability as well as further strength

* Thus, the cumulative effect is vital to the nature and power of a rope

I this case, the premise on necessary beings is like that: it interacts with the cosmological arguments: we live in a world of contingent beings, which entails a necessary being as their sufficient cause. Thus, Plantinga's first premise:

1. By definition a maximally great being is one that exists necessarily and necessarily is omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good.

In that context, the concept that that necessary and sufficient being is a maximally great being then leads to the inferences that such a being has certain characteristics, which of course are those of God. For, we are not just discussing ideas, but the context of a world of contingent beings that cry out for an adequate cause.

Indeed, anticipating, the observed characteristics of the contingent beings we OBSERVE, raises the issue of the design implicit oin their nature:

1] The fine-tuned observed cosmos that we have evidence of as being finite in time and matter: 13.7 BY, ~ 10E80 atoms. The conditions for such a universe as we observe that has atoms, galaxies and life in it, are exquisitely balanced on a multidimensional knife-edge. (ANd, the alternative, some sort of quasi-infinite array of sub-universes, is implicitly a case of an ad hoc metaphysical assertion designed to save phenomena for worldviews otherwise in deep trouble.)

2] Life, at cellular level, is such that on the cosmic scale observed, it is overwhelmingly not plausible that molecular noise would lead to the DNA-RNA-Ribosome-Enzyme etc systems we see.

--> Thus the contrast between Dembski and Dawkins:

Dembski: intelligent design is not a religious doctrine about where everything came from but rather a scientific investigation into how patterns exhibited by finite arrangements of matter can signify intelligence.

Dawkins: “biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose”

3] Life, at human level, expresses both mind and morality. In turn, that is very hard to explain on other than theistic grounds, without self-referential inconsistency.

SO, there is a cumulative case to be addressed. Not as: this fails to be a knockdown proof so I can dismiss, but as Plantinga implied in your quote: which explanation best makes sense?

Thus, again, we see the vital importance of comparative difficulties relative to factual adequacy, logical coherence an explanatory scope.

Grace to al

Gordon

Again, good post.

Grace to all

Gordon

The key premise in this argument is premise 1, not premise 2. Since you have defined the maximally great being as one possessing necessary existence, your first premise assumes your conclusion -- that a maximally great being exists. All the other premises are just verbiage.

Shouldn't you focus on possible objections to premise 1? Specifically, why do you mention Gaunilo's objection but not Kant's? Doesn't Kant's objection to the ontological argument also apply to proposition 1 of this argument?

Is "existence" a characteristic of the same sort as knowledge, power etc? If not, then our conception of a maximally great being might include omniscience and omnipotence but not necessary existence. What specifically is the relationship between "greatness" and "existence?"

I notice also that your example of a necessary proposition is a simple tautology. Since bachelors are defined as unmarried men, your necessary proposition reduces to "all bachelors are bachelors." Is that a general characteristic of necessary propositions?

Franklin -- The real point of contention is premise 2. Many (a former teacher of mine among them) deny that they have any good reason to hold that it is true.

Is it because they deny what is referred to as the Axiom S5 or is there another reason? Also, if they deny that they have a good reason that it is true, do they also claim that they have a good reason to believe that it is false?

Nick -- The key premise in this argument is premise 1, not premise 2. Since you have defined the maximally great being as one possessing necessary existence, your first premise assumes your conclusion -- that a maximally great being exists. All the other premises are just verbiage.

While existence is, of course, necessary in order to be defined as "maximally great", that does not mean that we are begging the question by assuming that it exists. The Wikipedia article gives a good explanation why this is the case. The premise can be justified in the following ways:

1. We might show a proposition to be possible by showing that it is true. Thus, we know that consciousness is possible because we know that we have consciousness.
2. We can show a state of affairs to be possible by exhibiting how the state of affairs might arise by the laws of nature from other possible states of affairs. That is how we know that horse-like mammals with one horn are possible, since we can sketch an evolutionary story whereby they physically could evolve.
3. We might provide a mathematical or other model of the situation to be shown to be possible, a model that mirrors all the relevant logical structure of the situation, and show the model to be possible. This is how we know that it is possible to have three people where there are two fathers and two sons--we construct a model in our minds in which there is a grandfather, his son and his son's son.

My first question is are the 'possible worlds' simply a thinking device or do you literally mean that all 'possible worlds' exist? In other words is this simply a revisit to the many worlds hypothesis?

Just a thinking device. The concept of possible worlds is used because it is possible that the existence could have been different than it actually is (though we assume that the same laws of logic would still apply).

My next question is how can we say for sure what is possible in such alternative worlds?

When it is said that something is possible in a possible world it it merely saying that it is possible in at at least one possible worl. Saying that something is necessary is to say that it must be true in all possible worlds. For something to simply be true it must be true in at least this world (the actual world).

For example, perhaps if you observed and calculated out all possible combinations of all the sub-atomic particles for the whole universe you would find it would have been impossible for Hubert Humphrey to have won in 1969.

I don't follow. How do we know this?

The 'set of all possible worlds' would not contain a President Humphrey anymore than the infinite set of even numbers will contain the number 7!

