1

I'm not a materialist, but I think there's a serious flaw in your "second conclusion" to reductionism. You write, "Since doxastic states are produced by matter, matter can produce doxastic states in anything (or everything). If this is true it leads to a peculiar result. Mountains can have 'beliefs', car engines can feel 'pain', and rivers can have 'memories.'"

I don't see how this follows at all; it's a failure to recognize distinctions in different types of matter. You could equally write, "Since fission reactions are produced by matter, matter can produce fission reactions in anything (or everything)," and then assert that one's chair or desk could spontaneously erupt into a mushroom cloud at any moment. Fission reactions only occur in certain types of matter, under certain types of (highly unlikely) conditions. So a materialist could argue that, no, a mountain can't have 'beliefs,' because unlike a brain, it is not composed of the type of matter that produces that sort of property.

2

Dead right, Keith. That's the knock-down objection.

What say you, Joe?

3

So a materialist could argue that, no, a mountain can't have 'beliefs,' because unlike a brain, it is not composed of the type of matter that produces that sort of property.

The difference between a mountain and a brain is not composition, but arrangement. Both are made up of the same subatomic particles, albeit arranged in significantly different ways. So if doxastic states are produced by matter, it should be possible for any matter to produce them.

4

If the arrangement of matter isn't important then you'd have no objection to me cracking your head open with an axe and pounding your brain out into a flat pancake on the street, right? It's just a different arrangement of the same old matter right?

5

"Most atheists and other advocates of philosophical naturalism also believe in materialism, the idea that everything that actually exists is material or physical."

Once Joe sets up this big fat strawman, he can coast all the way to his intended conclusion: Atheism is not logical.

But the supposition is wrong. The idea is that everything that actually exists is provable, demonstrable, explainable, or replicable. We just stop short of imagining that there's an invisible superbeing with magic powers. 'Cause it don't seem very likely.

6

I am far from being a philosopher so please bear with a bit of foolishness (if that is what it is) on my part.

My only comment is this: I don't see how a discussion, debate, argument, or nuclear holocaust regarding naturalism can provide affirming or negating proof about supranaturalism (which is what I suspect is motivating both sides of this intellectual exercise). Those who hold to supranaturalism can only reach a "diagnosis of exclusion" by demonstrating the faults of naturalism or non-reductive materialism; those who do not hold to supranaturalism can only "disprove" it by ruling it out a priori (is that the correct term?).

Christians, it seems to me, affirm that some things can only be known by faith; naturalists that everything that can be known (but certainly not everything that exists! - think of the hubris involved) can only be known through empiricism (if that is the correct term).

Perhaps that is why, to my untrained and unsophisticated eye, so many of these conversations appear to be between two antagonists, one speaking French and one speaking Cantonese, and neither understanding a word the other is saying.

7

Far from a knockdown argument KS sidesteps the force of the argument completely. If enough subatomic particles are arranged in certain configurations they will, by process of fission, degrade to smaller, more stable states. This is not a highly unlikely occurance. It happens all the time.

However, for a materialist assert that doxastic states are inherent properties of matter strains credulity. Of course, credulity is just an illusion anyway...

8

Boonton: "If the arrangement of matter isn't important then you'd have no objection to me cracking your head open with an axe and pounding your brain out into a flat pancake on the street, right? It's just a different arrangement of the same old matter right?"

Sometimes you write some very thoughtful, thought provoking things. But then you retreat to silliness like this, and all pretense of seriousness vanishes. You seem to have a need to post even when you have nothing to say.

9

Keith I don't see how this follows at all; it's a failure to recognize distinctions in different types of matter. You could equally write, "Since fission reactions are produced by matter, matter can produce fission reactions in anything (or everything)," and then assert that one's chair or desk could spontaneously erupt into a mushroom cloud at any moment.

Fission is simply the splitting of a nucleus. You could split the atoms one’s chair and release energy, though maybe not enough to create a mushroom cloud. But the same ‘properties’ (i.e., energy release) exist. The difference is in degree, not kind.

For your comparison to be valid we could say that the doxastic states in mountains differ in degree from humans.

(Note: I'm not saying my argument is not flawed; I just don't think it suffers from that particular flaw.)

Franklin That's the knock-down objection. What say you, Joe?

I say ya’ll will have to do better than that. ; )

Seriously, you have to explain how new properties that exist nowhere else in the universe come about out of this matter. (And you can’t really rely on the arrangement argument since the dead brain and the live brain are basically the same arrangement (at least for awhile after death).

10

I suspect that a materialist would claim that if you could rearrange the sub-atomic particles in a mountain and generate something identical to a brain, then it would be capable of thought. However, that is not the same as saying that mountains, as they exist now, as capable of thought. A materialist doesn't even have to claim that the difference in the thought capabilities of brains and mountains is one of degree rather than kind. It's perfectly reasonable to claim that in the absence of a particular arrangement of matter, thought is completely absent.

Therefore, Keith's objection seems to hold water.

Premise 8 should read something like:

8. Doxatics states are physical states and physical states are composed of particular arrangements of matter. Therefore, doxastic states are composed of (or at least properties of) particular arrangements of matter.

