1

Human dignity is a first-order concept. If you're a Kantian ethicist. Of course, if you're operating that way, you'll end up with the ethical stance of the UN--committed to a document which holds that paid vacations are essential to human dignity, but unable to muster sufficient conviction to refuse seats on a Human Rights Council to genocidal dictatorships. That is, on paper, you'll be a god; on earth, you'll be a worm.

Better to start from something a bit more real and less self-gratifying than altruistic moral convictions. How about "the fear of the Lord" for a place to start being wise?

Cheers,
PGE

2

...anyone who cannot embrace this conviction should not be considered civilized,...

Aside from the fact that there simply is no "liberal democratic tradition" that equates zygotes with born people, to what would you relegate those "who cannot embrace this conviction?"

That's what sends shudders through those who are legitimate heirs to the liberal democratic tradition.

3

Joe:

PGE may have a point there, judging by what the US founders did before they made the DOI. Namely, issuing the following call to penitence and prayuer for blessings:

May 1776: In times of impending calamity and distress; when the liberties of America are imminently endangered by the secret machinations and open assaults of an insidious and vindictive administration, it becomes the indispensable duty of these hitherto free and happy colonies, with true penitence of heart, and the most reverent devotion, publickly to acknowledge the over ruling providence of God; to confess and deplore our offences against him; and to supplicate his interposition for averting the threatened danger, and prospering our strenuous efforts in the cause of freedom, virtue, and posterity.. . . Desirous, at the same time, to have people of all ranks and degrees duly impressed with a solemn sense of God's superintending providence, and of their duty, devoutly to rely, in all their lawful enterprizes, on his aid and direction, Do earnestly recommend, that Friday, the Seventeenth day of May next, be observed by the said colonies as a day of humiliation, fasting, and prayer; that we may, with united hearts, confess and bewail our manifold sins and transgressions, and, by a sincere repentance and amendment of life, appease his righteous displeasure, and, through the merits and mediation of Jesus Christ, obtain his pardon and forgiveness; humbly imploring his assistance to frustrate the cruel purposes of our unnatural enemies; . . . that it may please the Lord of Hosts, the God of Armies, to animate our officers and soldiers with invincible fortitude, to guard and protect them in the day of battle, and to crown the continental arms, by sea and land, with victory and success: Earnestly beseeching him to bless our civil rulers, and the representatives of the people, in their several assemblies and conventions; to preserve and strengthen their union, to inspire them with an ardent, disinterested love of their country; to give wisdom and stability to their counsels; and direct them to the most efficacious measures for establishing the rights of America on the most honourable and permanent basis—That he would be graciously pleased to bless all his people in these colonies with health and plenty, and grant that a spirit of incorruptible patriotism, and of pure undefiled religion, may universally prevail; and this continent be speedily restored to the blessings of peace and liberty, and enabled to transmit them inviolate to the latest posterity. And it is recommended to Christians of all denominations, to assemble for public worship, and abstain from servile labour on the said day.

Worth a thought or two.

GEM

4

While these principles may be sound, is this really where the evangelical finds his starting point? I'll suggest that the rational approach is inadequate for the believer (in terms of belief consistency and practice) as well as being inadequate for the rest of society (because without it society degnerates further).

Some may confuse or even intentionally reinterpret the traditional evangeliceal position for a dominionist or theocratic position, so quality communication is the key here.

http://evangelicalperspective.blogspot.com/2006/06/looking-for-biblical-position-on-party.html

5

Of course I was aware of the talk of inalienable rights in the the twin Declarations you cite. But I'd never given them much thought. "Inalienable" means something like "not subject to forfeiture". Do we believe that people have any inalienable rights? Perhaps so, perhaps not. We imprison some who commit crimes. If this is just (and no doubt it is), no one has an inalienable right to liberty. We think it necessary to sometimes kill (in self-defense if at no other time). Thus no one has an inalienable right to life.

Do we mean perhaps that only the innocent have inalienable rights? Likely not. There are things that we cannot do to even the most vile of criminals. We cannot torture them for pleasure, for instance.

But however that might be, it is perhaps defensible to say that the innocent have inalienable rights to life and liberty. (But this of course is disputed by some. Would you kill one innocent to save 100. Would you unjustly imprison one so that 100 innocents might be freed?)

6

I go with PGE and GEM on this one: the Bill of Rights says it better than the UN. Dignity is a meaningless fantasy, a utopian thing, if untied from the truth of our Creator, our being creatures of His goodness and love. All our dignity derives from the foundation and fountain of the goodness of our Divine Creator. --lester

7

Aside from the fact that there simply is no "liberal democratic tradition" that equates zygotes with born people, to what would you relegate those "who cannot embrace this conviction?"

Actually Mumon the defintion that Joe proposes ends up being a huge strawman. No one really argues with it, the problem is the debate about when human life begins and ends. I have not heard a serious argument that some humans are more and others less deserving of dignity. Joe's definition assumes a presumption that many do not agree on, that life begins at conception.