Again, I don't see why that is the case. The reason seven cannot be part of the infinite set of even numbers is because by definition seven cannot be an even number.

Joe,

It's not that the P2 (premise 2) skeptics (at least those that I know) think that they have reason to deny P2. Rather it's that they think they have no reason to accept it. They will make the quite obvious point that no every bit of English expresses a coherent concept. Take, for instance, 'the set of all non-self-membered sets'. There can be no such set as this. For if there were, it would either be a member of itself or it would not. If it were, then by its definition it would not. But if it were not, then again by its definition it would. Thus if such a set exists, it's a member of itself just if it's not a member of itself. But clearly that's impossible.

What the P2 skeptics will say is that, for all we know, 'all powerful, all good, all knowing creator of the world' might, like 'set of all non-self-membered sets', turn out to be such that it cannot be true of anything.

I know of no way to answer this objection. In general, the way to prove that a concept can be true of something is to produce a thing of which it is true. But that doesn't seem a real possibility in the case of God's existence. We can't, as it were, hold up God and thus prove that the concept of God can find application in the world. (Anyway, if we could do such a thing, all argumentation for God's existence would be moot in the extreme.)

Franklin,
But as regards necessary existence, it does seem to me that if you tell me that a being exists necessarily, you have told me something about the kind of thing that it is. 'Necessary existence' seems to me to qualify the being of a thing in a way that mere 'existence' does not.

Well, in both cases, I've told you that the thing exists. Whether "necessary existence" or "mere existence" really make a difference depends on the significance of "necessary." That's why I mentioned that Joe's example of a necessary proposition was a simple tautology and asked if that was a general property of necessary propositions. If it is, then necessary propositions don't seem very interesting or valuable. If it isn't, I'd like to see another example.

Second point: Say that we compare two beings at a world. The two are equally powerful, equally knowledgeable, equally good. But one has so tenuous a grip on existence that if conditions had been even just a bit different, it would not have existed. The other, however, is much more 'existentially robust'. Conditions would have had to be radically different for it not to exist. Now I ask, Which of the two is the greater, the more perfect? (I take it that in this discussions, degree of greatness = degree of perfection.) The answer seems clear to me. The one that has a firmer grip on existence is the more perfect. But this entails that maximal greatness must bring along necessary existence.

1. If we are talking about actually existing objects, I don't see that a thing can have a "tenuous" grip on existence. It either exists or it does not.

2. If we are talking about our hypothetical concepts of a thing, then it seems to me that you have simply restated the original assertion that existence is more perfect than nonexistence. I still haven't seen any argument explaining why, to use an old example, a concept of 100 thalers (that actually exist) is more perfect or greater than a concept of 100 thalers (that don't actually exist).

It still stikes me as being akin to talking about the purpleness of joy or the happiness of triangles.

To clarify my earlier point about premises 2-4 being unnecessary:

Premise 1 defines the maximally great being as one that exists necessarily.

Premise 2 states that the maximally great being exists possibly (i.e. in one or more possible worlds). This gives absolutely no new information, as the maximally great being has already been defined as existing in all possible worlds (by definition of necessary). In fact, one could argue that proposition 2 isn't true, given proposition 1. Saying that a being exists possibly implies uncertainty about whether it exists in all possible worlds, but proposition 1 has already asserted that the maximally great being does exist in all possible worlds.

One can't object to premise 2 without also objecting to the definition in premise 1, so all objections to premise 2 reduce to objections to premise 1.

Premise 3 is a restatement of premise 2

Premise 4 follows directly from premise 1, if and only if one accepts the assertion that necessary existence is part of the definition of maximally great.

Premise 5 follows directly from the definition in premise 1.

So, this argument isn't really an argument. It is a single assertion based upon an unsupported definition that doesn't do much to dismantle implausibility structures.

For example, perhaps if you observed and calculated out all possible combinations of all the sub-atomic particles for the whole universe you would find it would have been impossible for Hubert Humphrey to have won in 1969.

I don't follow. How do we know this?

Let me try to develop this a bit more. You say it is possible to imagine a world where Hubert Humphrey won in 1969. Sure. Star Trek and Star Wars are proof it is possible to imagine a world where faster than light travel is easily accomplished. However are the worlds of Star Trek and Star Wars part of this collection of 'possible worlds'? Assuming Einstein was right such worlds are not 'possible worlds', they are imaginary worlds just like the Middle-Earth of Lord of the Rings.

How is it possible to make true statements about possible worlds? Let me give you an example of what I'm trying to say. Chess is a game with a finite number of possible games but the number is so huge it might as well be infinite. However there is one game (known as Fool's Mate http://www.onelang.com/encyclopedia/index.php/Fool%27s_mate) that is the shortest possible checkmate. It takes only two moves by white for Black to checkmate on his second move. While there is a huge number of possible chess games we can say there is no possible chess game that results in a checkmate in fewer moves.

There are other questions about possible chess games that are no as easy to answer. for example, is there some combination of moves that will always result in a win for white or black no matter what the other player does? If so then the game would really be ruined. However at the moment I don't think we have the ability to answer this question. We cannot prove no such combination exists. We cannot prove it exists. Of course, as far as we know no one has yet stumbled upon it if it does exists that we know about and all possible games have not been played.