Then we might add another premise:

9. Not all matter has the same arrangement.

and conclude:

10. Therefore not all matter has (or can have) doxatic states.

11

Joe,

How 'bout this then. The inference seems to take this form: states of type S are produced by matter, and so matter of any type or arrangement can produce states of type S.

To undermine the inference, we need an S for which this claim comes out false. Water, it seems, is a state of matter; it is hydrogen and oxygen combined in a certain way. Thus it seems that, if the above claim is true, we could make water out of just any type of matter at all. But we can't.

Here's a second counter-example, one of a different sort. Some types of matter - Uranium isotypes of a certain sort, for example - are in a state of atomic decay. Thus if your above claim is true, it must be that just any type of matter at all can exemplify atomic decay. But of course this is not true. Some types of matter are quite stable.

Last point: some materialists (David Lewis was one example - I heard him once say it in response to Robert Adams) hold that mental states are just matter, with its same-old properties, arranged in quite peculiar ways, working as it must given those same-old properties and their peculiar arrangement. Thus pain is no more a metaphysical novelity and so no more a metaphysical puzzle than, say, a bicycle. Bikes do quite extraordinary things - things no matter could do before the invetion of bikes. But there is no real metaphysical novelty here - it's just matter with its same old complement of properties doin' what it must do given its novel arrangement. The point: in a bike (and a brain), there's no new novel properties of matter; on the contrary, there' just a novel arrangment and the quite predictable (in principle) workings of matter given that arrangement.

Oh, and a dead brain is most certainly not in the same state as the live brain. Blood flow has stopped, electrical activity has ceased, etc. It has the same gross state (at least to one such as me who knows little about how brains should looke), but if you could look a bit more closely one would find obvious differences. Surely you don't think that a dead brain is arranged at every level of detail in precisely the same way as it was when alive? Oh what a mystery-monger you would be if you said that!

12

(And you can’t really rely on the arrangement argument since the dead brain and the live brain are basically the same arrangement (at least for awhile after death).

"Basically" doesn't cut it. To defeat the "arrangement" argument, you would have to demonstrate that a live brain and a dead brain can be identical physically yet have different doxatic states. That would be difficult, since death is usually determined medically by tests that analyze specific changes in the brain. Physicians don't test for absence of mind, they test for failure of particular brain functions. We don't actually know that there is ever a situation where a live brain and a dead brain don't differ in some way.

13

Cheesehead,

Sometimes you write some very thoughtful, thought provoking things. But then you retreat to silliness like this, and all pretense of seriousness vanishes. You seem to have a need to post even when you have nothing to say.

Oh how ad hominem and question-begging doth flow at the outpost. Boonton offers a clever little argument that takes the form of a counter-example to a claim offered, and all he gets in return is an argument-free and so question-begging dismissal of that claim conjoined to a personal attack.

14

Franklin: You may wish to review the actual meaning of the term "ad hominem" before so carelessly flinging it about.

15

Frank

Water, it seems, is a state of matter; it is hydrogen and oxygen combined in a certain way. Thus it seems that, if the above claim is true, we could make water out of just any type of matter at all. But we can't.

Why can't we? All water is is a certain arrangement of the same sub-atomic particles that all matter is made of.

Some types of matter - Uranium isotypes of a certain sort, for example - are in a state of atomic decay. Thus if your above claim is true, it must be that just any type of matter at all can exemplify atomic decay. But of course this is not true. Some types of matter are quite stable

It is not the matter that is stable, it is the arrangement of the particles that make the particular molecule that is stable.

Last point: some materialists (David Lewis was one example - I heard him once say it in response to Robert Adams) hold that mental states are just matter, with its same-old properties, arranged in quite peculiar ways,

If that's true, then a mental state (a thought, if you will) should share the same properties as other matter, i.e. mass, volume, temperature, etc.

Boon:

If the arrangement of matter isn't important then you'd have no objection to me cracking your head open with an axe and pounding your brain out into a flat pancake on the street, right?

Who said the arrangement isn't important?

16

Is dualism any less susceptible to the charge that all entities could potentially possess "minds?" Some dualists, after all, are animists.

17

Nick I suspect that a materialist would claim that if you could rearrange the sub-atomic particles in a mountain and generate something identical to a brain, then it would be capable of thought.

You bring up a valid point that does require clarification. I don’t mean to imply (though I was unclear on this point) that arrangement is irrelevant to doxastic states. But at best it can only be a necessary, though not sufficient condition. Arrangements of matter can only lead to the restructuring of properties that are already inherent. The materialists, however, is claiming that the arrangement creates the property through some indeterminate magical process that is absent everywhere else in nature.

My counter-argument is simply that if doxastic states can be produced by the arrangement of matter then it is question-begging to assume that our brains are the only types of arrangements that can create/release these properties.

8. Doxatics states are physical states and physical states are composed of particular arrangements of matter. Therefore, doxastic states are composed of (or at least properties of) particular arrangements of matter….10. Therefore not all matter has (or can have) doxatic states.