At the other end of 'life stages' the thinking gets even more muddied. What defines the end of life? At one time it was when someone had no pulse. We know the heart can be restarted in many instances after it has stopped. 'brain death' presumes the brain to be a single organ rather than the reality that it is more like several different organs. They include a primitive, 'automatic pilot' brain that keeps the body's most basic functions going which is distinct from the 'higher brain' that is responsible for what we consider humaneness...our ability to think.

8

But however that might be, it is perhaps defensible to say that the innocent have inalienable rights to life and liberty. (But this of course is disputed by some. Would you kill one innocent to save 100. Would you unjustly imprison one so that 100 innocents might be freed?)

This is an interesting question that relates a bit to an argument I've had about legalized abortion (and isn't 'sanctity of life' just a code word 80% of the time to mean a thread about abortion?). In brief here it is; suppose another human beign needs something from your body. Say a kidney or even just a blood transfusion. For reasons too technical to list, there is no other option. If this does not come from you the human will die. Suppose you do not want to do this. I don't think it matters whether your reasons are good (you believe God forbids such things) or bad (you just don't like the guy). I don't think US law could force you against your will to donate either a kidney or even just your blood. Even though from a utilitian POV the imposition on you is minor and the benefit to the other person is great.

Now let's say we discover that the cure to cancer is sitting inside the center of Johnny Depps brain, written on a tiny piece of paper inserted there by advanced aliens. The only way to get a hold of this is to cut into his brain, which believe it or not, will kill him. Under US law, despite the fact that it would save millions of lives, the gov't could not legally force this to happen.

Or to translate into Star Trekise, the needs of the one in this case will outweight the needs of the many.

9

pgeeps Human dignity is a first-order concept. If you're a Kantian ethicist. Of course, if you're operating that way, you'll end up with the ethical stance of the UN--committed to a document which holds that paid vacations are essential to human dignity, but unable to muster sufficient conviction to refuse seats on a Human Rights Council to genocidal dictatorships.

I don’t see how it follows that recognizing the inherent dignity of all human beings (a Christian concept) entails supporting “genocidal dictatorships.” You appear to imply that holding this specific moral conviction (that all humans are worthy of dignity) at the individual level inevitably leads to advocating positive rights such as paid vacations. I think that is obviously false.

Better to start from something a bit more real and less self-gratifying than altruistic moral convictions. How about "the fear of the Lord" for a place to start being wise?

No argument there. But what about non-Christians? Are they exempt from recognizing human dignity because they don’t share our foundational principle? What about natural law and common grace?

Mumon Aside from the fact that there simply is no "liberal democratic tradition" that equates zygotes with born people,…

Yes, Mumon, I realize that if you lived in the early 1800’s you’d be saying, “Aside from the fact that there simply is no "liberal democratic tradition" that equates black people with white Americans…” But some of us are attempting to put away our prejudices and expand the recognition of dignity to all humans.

Can you point out one example in history where civilization has been improved by denying
the inherent dignity of a group or subgroup of the human species?

That's what sends shudders through those who are legitimate heirs to the liberal democratic tradition.

Um, aren’t you still a Buddhist? While your religion may not be incompatible with the liberal democratic tradition it certainly hasn’t added enough to allow you to claim being a “legitimate heir."

Collin While these principles may be sound, is this really where the evangelical finds his starting point? I'll suggest that the rational approach is inadequate for the believer (in terms of belief consistency and practice) as well as being inadequate for the rest of society (because without it society degnerates further).

I’m confused about what you mean by “the rational approach.” Recognizing human dignity is not a rationalist concept. It is, in my opinion, a moral conviction based on the “law written on our hearts.”

Boonton No one really argues with it, the problem is the debate about when human life begins and ends.

There's no debate--at least no legitimate moral or scientific debate--about when life begins: it begins at the completion of fertilization. What is disputed is when "personhood" (a metaphysical concept) begins.

At the other end of 'life stages' the thinking gets even more muddied. What defines the end of life?

Death is the permanent cessation of:
--any possible voluntary movement or activity,
--any self-initiated or self-contained or self-activated movement or activity of the body (except for decay, hair growth, etc.)
--any perceptions, thoughts or feelings that seem to be associated with, or that require, that body.

Not so hard, was it?

10

Yes, Mumon, I realize that if you lived in the early 1800’s you’d be saying, “Aside from the fact that there simply is no "liberal democratic tradition" that equates black people with white Americans…” But some of us are attempting to put away our prejudices and expand the recognition of dignity to all humans.

Perhaps but there was an extensive tradition that equated blacks with human beigns. Go to the parts of the country that were the strongest in support of slavery. Even there they had laws on the books limiting what could be done to slaves. In no part of the country could a man kill a slave as he could, say, kill his cow. Speaking of which, by passing laws forbidding slaves to be taught to read and write etc. even slavery supporters were implicitly acknowledging that blacks were human beings. Care to show me a state that has a law against teaching horses or cows or sheep to read and write?

Pro-slavery forces did not argue that blacks were not humans but fundamentally argued with the concept that all humans were entitled to liberty equally.

Can you point out one example in history where civilization has been improved by denying
the inherent dignity of a group or subgroup of the human species?