So last night I played a few games of chess with my nephew-in-laws. Does a 'possible world' exist where one of us played the hypothetical 'unbeatable' game? Quite frankly we cannot say unless someone has come up with the mathematical tools to examine 'all possible games'.

Now with the constraints of the known laws of physics, chemistry etc., is it possible to assemble an Earth where Hubert Humphrey won in 1969? I can't think of a reason for why not but considering how complex all possible combinations of atoms can be it very well might be impossible to have an alternate Earth where Humphrey won the '69 election! Just like it may very well be impossible for there to be a 'possible world' where I discovered the 'unbeatable gambit' last night in my chess game! No such thing may exist in the game we know as chess likewise it simply might be impossible to assemble the atoms of an alternate planet that still fits what we want to define as a 'possible earth' where Humphrey won in '69.

So are we really able to make true statements about 'possible worlds'?

Nick,

About water and H20. 'Necessarily, water is H20' means roughly 'Necessarily, any mass (or sample, or amount - pick your term) of water is a mass of H20'. Such a proposition is true by default in worlds in which water does not exist, for in a world in which water does not exist it is false of no mass of water there that it fails to be H20.

In symbols: N(x)(Wx > Hx). (Necessarily, for all x, if x is a mass of water, x is a mass of H20.) But universally quantified propositions of the sort (x)(Wx > Hx) are true if there is no x that satisfies the predicate 'W', for in such a case 'Wx' is always false and thus 'Wx > Hx' is always true. Thus in worlds in which there is no water, (x)(Wx > Hx) comes out true, again by default.)

Saul Kripke argued in Naming and Necessity and elsewhere that such a propositon as 'Water is H20', if true, expresses the nature, or essence, of water. It says just what water is, not merely what visible or tangible properties it appears to have to us. As such, it is necessarily true if true at all.

Franklin:
About water and H20. 'Necessarily, water is H20' means roughly 'Necessarily, any mass (or sample, or amount - pick your term) of water is a mass of H20'. Such a proposition is true by default in worlds in which water does not exist, for in a world in which water does not exist it is false of no mass of water there that it fails to be H20.

Eh? Rather, I would say that in worlds that water does not exist, "water is H2O" is meaningless rather than necessarily true. "Water is H2O," as you have described it, is a statement about the (physical) nature of water. Mass, sample, amount, are all descriptors of physical properties, and H2O, which you have left undefined, is likewise usually a statement of physical characteristics. If water does not exist in a possible world, then it has no nature whatsoever in that possible world. Something that does not exist cannot be something else and neither can it fail to be something else. Water that does not exist cannot be H2O and cannot fail to be H2O

Saul Kripke argued in Naming and Necessity and elsewhere that such a propositon as 'Water is H20', if true, expresses the nature, or essence, of water. It says just what water is, not merely what visible or tangible properties it appears to have to us.

Assuming that water has an essence outside of its properties and assuming that H2O describes that essence rather than properties... Both propositions seem questionable.

It appears to me that these arguments are philosophical shell games. Words are used as either descriptions of actually existing objects or abstract concepts in asserted definitions, and the usage changes mid-argument.

Nick,

About superlatives and necessary existence.

Your question is right on the head. Here's a response. When we speak of the perfection of God, we mean by definition the maximal perfection that could be enjoyed by any being. Being more perfect than any other actual being does not by itself make a being God. Rather being more perfect than any other being could be is what makes God God. This is definitional.

So, then, the perfection of God has trans-world comparisons built right in. For being more perfect than any being could be means being more perfect than any other being at any world is.

Of course one might ask at this point (and I take it that you did) whether one might construct the concept of an absolutely maximally ugly being. Wouldn't such a being have to exist just as necessarily as God, if God exist necessarily?

One here would have to get into the metaphysics of ugliness. Here's my take. It's Thomistic. Ugliness, like disease, is a parasitic concept that implies that lack of a certain positive quality. Disease is not itself a positive state on a par with health but rather just is the lack of health. So too ugliness is not itself a positive quality to be set beside beauty but is rather the lack of beauty.

Now, all things that exist, insofar as they exist, are beautiful in some respect to some degree. Of course some things are quite extraordinarily ugly. Rape is a good example. But while the rape of a woman, qua rape, is ugly and wicked, it still contains within it an element that has some beauty. It has two minds, and while minds can become corrupted, a mind, qua mind, is a thing of beauty. it has a man and a woman, and while either can become corrupt, both are, qua man or woman, beautiful.

The point is, that while ugliness is quite real, it's reality is parasitic on beautiful things. Ugliness is the lack of beauty, and the thing in which the lack is found is always still beautiful to a degree.

Thus it seems to me that 'absolutely maximally ugly' is an incoherent concept.

The right question to ask at this point is whether the concept of God might be incoherent as well. This is to question premise 2 in the original argument. As I said, I know of no good response to this question.