That’s reasonable enough. But to be valid you have to explain how some arrangements of matter have those properties while others do not. You are claiming that the properties are not inherent in matter (which has a real existence) but in an arrangement (which is merely a theoretical construct).

Franklin The inference seems to take this form: states of type S are produced by matter, and so matter of any type or arrangement can produce states of type S.

As I point out above, that is not the point I wanted to argue. But even so, it would be a misunderstanding of my garbled meaning. I would write that as:

States of type S are produced by matter, and so matter of any type or arrangement has the potentiality to produce states that exhibit the same type of properties as type S.

The point: in a bike (and a brain), there's no new novel properties of matter; on the contrary, there' just a novel arrangment and the quite predictable (in principle) workings of matter given that arrangement.

While clever, this argument isn’t really serious. It confuses properties for arrangements. The “novel” properties in a bike are not different than the properties in a tricycle, an automobile, or a cat. What is “novel” is not the properties but the arrangement.

Surely you don't think that a dead brain is arranged at every level of detail in precisely the same way as it was when alive?

No, of course, I don’t. But I’m not a physicalist. I don’t have to explain the differences by resorting to explanations that rely solely on properties of matter. The problem is that while you can explain what is different you have no explanation for why such differences in arrangements should have such radical effects.

18

Fen,

Why can't we [make water from just any type of matter at all]? All water is is a certain arrangement of the same sub-atomic particles that all matter is made of.

Well, you can't make it from a single electron. Indeed you can't make it from any number of electrons, no matter how great, for electrons are basic particles. One must have the other components of hydrogen and oxygen.

It is not the matter that is stable, it is the arrangement of the particles that make the particular molecule that is stable.

At bottom, that's my point. You get certain types of behavior only when there's a certain sort of arrangement of a certain sort of matter. Materialists will say this is true of mind as well. Change the arrangement or the type of matter arranged, and there will be no mind left.

If that's true [i.e. if it's true that mind iss just matter arranged a certain way], then a mental state (a thought, if you will) should share the same properties as other matter, i.e. mass, volume, temperature, etc.

Don't expect materialists to blanch at this conclusion. The pain in my left shoulder hurts, and it weighs precisely 1 oz. Now of course its weight is not something that can be revealed by introspection. But it is, as it were, the objective side of the pain, which, like all things, is material through and through. (Don't get me wrong here. I don't defend this view. I just mean to give it its proper expression - something that I'm not sure has been done.)

19

Joe,

The materialists, however, is claiming that the arrangement creates the property through some indeterminate magical process that is absent everywhere else in nature.

That's just mischaracterization; and it seems to render your argument an example of straw-man.

Some materialists claim that the mental property is identical to (to a first approximation)the material arrangement. Some don't. There are those who believe that mental properties are genuinely novel and come to be just when matter is arranged in a certain way. But they don't exhaust the field.

The first generation of those to defend a materialist account of mind - Aussies like Armstrong come to mind - would say such things as this - pain is identical to the firing of C-fibers. It's not that the pain is produced in some way by the firing. It is the firing.

20

"But I’m not a physicalist. I don’t have to explain the differences by resorting to explanations that rely solely on properties of matter."

God forbid Joe should have to resort to physical explanations for anything. But note that he does not explain any differences here. He simply implies that he can. This is religious-speak code for "spirit," or some magical property that believers jointly invest with meaning that is not demonstrable.

That's less than a bad explanation - it's no explanation at all.

21

Indeed you can't make it from any number of electrons, no matter how great, for electrons are basic particles.

Someone better versed in high energy nuclear physics would have to confirm or deny this. This goes beyond my level of comprehension.

One must have the other components of hydrogen and oxygen.

No, all you need is a sufficient quantity of fermions (elementary particles that make all matter).

You get certain types of behavior only when there's a certain sort of arrangement of a certain sort of matter.

I think the point is that we have no way of knowing if it is a unique arrangement that allows for the production of these doxastic states. Many different compounds share common properties, so it cannot be ruled out that certain arrangements of inorganic matter might not allow the creation of doxastic states.

22

Good morning my philosophical friends,

I'm still working to put together my synthesis of the discussion on free will from last Thursday. When it's ready, I'll post it on that comment thread.

This comment thread, however, deals with pretty much the same issues of mind and consciousness, so I'll let this thread know when I've posted on free will.

In the meantime, two points.

First, I prefer nice, accessible words to flashy jargon whenever possible, so I would have used the term "mental states" instead of "doxastic states". Is there some nuance attached to "doxastic" that makes it a better choice?

Second, there is a problem with Joe's syllogistic chain reasoning.

Joe writes:

Earlier I stated that we should reject any presupposition that leads us to a belief that is logically impossible. If that is the case then we have sufficient reason to reject naturalism or to reject logic; we can't keep both. For materialism states that:

1. Anything that exists is made of matter.
2. All matter is one; everything that exists is one.
3. Doxastic states are composed of matter and can exist.
4. Beliefs are doxastic states.
5. A belief can be true.
6. A belief can be false.
7. Since matter is one and beliefs are made of matter, all beliefs are one.
8. All beliefs are both true and false.

Therefore, the presupposition that matter is all that exists is both true and false at the same time. But since that leads to a logical contradiction we must give it up (or give up on logic).

