Let me clarify that this argument is not intended to be used as a proof of God’s existence. The sole intention is to put in quantifiable terms the probabilities that we should form a belief about such a Being’s existence. In other words, this is not an ontological proof but a means of justifying a particular epistemic stance toward the idea of the existence or non-existence of a deity.
The argument is that starting from an epistemically neutral point (50%|50%), we can factor in specific evidence for the existence or non-existence of a deity. After evaluating each line of evidence, we can determine if it is more or less likely that it would entail the existence of God.
The numbers we assign are not completely objective (since we don’t have an objective standard to compare them to) but neither are they assigned arbitrarily. For example, the claim that a specific piece of evidence is two times (.2) more likely to be true if God exists does not mean that it is the only possible explanation. It is simply stating that from a neutral and objective viewpoint, it would be more likely to have occurred if a God exists then if he doesn’t.
The lines of evidence that Unwin presents are, of course, not the only ones that we could use. If better evidence should be considered we could take that into account also. We could keep plugging in numbers to this formula for every criterion that we deem important. My contention, and the reason for the post, is that the more evidence we consider the more the probability of God’s existence increases above the 50% point. If my point is correct it would mean that it is more rational to believe in the existence of God (in the purely theistic sense) than to disbelieve it.
The third part of this series attempts to explain why, if atheism is not a matter of practical reason, that some people reject theism.
When this post originally appearred last summer, a number of points required clarification:
”If good exists, there is necessarily the possibility of evil as the absence of good.”; “Neither good nor evil could be defined if the other did not exist.”
The existence of evil has very little to do with the argument at hand. As philosopher Alvin Plantinga shows, the existence of evil is as possible in a world where God exists as in one where he does not. Some people might still claim that the appearance of evil tilts the scales in favor of the non-existence of God. To make that claim, however, they must first refute Plantinga’s argument.
Also, your choice of criteria is totally arbitrary. What about D(pretty flowers) = 145 or D(this beer is stale) = 0.2. I love your blog, but you should print a retraction for this post.
My ratings are subjective but not arbitrary. D(pretty flowers) would imply the existence of an aesthetic sense and might raise the number above neutral. D(stale beer), on the other hand, would be neutral in regards to God’s existence. We could have taste buds and stale beer in a world without a deity.
This "formula" is the silliest thing I'veseen since Pascal's wager, which has already been so thoroughly debunked that I won't bother unless someone requests that I do so. – Rob Ryan
Anyone who thinks that Pascal’s wager can be “debunked” obviously doesn’t understand Pascal’s argument.
I dunno. No matter how much evidence is provided, it seems to me that you still decide whether or not you want to believe the evidence. Didn't Nieztche state something along the lines of "Now it is our preference that decides against Christianity, and not arguments"? – Erunion
Exactly! That is the point of part three in this series.
One problem that I see with this approach is that if I start from a 50-50 prior probability, I should state which god am I talking about. If I'm going to be totally "neutral" with respect to the triune God of the Bible, I should also be "neutral" with respect Allah, Zeus, Loki, Baal, and every other god I can think of. I would have to calculate the probabilities for all these gods. What do I do with those probabilities? Do I just pick the one that gives me the highest posterior probability?
The short answer: yes.
Or should I just use this as an argument for some general "God" with no real attributes - maybe just a "First Cause" or a "Prime Mover" or something like that? Even if that approach were combined with other apologetic tools that argue specifically for the triune God of the Scriptures, I believe it still falls short, due to what Baus mentions about "all 'factual' knowledge is necessarily interpreted."
I agree. Again, that is the primary purpose of this series. More on that later.
You realize, of course, that this entire argument is based on a false dilemma, right? Either God (i.e. the Christian God) exists, or He does not, according to your argument.
That’s not what my argument says at all. I’m saying that based on the evidence I have at hand, I have more reason to form a belief that the Christian God exists than I do to form a belief that he doesn’t.
It completely rules out any non-Christian God possibility, as well as various polytheist possibilities. But even granting your either-or assumption, the logic is flawed anyway, insofar as it arbitrarily assigns numerical values to very subjective things. You can't just do that where it suits you. – Tgirsch>
Again, I should point out that this is not an ontological proof. And subjective is not the same as arbitrary.
It should be noted that the 50% prior probability is completely without base. No one would assign a 50% probability to an entity without some reason to do so, and since the reasons Urwin gives add their own probability, I'm not sure what he used to justify 50%. – Hunt
How would you have a “reason to do so” before you weighed the evidence? Urwin uses 50%|50% because it is a mathematically neutral starting point.
Maybe "debunked" wasn't the best word. How about "shown to be the piece of crap it is"? The writer of the following link is just one of thousands of freethinkers over the ages who has pointed out some of the logical shortcomings of Pascal's Wager. As I said last year, it is a tired old war-horse that should have been consigned to the knacker long ago. Don't despair, though; you still have "I don't have enough faith to be an atheist" and "Atheists know in their hearts they're wrong, they just want to do whatever they wish".
http://www.mukto-mona.com/Articles/avijit/pascal_wager.htm
You must feel terribly threatened by atheistic worldviews to spend so much time attacking them.
"You must feel terribly threatened by atheistic worldviews to spend so much time attacking them."
I love irony.
I love irony too, Rocketman. I also think it's important to examine its essence rather than just smiling and nodding (or shaking) one's head at it. Can you think of any reasons why an atheist in America might feel threatened by Christianity? I can; that's why I appear here occasionally to challenge Christian assumptions. I admit I feel threatened by Christianity and religion in general. The irony was neither intentional nor unnoticed; it simply is.
Rob,
Of course irony doesn't have to be intentional. In fact, I think its more entertaining when its unintentional. And no, my comment wasn't meant as a casual dismissal of your assertion (or to be condescending). I apologize if it came off that way. Being in a minority & feeling threatened is perfectly understandable. Not meant as an attack, just a brief observation (brevity being the soul of wit). Kinda funny too, given the circumstances.
Rob, I think part of the problem is that Pascal's wager has several facets. Wouldn't you agree? One facet is pretty vulnerable (as your link, and many others, clearly show). But other facets are sturdier:
- the point the agnostic's 'maybe' eventually becomes a 'no' in terms of Christianity
- the point that even if the atheist turns out to be correct, the believer arguably still wins (i.e. having found joy, meaning, comfort,...).
I also think it's interesting that so many people cut down the argument as a false dichotomy (i.e. by positing various Gods who punish various things), but then proceed to choose agnosticism, one of the sides of the original dichotomy.
It's like showing someone that it's much better to go to college than to stay home, which they refute as a false dichotomy (e.g. "it's even better to tour Europe"), and then they decide to stay home.
Yes, MAS, a wise man once said,"Not to decide is to decide."
I suppose we could view agnosticism as a default position for the unconvinced.
Certainly, in terms of Christianity, maybe = no, as you say.
Rocketman: No offense taken, no apology necessary. I just wanted to clarify so as to avoid the ol' "pot calling the kettle black" accusation. I know I'm black!
Nice blog. How are you?
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