Nick,

I did not say 'essence outside of its properties'. Indeed that makes little sense. I said rather that 'Water is H20' expresses just what water is, not merely what visible or tangible properties it appears to have to us. Being H20 is of course a property, but not a tangible or visible one. (By 'tangible' I mean what is usually meant, viz. tangible to the unaided senses.)

Being H20 is, on my view, an essential property of water. No matter how much a substance looked or acted like water, it would not be water if it were not H20. This seems like solid good sense to me, and it seems perfectly in accord with the chemists use of 'water' and 'H20'.

Gordon likes to expand threads way too much. The 'uncaused causer' argument is different from this one. I think it too suffers from an assumption that we cannot make. Namely that everything must have a cause. Why? What is to say that one thing or maybe even a handful of things may happen without a cause while everything else requires one? It seems like the only real argument is that it is difficult for humans to imagine such a state of affairs. Yet we know many things that are difficult to imagine such as the nature of atomic particles or the behavior of space and time at high speeds or intense gravity that are nevertheless the state of affairs.

Another issue I have with the 'first cause' argument is that I don't think it says anything about the nature of God. It might 'prove' that something exists as a cause of the universe but it doesn't follow from that this 'something' is an intelligent beign or something that we can recognize as our conception of God.

Boonton:

Hard questions are hard because they have no easy answers.

Kindly therefore note postulate # 1 in the original post:

1. By definition a maximally great being is one that exists necessarily and necessarily is omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good.

You will see that it uses the concept of necessary beings, which plainly shows that the arguments in question form a cumulative case, as I pointed out in comment no 1.

Now on your other point: I think it too suffers from an assumption that we cannot make. Namely that everything must have a cause. Why?

--> This too was discussed: EVERYTHING THAT HAS A BEGINNING HAS A CAUSE -- that is, contingent beings (those which might not exist as they have a beginning) have the dufficient reason for their existence external to themselves. You did not exist necessarily or forever, you have a beginning, and a cause. SO do I. (Notice how your statement distorts what has been said: cause is substituted for reason.)

--> The principle of sufficient reason, as discussed, is very different from CAUSE. It is the first plausible that the entities that exist are intelligible -- i.e. of something is, there is a sufficient reason for that: (a) those things that have a beginning are caused, (b) those that are necessary beings have their explanation within their inherent nature -- they cannot not be.

--> The key point here is, to reject PSR commits oneself, as already noted also, to the unintelligibility of the cosmos. Are you sure you want to go there?

--> In short, you have responded to a strawman of your own making.

--> As to the red herring that the cosmological argument does not tell us all we would wish to know about GOd, no responsible theist to my knowledge asserts that it does. That is part of why the question in view is a CUMULATIVE case, as was also already discussed.

--> Indeed, the ontological argument uses greatest being thinking to begin to fill in the bill as to what a GOd should look like: not only necessary, but having maximal greatness that is logically possible. Onward, I think the teleological argument in light of cosmological finetuning and the intricacies of life, mind and morals shows that we reflect the Creator enough to infer further plausible characteristics from empirical data, which are consistent with greatest being thinking.

--> In short, it is a fallacy to try to engage a cumulative case as if its components were unrelated. And, in particular, in a context where knockdown proofs are explicitly off the table, it is a red herring to raise that issue.

--> For, PLantinga, Joe and I are not discussing knockdown demonstrations -which are notoriously absent on just about all major phil questions], but rather inferences to best explanation in light of comparative difficulties:

--> SO, what is your live option alternative, and what are its difficulties relative to dactual adequacy, logical coherence and explanatory power? [Otherwise, we are open to the problem of selective hyperskepticism, as Plantinga notes in the excerpt Joe cites.]

Okay

GEM

Gordon,

"1. By definition a maximally great being is one that exists necessarily and necessarily is omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good."

You will see that [statement # 1] uses the concept of necessary beings, which plainly shows that the arguments in question form a cumulative case, as I pointed out in comment no 1.

Statement # 1 uses a hypothetical necessary being, not an actual necessary being.

The rest of Plantinga's ontological argument confuses the hypothetical being of the defintion with something that is truly a necessary being. He conflates a contingent statement about a necessary object ("a maximally great being exists") with a necessary statement about a contingent object ("If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in the actual world."), and loses himself in the logical muddle.

Fortunately, the argument is fairly concise, and it is easy to pick out the error.

Maybe Joe can find better arguments to fill out the rest of the cumulative case on behalf of God's existence, and you are right to point out that possibility.

But he hasn't gotten off to a great start, and accusing Boonton of attacking strawmen is not justified. Boonton's arguments have made a lot more sense than Joe's so far.

Gordon,

Thank you for taking the trouble to respond so thoroughly to my comments.

I would like to let you have the last word, but I feel you deserve a few clarifications about what I have been driving at in my criticisms of Dr. Platinga.

"Statement # 1 uses a hypothetical necessary being, not an actual necessary being."

--> Correction: All that is needed for the materiality of the link to the Cosmological argument is the undeniable evident fact that Statement 1 adverts to the CONCEPT of a necessary being, a concept that is best defined through the cosmological argument.