I'm not sure what precisely Joe means when he states that "all beliefs are one". I think the reason I'm not sure about it is because Joe himself is very likely not sure himself.

He seems to be saying that since all matter can potentially produce mental states (which is true), all beliefs, being a type of mental state, are capable of being produced by any particular piece of matter (true again, with the proviso that the matter must be integrated into a living being with some kind of brain).

But Joe then conflates "belief" as a mental state with "belief" as the content of what someone with a belief actually thinks. That is like conflating the meaning of this sentence with the pattern of pixels on your screen, or with the binary bits (the string of "0"'s and "1"'s) which encode the text in your computer. The meaning of a sentence is not part of the physical expression of the sentence. Likewise, the content of a belief is not part of the physical representation of the belief in one's brain.

The last step of the syllogism, "All beliefs are true and false", fails to follow, because the content of the belief is not the same as the act of believing in a person's mind or brain. If it is not same thing, it can't be used in the syllogism.

It would be true to conclude, however, that all beliefs that a person believes are physically real. All beliefs truly exist, even if the actual content of the belief is false. But of course this conclusion does not support Joe's corollary that materialists are illogical and deluded.

In other words, a materialist would not say that it is true that materialists are illogical just because Joe believes it. A materialist would instead say that it is true only that Joe's belief exists.

What were you saying about this post being a rough draft, Joe? ;)

23

Matthew: If I understand you correctly, you would agree with the statement that beliefs are an inherent property of matter. You have added the not unimportant proviso that the matter which holds the beliefs be incorporated into a living being, but I think that could be shown on a materialist basis to be a distinction without a difference. After all the only thing that makes a living being is matter arranged into a sequence such that it replicates itself, whether on the level of proteins or macroscopic organisms.

(As an aside from the last thread, I think that undercuts your ordering principle of organization being the "struggle for survival." Unless "struggle for survival" is an inherent property of matter it is meaningless as an explanation of how matter organizes itself and develops self-replicating patterns of what we refer to as proteins.) Cheers.

24

Many different compounds share common properties, so it cannot be ruled out that certain arrangements of inorganic matter might not allow the creation of doxastic states.

Sure, and I suspect that many materialists would believe that AI is theoretically possible (i.e. doxastic states produced by a particular arrangement of silicon compounds rather than a particular arrangement of carbon compounds). But, that's pretty far afield from Joe's original claim that if one arrangement of matter generates doxastic states, then we must assume that any arrangement of matter can generate mental states. On the contrary, it appears that very few arrangements of matter are compatible with doxastic state, so a materialist would be very unlikely to attribute thought to a mountain or a river. A materialist might even claim that there is only one arrangement of matter, that corresponding to a human brain, that is capable of generating mental states.

On the other hand, if doxastic states are not material, then there's no reason to assume that they are only attached to the perambulating collections of carbon compounds that we call human beings. Non-material mental states could reside in mountains, car engines, or rivers. In fact, we know that people exist who do attribute doxastic states to such features of the environment. Those animists are definitely not materialists.

Joe:
You are claiming that the properties are not inherent in matter (which has a real existence) but in an arrangement (which is merely a theoretical construct).

You've lost me there. Which properties of matter have "real existence" and which are "theoretical constructs?" Of those properties that you believe are inherent in matter, which can you describe without referring to "arrangement" (in the broad sense in which we have been using the word in this thread).

25

Cheesehead,

I posted a comment, but it has been filtered out.

26

Cheesehead,

Hi there.

You wrote,

"You have added the not unimportant proviso that the matter which holds the beliefs be incorporated into a living being, but I think that could be shown on a materialist basis to be a distinction without a difference. After all the only thing that makes a living being is matter arranged into a sequence such that it replicates itself, whether on the level of proteins or macroscopic organisms."

Scientists have been trying to create life in a test tube for a long time now. If such matters were really a distinction without much of a difference, they would have succeeded by now.

And I made two distinctions, not one.

The belief-generating material must not only be incorporated into a living being -- it must be incorporated into a living being with a brain. These are two very importants steps. I would not minimize them, I find them both to be extremely fascinating and puzzling, as I'm sure everybody here does as well.

My point is not that matter is not fungible (substitute-able), since it clearly is. My point is that belief-generation is a complex process which involves the leap from inert to living, and from living to conscious. That ain't nothing, it's something.

I think if we both try to knock down everything the other side says, we are not going to make a lot of progress towards reaching an understanding of the mind and mental states. We need to get behind our natural inhibitions about certain ideas and try to understand them on their own terms.

After all, even if I'm wrong and people have immaterial minds and souls, I think most of us would agree that our (allegedly) immaterial minds seem to somehow act exclusively through the matter of our material brains. So what I'm saying doesn't actually contradict religious beliefs per se, it just claims that the immaterial mind is not actually a necessary hypothesis.

Thanks for your comment.

27

Cheesehead,

Hello again.

I tried to get my comment through but it still doesn't work.

28

Quoth Joe Carter: The problem is that while you can explain what is different you have no explanation for why such differences in arrangements should have such radical effects.

I don't know what sort of "why" we are looking for here. Why is sodium toxic, same with chlorine, but when combined, they're healthy, tasty salt? Would you argue, Joe, that the rearrangement is immaterial (snare tap, cymbal crash) to the properties of each?

(I note also that no one has explained why the problem of ascribing thoughts to rocks is unique to materialism. Animists aren't materialists.)

29

I don't know what sort of "why" we are looking for here. Why is sodium toxic, same with chlorine, but when combined, they're healthy, tasty salt?

I feel compelled to point out that it is the dose that makes a substance toxic, not the substance itself. Our bodies have free ions of both sodium and chlorine, in fact they are essential the for the proper function of our heart (and I thought I was wasting my time in that Human Physiology course). At the same time, consuming a pound of "healthy, tasty salt" in a sitting would most likely be fatal.

But, that's pretty far afield from Joe's original claim that if one arrangement of matter generates doxastic states, then we must assume that any arrangement of matter can generate mental states.

Joe clarified his statement in post 17 with this statement:

"I don’t mean to imply (though I was unclear on this point) that arrangement is irrelevant to doxastic states. But at best it can only be a necessary, though not sufficient condition. Arrangements of matter can only lead to the restructuring of properties that are already inherent. The materialists, however, is claiming that the arrangement creates the property through some indeterminate magical process that is absent everywhere else in nature."

30

Joe clarified his statement in post 17 with this statement:

This should read: Joe clarified his original statement with this one in post 17.

31

This post is rather absurd.
"For materialism states that: ...

7. Since matter is one and beliefs are made of matter, all beliefs are one.

8. All beliefs are both true and false. "

That's a non-sequitur for example, and no "physicalist" would say such a thing but an imaginary straw-man.

It is as though one were saying:
All logic circuits are have metal connectors.

Therefore the states of all logic circuts are the same.

Now please find me one "materialist" or "physicalist" who actually, you know, has lived or is living who has actually said such a thing...

32

Me thinks this might have been a better post if the clear inadequacy of naturalism were dealt with instead. And perhaps a paragraph that, it would appear, you're dealing with the modern science of chaos rather than the classic science of organization. For these steps
5. A belief can be true.
6. A belief can be false.
7. Since matter is one and beliefs are made of matter, all beliefs are one.
8. All beliefs are both true and false.
seem to confuse the contextual truth ("are made of") and the truth value ("true" & "false") of each. Now I'm not certain if that's your problem or someone else's problem, but it is an inconsistency to be addressed.
Enjoy.
Badgers win. Buckeyes lose. :)

33

Cheesehead,

Hi there.

You have added the not unimportant proviso that the matter which holds the beliefs be incorporated into a living being, but I think that could be shown on a materialist basis to be a distinction without a difference. After all the only thing that makes a living being is matter arranged into a sequence such that it replicates itself, whether on the level of proteins or macroscopic organisms.

Scientists have been trying to create life in a test tube for a long time now. If such matters were really a distinction without much of a difference, they would have succeeded by now.

And I made two distinctions, not one.

The belief-generating material must not only be incorporated into a living being -- it must be incorporated into a living being with a brain. These are two very importants steps. I would not minimize them, I find them both to be extremely fascinating and puzzling, as I'm sure everybody here does as well.

My point is not that matter is not fungible (substitute-able), since it clearly is. My point is that belief-generation is a complex process which involves the leap from inert to living, and from living to conscious. That ain't nothing, it's something.

I think if we both try to knock down everything the other side says, we are not going to make a lot of progress towards reaching an understanding of the mind and mental states. We need to get behind our natural inhibitions about certain ideas and try to understand them on their own terms.

After all, even if I'm wrong and people have immaterial minds and souls, I think most of us would agree that our (allegedly) immaterial minds seem to somehow act exclusively through the matter of our material brains. So what I'm saying doesn't actually contradict religious beliefs per se, it just claims that the immaterial mind is not actually a necessary hypothesis.

Thanks for your comment.

34

Still no luck posting yet. The filter doesn't like me (or what I have to say, perhaps?).

35

Hi Matthew: Your one comment that got past the censors had quite a bit that I could agree with. I oversimplified your proviso for one. (I really did catch the full implication the first time and overeconomized in summing it up.)

I agree that the distinction between life with self-consciousness and nonliving matter is hugely important. As you alluded to in the inability of scientists to create life in a test tube, I believe that there is an unbridgable chasm between living things and the nonliving matter which comprises their corporeal being. Implicit in that last sentence is that there is a real, yet incorporeal, part to living organisms which makes them more than a complex arrangement of matter which can self-replicate that organization with variations. IOW life is not an inherent or emergent property of matter.

If one holds to a strictly materialistic view of nature I do not see how you can say otherwise than that life and therefore beliefs are an inherent or emergent property of matter.

So therein lies a big difference between the strictly materialistic view and the Christian view: Christians see a huge gulf between living creatures and nonliving matter. I think, though, that from a strictly materialistic viewpoint you would have to hold that life is an emergent property or inherent property of matter. Do you agree?

You said: "I think most of us would agree that our (allegedly) immaterial minds seem to somehow act exclusively through the matter of our material brains."