I wasn't attacking the materiality of the link to the cosmological argument (let's call that "the CA"). I was attacking the five-statement argument of Dr. Plantinga that Joe has presented in the current post (let's call that "Dr. Plantinga's ontological argument", or "DPOA").

I agree with you that if DPOA holds water, then it would be an important link in chain of the CA, or an important strand in the rope.

--> Thus, my point that the theistic arguments constitute a cumulative explanatory case is again underscored. And, through his apt citation of Plantinga, that is the point Joe made. In short, his post is considerably more apt and subtle than you have thought.

My problem with Joe's post is not that DPOA is not a cogent point in the CA. It's that DPOA doesn't make sense in the first place, and can't be used in any argument.

--> Again, the underlying issue is the PSR [the principle of sufficient reason], and the intelligibility of the cosmos: that which begins has a cause, and a sufficiently large cluster of such constituting a cosmos with a beginning -- i.e. the observable universe -- requires a cause sufficient to explain its origin.

The principle of sufficient reason does not demand that everything have a cause, it demands that everything have an explanation. And it certainly doesn't tell us anything about the nature of the cause of the universe, assuming such a cause exists in the first place.

--> That brings us to the issue that we must then choose between infinite regress [NB, relative to earlier threads: which is absurd in the real world as opposed to as a mathematical concept: those who propose to accept such have to handle Hilbert's Hotel Infinity, not me, on this! Absurd results follow in the real world from asserting an actual infinite, given the property that a proper subset of a countably infinite set can be set in strict one to one correspondence with the set, how we identify such a set. And, there is a countable number of years -- a countably finite step of time -- etc to 13.7 BYA, or any other time in the past.] and a necessary being, one that exists in and of itself.

I agree with you that we should not be too quick to assume that an actual infinite set exists in the physical world.

But whether or not the universe is finite is an empirical question, not a logical one.

The fact that theoretical infinite sets have the property of having a one-to-one correspondence with some of their subsets (in other words, they have the same size as some of their subsets) is not a logical conundrum, but a straightforward mathematical result. It has no bearing on whether the cosmos (or even a piece of cotton thread, for that matter) is infinite or finite.

--> Formerly, through the Steady State cosmology, it was asserted that the material universe constitutes that necessary being, but since the collapse of that theory [which never ever had a single piece of accepted empirical support and fell apart when the 2.7 K radiation was found] and the similar empirical challenges to infinite array cosmologies, multiplied by the multidimensional finetuning of the cosmos, we are looking at the relative plausibility of an extra-cosmic necessary being, i.e. a Creator.

You can argue that the universe needs an extra-cosmic necessary being. But whether the universe is in some kind of steady-state or not has no bearing on the relative plausibility of your hypothesis.

--> FIrst, is it reasonably plausible that a leading logical thinker who has solved an outstanding problem, the logical form of the problem of evil, would in a book that has been through a serious editorial process, commit a "logical muddle"? Or, is it more plausible that you made an error in assessing the bird's eye view summary of the case?

Let me introduce you to a distinguished professor of linguistics at MIT by the name of Noam Chomsky. He is an extremely prolific author who enjoys a cult-like following among many well-educated and influential people.

Unfortunately, he is a B.S. artist (pardon my French) of the first order, who prides himself on his logical prowess but publishes tracts with logical holes bigger than the planet Jupiter.

Of course, Dr. Plantinga is scrupulously honest, and is probably a much more intelligent thinker than Dr. Chomsky. But my point is only that I am attacking Dr. Plantinga's argument, I am not attacking his character, capabilities, or credentials.

So, to answer your question, of course it is possible that his book could have a few logical muddles in it. And whether it is plausible that DJOA is a logical muddle would seem to be contingent upon the necessity of my own argument's being maximally great in the universe of this comment thread :)

--> On substantial points:

a] The concept of a necessary being is adverted to, as noted, linking to the cosmological case that a cosmos constituting contingent beings requires a necessary being for their origin and sustenance.

You are making a big logical mistake here.

When you refer to the universe as being constituted by contingent beings, you are using the philosophical definition of contingent, "not subject to determinism, or free", or one of the common usage definitions of contingent, "dependent on something else". You are not using the logical definition of contingent that Joe and Dr. Plantinga are using, "true in some possible worlds and false in others".

Similarly, you are using a different definition of necessary as well. Instead of the logical definition of "true in all possible worlds", you are now using the causal-relationship definition of "characteristic of a prerequisite without which a being, event, or state of affairs cannot exist or happen." This is totally different from the concept of a necessary being as adverted to in DPOA.

[E.g. a fire requires fuel, oxidiser and heat to start and to sustain it. That is how fires are fought. That is, we are looking at sufficient and necessary causal factors. In the case of a fire, the three legs of the fire triangle are each necessary and jointly sufficient. A theistic Creator is obviously sufficient to explain the cosmos, but is such an entity a NECESSARY one? Thus, the issue of the material relevance of the concept of a necessary being as the best explanation for a world of contingent beings that is itself arguably contingent.]

Once again you are conflating different definitions of necessary and contingent.