I would agree to the point of saying that our minds are mediated to our bodies and the physical world through the agency of our material brains. However since mind is more than an inherent property of the matter which composes it (in the Christian worldview), and since the Bible teaches the survival of the individual beyond death, I cannot agree that mind can only operate through the agency of the physical brain. I do not immediately see how one could hold to the immortality of the human being without having the mind be able to operate at some level independent of the brain.

Hope those censors let you through again. ;)

36

Sometimes you write some very thoughtful, thought provoking things. But then you retreat to silliness like this, and all pretense of seriousness vanishes. You seem to have a need to post even when you have nothing to say.

Why is it silly Cheesehead? Or should I say is it any sillier than saying how matter is arranged isn't important? Coal and a diamond are both just matter right? In fact they are even the same type of atoms but we treat them very differently because they are arranged differently. Why? Because the arrangement is highly important. In fact, science first started exploring the arrangement before 'fundamentals'. It studied coal and diamonds before it even knew about carbon atoms (and of course the periodic table was made before we started learning about subatomic particles).

Joe has pounded this point far too long not to be called to account for it. The gist of this argument is like saying beaches don't exist because you can't see any 'beach properties' looking at a single grain of sand under a microscope. Just about everything science has to say it has to say about the properties of vast arrangements of matter (stars, clouds, cells, molecules, atoms, protons, quarks etc).

Joe
Seriously, you have to explain how new properties that exist nowhere else in the universe come about out of this matter. (And you can’t really rely on the arrangement argument since the dead brain and the live brain are basically the same arrangement (at least for awhile after death).

Sort of like how a diamond and coal are basically the same arrangement of carbon atoms right Joe? Fact is a dead brain does not have the same physical arrangement as a dead brain. The energy and reactions happening in a dead brain are not the same as a living brain. Maybe it is impossible to pick this up right after death but if that's the case you are basically saying we cannot determine for sure if the brain has died.

For your comparison to be valid we could say that the doxastic states in mountains differ in degree from humans.

Computer chips are made from silicon. Silicon makes up a major portion of the earth's crust. Therefore the earth's crust is a computer? Hmmmm....

You bring up a valid point that does require clarification. I don’t mean to imply (though I was unclear on this point) that arrangement is irrelevant to doxastic states. But at best it can only be a necessary, though not sufficient condition. Arrangements of matter can only lead to the restructuring of properties that are already inherent. The materialists, however, is claiming that the arrangement creates the property through some indeterminate magical process that is absent everywhere else in nature.

My counter-argument is simply that if doxastic states can be produced by the arrangement of matter then it is question-begging to assume that our brains are the only types of arrangements that can create/release these properties.

Which no materialists have ever claimed. It's possible to imagine that there maybe numerous arrangements of matter that might be able to think. Star Trek mined that for many episodes with conscious 'energy clouds' and such. I can view this web page on a Window PC, an Apple or a Linux based computer. Three very different 'arrangements' yielding the same picture....but you'll still never browse the web using a mountain.

That’s reasonable enough. But to be valid you have to explain how some arrangements of matter have those properties while others do not. You are claiming that the properties are not inherent in matter (which has a real existence) but in an arrangement (which is merely a theoretical construct).

It's fair to ask how certain arrangements can have this property but one doesn't have to do it for it to be true. Again what is this silliness about arrangement being a theoretical construct? A diamond has very real properties while coal has very different real properties. Neither are 'theoretical constructs'. What is a 'theoretical construct' are the strings from string theory that supposedly make up the most fundamental building blocks of matter. Joe has it backwards, it's the big arrangements that are real while the smaller you go the more theoretical you get.

States of type S are produced by matter, and so matter of any type or arrangement has the potentiality to produce states that exhibit the same type of properties as type S.

Ok, so let's say S is a cloud in the sky. I guess a mountain could potentially be broken down, it's atoms smashed and rearranged to form atoms of only hydrogen and oxygen, then for them to be combined and turned to vapor in order to make a cloud in the sky. OK. That's a long way from saying a mountain and cloud are the same thing (although I guess the protons and electrons or even more basic particles in a mountain will indeed look just like the ones in a cloud).

Long story short, the big arrangements of matter are what have real properties while the most basic blocks of matter are more theoretical. (Just like a novel has more unique meaning (properties) than the alphabet even though the novel is made up of letters of the alphabet). Some of these properties we can understand down to the most basic building blocks but many of these properties we do not. People knew the properties of coal long before they knew how those properties came from the atoms that make it up and even down. Even now most of these 'arrangement properties' remain unknown from their building things up from their basic building block properties.

37

This is the silliest proof since that one about the arrow that will never hit its target.

1. Anything that exists is made of matter.
2. All matter is one; everything that exists is one.
3. Doxastic states are composed of matter and can exist.
4. Beliefs are doxastic states.
5. A belief can be true.
6. A belief can be false.
7. Since matter is one and beliefs are made of matter, all beliefs are one.
8. All beliefs are both true and false.

What do you mean by "all matter is one"? It's a nonsensical statement. If this were true you could not make statements about distinct, discrete pieces of matter like me or the mountain. You're just mixing the singluar and plural without any meaningful structure to the objects you describe.