In addition, it is incorrect to assume (or to describe as "obviously sufficient") that a theistic Creator explains the universe, either in a PSR sense of "explain" or in any other sense. The hypothesis of a theistic Creator merely begs the question of explanation and causality: what caused/created the Creator?

b] Further to this, note that we are explicitly not dealing with attempted proofs beyond rational dispute, but inferences to best explanation, so the mere fact that one can conceive of objections -- in the absence of an honest examination of comparative difficulties across live options -- has no merit. That is, this is a question of inference to best explanation: the underlying methodology of science, management, law, decision making and general real life praxis.

I am arguing the DPOA has no logical merit. Since it is a logical argument, that would foreclose any possibility of its use in any scheme of inference to best explanation.

c] In that context, the hypothesis that a necessary being sufficient to create a cosmos will be a maximally great being is a reasonable postulate.

I agree.

But a reasonable hypothesis may be true or false, and statements 2 through 5 of DPOA collapse under their own weight anyway.

d] In this light, the necessary existence of a maximally great being sufficient to originate the human and natural worlds as we experience them implies that once the existence is possible, it is inevitable that such a being exists in the actual world.

That is, the underlying logical issue is: is such a necessary being as put forward in the cosmological argument a logically impossible non-entity? Once that is not the case, then the possibility plausibly leads to the inevitability.

You are again conflating "'necessary' meaning 'true in all possible worlds'" with "'necessary' meaning 'prerequisite for a contingent (in the sense of "dependent"!) reality'".

e] Note as well how the arguments are working together: each is parallel and mutually supportive, why a rope is a better analogy than a chain -- notoriously no stronger than its weakest link. [BTW, when the Brooklyn Bridge was being built, fraud was discovered in the composition of some of the steel fibres in the cables. The designer concluded they were insufficient to fataly weaken the bridge, and the past 100+ years is sufficient proof of his wisdom.]

--> Thus, the point is that the case in view is a subtle one, as a rope is far more subtle than a chain.

Once again, I would wholeheartedly agree with you about the strength that DPOA imparts to the CA if only DPOA had any merit. But as a logical argument with logical errors, it has none. Sorry.

But I'm sure Joe will give us much better arguments to chew over in the future installments of Dismantling Implausibility Structures.

Thanks again for your exhaustive counter-arguments and your commitment to hammering out the nuances of various points in our discussion. I hope my response has made my position clearer.

Gordon,

I see several interesting comments; at last we may be getting down to comparative difficulties in this thread.

Yes, we do seem to be making some progress.

"DPOA [Dr. Plantinga's ontological argument] doesn't make sense in the first place, and can't be used in any argument."
I think we disagree here.

I agree.

... the issue is not proof beyond rational dispute.

For you, DPOA is a plausible argument. Yet DJOA is a chain of tight logic. If any piece of the chain is faulty, then the chain itself has been broken, and the argument by its own terms as a logical argument is rendered null and void.

For example, take the following argument:

1) You know what you are talking about.
2) People who disagree with you don't know what they are talking about.
3) I disagree with you.
4) Therefore, I don't know what I am talking about.

The argument has three premises and one logical deduction. If any of the premises is faulty, or if the logical deduction is fallacious in some manner, then the argument is invalid. If the argument is invalid, then it is purely useless as a logical argument and cannot be used as a premise or a motivating context for any other argument or proposition.

However, if the argument is not meant to be a logical argument, but only serves as an outline or summary of your (or someone else's) position, then it can serve as evidence whereever you like. But since its truth/falsity has not been logically established, you cannot expect that anyone (especially myself) is going to necessarily agree with it.

... one may reject PSR [principle of sufficient reason], but that implies the ultimate unintelligibility of the cosmos...

I don't understand everything in the cosmos, and neither do you, or anyone else. So it is possible that the cosmos is unintelligible.

If it is possible that the cosmos is unintelligible, then there exists a cosmos that is unintelligible.

Yet if a cosmos exists that is unintelligible, then the actual cosmos is unintelligible. So if the actual cosmos is unintelligible, then the cosmos is unintelligible.

(You know, if Kant had known Dr. Plantinga, he could have saved himself a lot of trouble!)

Do you agree with this argument about the intelligibility of the cosmos?

I think that you probably don't. If that is the case, can you explain to me why the argument would not be true?

Thanks again for your responses. I do think we are making good progress on the comparative difficulties, and perhaps one of us may actually end up convincing the other!

Cheers, Matthew.

Hi Matthew

Good to see a significant interaction developing. I have a few quick coments on your last two posts, taking the last first for convenience:

1] You are quite right that the hotel is absurd. But the explanation is merely that hotels with infinite rooms and infinite guests do not exist. The set of integers, [Z]is a well-defined mathematical object which can be said to "exist" in a theoretical sense.

--> You have unfortunately restated the problem as if it were the solution. My point is, as David Hilbert's was, that there is a difference between a mathematical concept and a physically feasible entity.

--> The point of Hotel Infinity is precisely that it is a thought experiment that reveals that a countably infinite set is a physical absurdity. Indeed, subtraction is banned in the theory of transinite numbers, but guests can leave a hotel enytime they want. Similarly, a full hotel does not become half empty by moving guests around. But these would be the consequences if such a hotel were to be possible. That is, Hotel Infinity is an impossible world.

--> In short, while transfinite numbers are conceivable, in praxis, they are not physically realisable on pain of absurdity. THus, the link between world dynamics and possible worlds is shown to be useful.

2] For you, DPOA is a plausible argument. Yet DJOA is a chain of tight logic. If any piece of the chain is faulty, then the chain itself has been broken, and the argument by its own terms as a logical argument is rendered null and void.

--> True enough as it stands. However, what is happening is that we are exeetrting two interpretations of a skeletal summary of a major argument.

--> In such a context, the issue is which interpretation is fairer. It seems to me, that if an interpretation exists that would show the argument as not contradictory, that should prevail in absence of direct evidence that it is an inaccurate interpretation to the reasonably discernible original intent of the author.

--> I believe I have provided just such an interpretation above, by noting that possible worlds talk and dynamics of existence talk are duals to each other.

--> This duality, I routinely have used in electronics systems design and in management, especially in scenario analysis for sustainable development planning. [Cf. http://www.angelfire.com/pro/kairosfocus/resources/SD_concept.htm ] Specifically, one exploits the power of the implication argument that a currently false antecedent can have true implications, then projects alternatives based on the relevant dynamics/plausible models, then one selects which of the alternative possible worlds is best to actualise.

--> Kindly, therefore, addres the summary I made above:

* 2 simply claims that the MGB is not an incoherent concept.

* 3 does the dual from dynamics of being talk to existence in possible worlds talk.

* 4 applies the definition that MGB is a NECESSARY being (which surely is greater than a contingent one!), so if possible then actual: if a necessary being is possible, then such a being exists in uhe actual world [which is manifestly a possible world] which is full of contingent beings that cry out for a NB to explain their existence. [NB link to CA and to TA, and onward to morality and mind as well.]

* 5 is the dire[c]t implication of 4

--> To that, I now add that 1 states a commonly acceptes understanding of what a maximally great being, i.e. God, would be like:

1. By definition a maximally great being is one that exists necessarily and necessarily is omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good.

--> Here, I reiterate the points: (a) we live in a world of highly complex contingent beings, so that once an infinite regress of causes is seen as absurd [nb 1 above], can only be explained as ultimately caused originally and sustained now by a necessary being, (b) necessary existence is plainly greater than contingent existence -- all the difference between creature and Creator.

--> In short, I am NOT asserting that this is a knockdown proof, only that it is coherent on a plausible interpretation and fits into a convergent cumulative case when coupled with the CA and the TA

3] I don't understand everything in the cosmos, and neither do you, or anyone else. So it is possible that the cosmos is unintelligible. If it is possible that the cosmos is unintelligible, then there exists a cosmos that is unintelligible.
Yet if a cosmos exists that is unintelligible, then the actual cosmos is unintelligible. So if the actual cosmos is unintelligible, then the cosmos is unintelligible.

--> First, you unintentionally beg the underlying question: I don't understand everything in the cosmos, and neither do you, or anyone else. This assumes, implicitly, that omniscience is impossibly, i.e. that a MGB, aka God, is impossible or known not to exist.

--> Second, the issue of the PSR assumes that there is the possibility that the cosmos is unintelligible: it is a forced, momentous choice across live options.

--> THE ISSUE HERE, IS THAT THOSE WHO REJECT PSR IN PRINCIPLE DO NOT LIVE THAT WAY. (Cf Kai Neilsen's little bang, BIG bang comment: in effect, why do we want explanations of little bangs, but wish to reject those for BIG ones? BTW, he is not a theist.) Thus, we are looking at selective hyperskepticism and self-referential absurdity: if the cosmos is unintelligible, then logically constrained dialogue is pointless.

--> Nor, does it directly follow from the premise that an unintelligible cosmos is a logical possibility, that the actual cosmos is unintelligible. FOR, UNLIKE THE MGB, THE COSMOS IS NOT BY DEFINITION OR BY CA + TA A NECESSARY, INTELLIGENT BEING.

--> Indeed, the evidence we have, indicates strongly that the cosmos originated a finite time ago, is exquisitely and intelligently finetuned and is currently running down to eventual heat death, absent extra-cosmic intervention. (My old Sears and Salinger has an interesting quip on the intersection of thermodynamics's energy conservation and entropy concepts and philosophy at this point! It is: "once entropy has been created, it can never| be destroyed. The Universe must forever bear this additional burden of entropy (a statement that implies the assumption, which may be questionable, that the Universe constitutes an isolated, closed system) [3rd edn, pp. 136-7].")

--> In short, the existence of ever increasing entropy in what on naturalistic assumptions would be an isolated system, leads to the strong inference that the universe is both not infinitely old and that it is contingent rather than necessary. That is why the lack of empirical evidence for, and eventual collapse of, the SS cosmology is highly significant in an inference to best explanation context.

--> In short, your parody fails.

--> Similarly, I think Plantinga is probably far more familiar with Kant than either of us.

4] Thanks again for your responses. I do think we are making good progress on the comparative difficulties, and perhaps one of us may actually end up convincing the other!