If you want to talk about two things that are one, you can start with the "doxatic state", or thought, and the underlying physical causal structure of the brain. The causality of thought and the causality of matter are one and the same causality. I know it's a hard idea for a dualist like you to grok, but it is clearly true. The only illusion about ideas is the illusion that they are separate things in and of themselves.

You gotta lay off the Plato!

38

You guys give me a migraine!

39

There's no such philosophy as "Naturalism". You just made that up and heaped all sorts of supposed attributes upon it, so you could stick pins in it. A straw man if I ever saw one.

40

Hi Joe,

Great post, one of the funniest things I've read in a while. Love that line: "Since matter is one and beliefs are made of matter, all beliefs are one." Right out of Mel Brooks. And to think some of the commenters here took it seriously!

41

Mumon:

Hi there! It figures that you'd be the one to give me a jumping off point... you note:

7. Since matter is one and beliefs are made of matter, all beliefs are one.

8. All beliefs are both true and false. "

That's a non-sequitur for example, and no "physicalist" would say such a thing but an imaginary straw-man.

There's a good chance that I'm misunderstanding the point, because no one seems to have picked up on it and that usually means I'm wrong, but it's the idea here that if all matter is a Unity (one), and beliefs are really just matter, beliefs are also a Unity, i.e. the only Unity which is Matter. The point is that the Unity characteristic of matter eliminates distinctions because matter exists as a whole. In other words, all beliefs we perceive as "different" are really simply the universe as a particular state. We cannot say that beliefs are different because they do NOT exist as parts of the universe because the universe is a Unity; we can only say the universe is in a different state in Unity.

In other words, we can only speak of the Universe/Everything as a whole because parts do not exist, as stated in Clause 5. Therefore, 7 and 8 are NOT non-sequitors; they are coherent if you examine them in context. You SHOULD have attacked the Unity clause instead...

[At this point, I'd like to predict that some overzealous yet bad logician will accuse me of not understanding that we can distinguish parts of something as different from each other. I will say in advance that he's a dummy and misunderstands the concept of one or Unity that in this argument's context stipulates the previous presuppositions as true, i.e. Clause 5.]

So do Parts really exist? We can imagine that they do, right? I mean look, this computer monitor has many parts: a button, glass screen, plastic frame, metal circuits. Of course, Parts cannot exist in a materialist worldview except as illusions because the Concept of a part is itself matter, which I'm arguing is a Unity for a materialist.

So if a materialist tries to argue: Parts exist, therefore matter is not a Unity, and "Parts" is a part of matter called a Concept, he really saying that "Parts of matter (concepts for example) exist, therefore matter is in parts (i.e. not a Unity)."

And that is begging the question.

Since I believe that Parts do exist, therefore I can not believe materialism.

Wow, that was actually kind of fun. Flame away, I'll only respond if I see something worth responding to.

42

AndyS:
Great post, one of the funniest things I've read in a while. Love that line: "Since matter is one and beliefs are made of matter, all beliefs are one." Right out of Mel Brooks. And to think some of the commenters here took it seriously!

Obviously, you don't grasp the force of the argument. Maybe the fact that even materialists took the argument seriously should have clued you in... Perhaps you aren't as philosophically inclined. That's okay, but save the sarcasm for a more appropriate situation instead of insulting both materialists and non-materialists as people who waste their time on "unserious" matters.

43

giggling,

I'm curious to know your thoughts on my "animist objection," raised above, which hasn't yet been answered.

44

Obviously, you don't grasp the force of the argument. Maybe the fact that even materialists took the argument seriously should have clued you in... Perhaps you aren't as philosophically inclined. That's okay, but save the sarcasm for a more appropriate situation instead of insulting both materialists and non-materialists as people who waste their time on "unserious" matters.

Actually the 'all matter is one' is right out of Joe's arguments/premises. It would actually be a pretty good satire of Joe by a materialist if it wasn't Joe's actual argument!

45

Jim Anderson:
I'm curious to know your thoughts on my "animist objection," raised above, which hasn't yet been answered.

Sorry for the late response; I've been away this weekend.

I don't grasp the force of your animist objection. Could you flesh it out a bit, Jim?

Boonton:
Actually the 'all matter is one' is right out of Joe's arguments/premises. It would actually be a pretty good satire of Joe by a materialist if it wasn't Joe's actual argument!

Yes, it is right out of Joe's argument. But it's not good satire because Joe doesn't actually believe that argument; what he did was to demonstrate that materialists must subscribe to that argument, and so because the conclusions are implausible, therefore materialism is implausible. For Joe, the ridiculousness of the "all matter is one" premise strengthens the force of his argument that materialism is implausible because he argues that materialism must hold those views.

So yes, AndyS is correct in that the premise is ridiculous. But unfortunately he missed the point that it's precisely its implausibility that renders materialism implausible in Joe's understanding (and, I might add, in my own). Instead, he just insulted everyone's intelligence, materialist and non...

46

It's interesting that no one has refuted my argument. I didn't see any holes in the logic, but I thought a materialist would try to find one. Hmm.

47

Giggling,

In comment 41, you say that anyone who is a materialist must believe that all matter is a "Unity" and that matter has no parts.

I'm not 100% sure exactly what you mean by this, but I offer myself to you as a counterexample: I am a materialist, but I do not consider all matter to be a unity without parts.

If you could be more specific somehow -- give a concrete example of what you mean by "all matter is Unity" and "parts don't exist" -- then I would be able to understand your point better.

Cheers,
Matthew

48

giggling,

Yes, it is right out of Joe's argument. But it's not good satire because Joe doesn't actually believe that argument; what he did was to demonstrate that materialists must subscribe to that argument, and so because the conclusions are implausible, therefore materialism is implausible. For Joe, the ridiculousness of the "all matter is one" premise strengthens the force of his argument that materialism is implausible because he argues that materialism must hold those views.

Unfortunately Joe did not demonstrate that materialists must accept the 'all matter is one' premise, he simply asserted it. Look at what he wrote:

That leads to our second conclusion. Since doxastic states are produced by matter, matter can produce doxastic states in anything (or everything). If this is true it leads to a peculiar result. Mountains can have 'beliefs', car engines can feel 'pain', and rivers can have 'memories.' In fact, since matter is all that exists, existence itself becomes a singularity. Materialism is, after all, another form of monism.

Joe's reasoning for why a materialist must believe mountains can have beliefs or car engines can feel pain is simply that they are all made of matter therefore one thing made of matter must have the properties of another thing made of matter. Guess what? Even Joe believes a mountain and an airplane are made of matter but a plane can fly and a mountain cannot. Just because something is made out of the same stuff that something else is it does not mean that it must have the exact same properties.

49

to: Matthew Goggins
cc: Boonton:

I know you are a materialist. I also agree that you believe parts of matter exist. But I argue that is inconsistent, i.e. you hold inconsistent ideas. To understand why for a materialist "all matter is a Unity," read my Comment 41 starting with "So do Parts really exist?" [for a materialist].
It's short, like three sentences.

Unfortunately, "concrete" examples don't help here because we're talking about abstract logic of beliefs. I mean, I could say "materialists cannot prove parts of matter like soccer balls or people exist because parts itself is an idea which is logically indistinguishable from the unity of "all matter" so you're begging the question by assuming "parts as an idea" exist in the first place because the idea is matter.

But "concrete" examples don't work too well with this discussion topic. My argument in Comment 41 is clear enough.

50

Boonton:
Guess what? Even Joe believes a mountain and an airplane are made of matter but a plane can fly and a mountain cannot.

Yes, everyone including every materialist believes a mountain cannot fly while planes can, but Joe and my point is that materialists logically should not believe this (see my comment above and #41), but do. They are really non-materialists, therefore, even as they proclaim they are materialists.

51

giggling,

I read your post 41 and reread Joe's 11 point argument. I call you attention to:

9. If any part of matter can produce a doxastic state, all matter can do so. (Follows from 1, 2, and 6).

Indeed this is true and not very debatable if you remember the meaning of the word 'can'. A mountain can fly like a plan. In order to do so it's matter must be drastically rearranged...you may need an atom smasher and other exotic tools but yes a mountain can fly if its matter is changed in very specific ways.

Likewise you can take the text of a Bible and transform it into a book of Penthouse stories by rearranging it letters. We may even form an argument that all text is one therefore the Bible is as much porn as porn is a Bible (at least written porn).

The novel Siddhartha has an interesting passage where a rock is held up. Today it may just be a rock but it may become soil in the future, may become a plant and then feed an animal or person so tomorrow the rock might indeed be thinking. In fact I believe there is a well known religious text that says, somewhere, that humans are made out of dust and to dust they will return.

Where you and Joe go wrong, though, is by purposefully misunderstanding your unity argument. The unity argument does not require you to believe mountains can fly like planes but it does require you to believe a mountain is fundamentally the same as a plane just as all English language writing is fundamentally built with the same alphabet.

This does not mean, however, that mountains can think or car engines can feel pain as you and Joe assert materialists should believe. This is just being silly as you would find an argument by a convicted murderer that he should be released because if all humans have eternal life then he could not have ended anyone's life.

52

We can have more fun making silly arguments of the form presented by giggling and Joe:

Start by taking his argument:

1. Anything that exists is made of matter.
2. All matter is one; everything that exists is one.
3. Doxastic states are composed of matter and can exist.
4. Beliefs are doxastic states.
5. A belief can be true.
6. A belief can be false.
7. Since matter is one and beliefs are made of matter, all beliefs are one.
8. All beliefs are both true and false.

Ok,

1. Water, ice, and steam are made of H2O
2. Water, ice, and steam is one.
3. States of water are composed of H2O and can exist.
4. Temperature is a state.
5. Water can be hot.
6. Water can be cold.
7. Since water is one and the temperature of water is made of water then all temperature states are one.
8. Water therefore must be both hot and cold regardless of whether it is ice, water or steam.

53

So, Joe: You gonna post your photos of your Moon walk on Flickr, or what? We're dying to see the photos!