I agree. Maybe this dialogue may help clear up several problems in this blog -- I have no hope that civility and sensible discourse can be restored across Western Culture.

Grace

Gordon

--> Kindly explain the paradoxes of Hilbert's Hotel Infinity, then. (FOr instance, it is full, but an infinite number of new guests shows up. No problem, just move guests in 1,2,3, . . . over to 2, 4, 6, . . . and infinitely many rooms are now PHYSICALLY available. Yet, once the new guests check in, there are no more guests in the hotel than before: the cardinality is still ALeph Null. SImilarly, if guests in 2,4,6 . . . check out in disgust, A-N guests, the number remaining is still A-N. Worse, if the same number of guests, in rooms 6, 7, 8, . . . check out, only five guests remain.)

--> have no problem with very large numbers, but the commitment to infinities is in a different qualitative sphere. Infinite sets have to be handled as mathematical entities, not physical ones.

These 'paradoxes' are indeed strange but that alone hardly serves as proof that infinities exist only in the mathematical imagination. We had this debate before when we discussed whether or not it is possible that the universe is infinite (that's different, BTW, than the visible universe which is finite). It is possible to imagine variations on 'Hotel Infinity' if you are willing to presume an infinite universe. An example I believe Gordon used was to take half the universe and match a star in half with another star from the entire universe. You would find that the set of half the universe contained enough stars to match up with the entire universe of stars....just like the set of even numbers can be paired up with the set of all integers {2-1, 4-2, 6-3,....}

This certainly feels strange but so does the fact that if I took a string exactly 1 unit long and made a circle out of it I couldn't describe its circumfrance without resorting to a number like pi. That mathematics may produce unexpected results when applied to physical theories does not mean such things don't exist. Some early Greeks made fools of themselves thinking that irrational numbers (like the sqr root of 2) couldn't exist for religious reasons.

Oh yes, Matthew

I forgot to note: unfortunately, sometimes the level of commentary in threads, especially from some of Joe's more acerbic critics, has slipped into the gutter. My hope is that this will not happen again.

GEM

Gordon,

"When you refer to the universe as being constituted by contingent beings, you are using the philosophical definition of contingent, 'not subject to determinism, or free', or one of the common usage definitions of contingent, 'dependent on something else'. You are not using the logical definition of contingent that Joe and Dr. Plantinga are using, 'true in some possible worlds and false in others'."

--> My observation is, that possible worlds talk is dual to logical coherence in this instance. Once PSR is applied, this can be seen.

--> That is, one form can be transformed into the other: why would an entity exist in some but not all all possible worlds -- not all plausible to X worlds? Ans: because it is conceivable as an idea and is not incoherent in logic, but is contingent on other prior things.

E.g. unicorns, horses with horns, are possible, but contingent. It so happens that to date, they do not exist on our planet: genetic engineering may yet fix that deficit, and so would become the causal SR for their actualisation in this possible and indeed actual world.

--> Such contingent beings, in short, would exist in some possible worlds, and not exist in other possible worlds, i.e. coherent models of a cosmos.

--> Necessary beings exist in all possible worlds precisely because their existence is not contingent on other entities, i.e. they cannot not exist in any logically coherent world-model.

O.K. Let's assume that all our definitions for necessary/contingent are logically dual.

First conclusion: DPOA (Dr. Plantinga's ontological argument) is rescued from any and all logical fallacies -- congratulations! However, this is what it now states: Assume a maximally great being exists and is necessary; it follows that a maximally great being exists and is necessary.

Second conclusion: the cosmos is unintelligible.

Where does the second conclusion come from? From here:

... it is possible that the cosmos is unintelligible.

If it is possible that the cosmos is unintelligible, then there exists a cosmos that is unintelligible.

Yet if a cosmos exists that is unintelligible, then the actual cosmos is unintelligible. So if the actual cosmos is unintelligible, then the cosmos is unintelligible.

Now, you have already stated an objection to this argument:

--> Nor, does it directly follow from the premise that an unintelligible cosmos is a logical possibility, that the actual cosmos is unintelligible. FOR, UNLIKE THE MGB [maximally great being], THE COSMOS IS NOT BY DEFINITION OR BY CA + TA A NECESSARY, INTELLIGENT BEING.

Unfortunately, one cannot deny that the cosmos is necessary. And I never said the cosmos is intelligent or non-intelligent. I would assume it is not intelligent. Whether it is intelligent or not has nothing to do with either the premise or the logic. In short, I do not understand your objection at all.

You referred to my unintelligible cosmos argument (let's call that "MUCA") as a parody, and indeed it is. But it is, and is intended to be, a totally serious argument. It uses the same logic as DJOA, and reaches a similar conclusion. One cannot gainsay MUCA without repudiating DJOA as well.

About Hilbert's Hotel Infinity:

Here's an example of an infinite set in the real physical world that may in fact be possible.

Take a one-hour time interval. Divide it in half and call the resulting 30-minute point T-1. Divide the second 30-minute interval in half and call the resulting 45-minute point T-2. Divide the last 15-minute interval in half and take the resulting 52-minute-and-30-