We do not consider chimps to be human and as such have improved our ability to treat humans for medical conditions greatly. Also we have avoided using humans unethically to gain medical knowledge. Then again note how your question assumes the answer. You assume that X was once considered a 'group or subgroup of the human species' and is now getting kicked out. In reality you may want to consider whether there is any value in having a boundary between what we consider to be a human beign and not a human being.

There's no debate--at least no legitimate moral or scientific debate--about when life begins: it begins at the completion of fertilization. What is disputed is when "personhood" (a metaphysical concept) begins.

well life begins before that then. A sperm cell and an egg cell are alive and therefore life. Personhood is indeed something of a metaphysical concept but metaphysical does not mean irrelevant...on the contrary metaphysical often means something very important.

Death is the permanent cessation of:
--any possible voluntary movement or activity,
--any self-initiated or self-contained or self-activated movement or activity of the body (except for decay, hair growth, etc.)
--any perceptions, thoughts or feelings that seem to be associated with, or that require, that body.

1. Presumes that we have resolved the personhood issue...otherwise how are we to say a movement is voluntary?

2. The second seems to be nothing more than a fancier way of saying the first point. Notice how you gotta put a clause in there for hair growth? Cause you know that is an involuntary activity but you still haven't wrestled that personhood question....so you put a little note on your definition. Until the personhood issue is resolved we aren't going to consider hair and nail growth to be in itself human life.

3. Needless to say this is a metaphysical requirement to a huge degree. You cannot say, for example, that Terri Schiavo was experiencing any perceptions, thoughts or feelings. I'm not even sure you could say this for anyone. There is no test to tell you if someone's soul has left their body or not. You cannot show that she had long since left such things behind.

Not so hard, was it?

Now now, certainly you should know by now its never that easy.

11

I went to the rationalist critique because the supporting material of the post appeared to be directed to reason rather than to Scripture. The statement "a universal, species-wide, recognition of dignity" reads like Kant.

While we do share some commonalities with many secularists on this matter the starting point is quite distinct. And while it is imperative to appeal to the secular mind, the basis of evidence is not out of the supply offered by them, but out of the Word.

Collin

http://evangelicalperspective.blogspot.com

12

Can you point out one example in history where civilization has been improved by denying
the inherent dignity of a group or subgroup of the human species?

Well, I can think of several subgroups that would certainly have felt that their inherent dignity has been denied, and society came out better: aristocratic classes and white antebellum Southerners.

But of course you don't mean it that way (though in fact by some odd intellectual ju-jitsu you probably think that you're on the side of the common people), so let's try some other groups: society definitely benefits when those more capable are given opportunities that those less capable are not.

To assume that in all things there is equality is bunk.

One other case, thanks to Mary Roach: by not equating brain dead people with living people we have been able to keep living people alive, and made society more just by clearly establishing that people who make people brain dead are killers, not people who stop beating hearts of brain-dead people.

13

The concept of the sanctity of life is the belief that all human beings, at any and every stage of life, in any and every state of consciousness or self-awareness, of any and every race, color, ethnicity, level of intelligence, religion, language, gender, character, behavior, physical ability/disability, potential, class, social status, etc., of any and every particular quality of relationship to the viewing subject, are to be perceived as persons of equal and immeasurable worth and of inviolable dignity and therefore must be treated in a manner commensurate with this moral status.

That's lovely, if you don't think about it. Which is true of so many conservative creeds. Sadly, it's insane if you treat it as if anyone is actually supposed to believe it. The which, ditto.

To start with the obvious, it's not really a statement of moral principle at all. (No rational argument demands that precisely these, all these, and only these characteristics must be taken to define "dignity", and "dignity" seems to have no meaning other than to characterize the creatures encompassed by this list of criteria. In this way, "dignity" among humans is similar to, but an even less content-full designation than, "bright" for atheists - it simply qualifies a category that was already perfectly well defined by more-relevant criteria, in obviously emotionally-manipulative language.) This is simply a list of club membership criteria. Like most such, it's intended to reinforce a certain social perspective on membership in the club, but such a designation hardly rises to the level of a moral category.

Its (deliberate) weaknesses are two, but they define virtually all the ways such a categorization can be weak: it includes too much, and it leaves too much out, in both cases arbitrarily.

First, it defines by fiat all humans as having "dignity", for no other reason than their being humans. As noted above, this makes "dignity" unnecessary as a designation, and empty as a moral concept. (As a designation, it is coextensive with "human", which is a better term for the purpose; as a moral category, it is meaningless, since "human" is not a moral concept.)

Second, it defines only humans as having "dignity", which requires - again on no grounds - that no creature of a non-human species can have (whatever is) the moral status that "dignity" confers. But, even leaving aside controversies over animal rights, computer intelligence, and the like, it seems obvious we would not only grant recognition of moral status to an alien species capable of appreciating and engaging in moral reflection, we would demand it of such a species toward ourselves (as we do not demand it of other species in which we fail to recognize "dignity"). Unless we are prepared to concede that any non-human is entitled to treat us exactly as it likes (though we are allowed to defend ourselves), no matter the consequences and no matter the nature of that other creature - that morality itself is a concern exclusively of humans even in relations with non-humans who themselves obey a moral code - the restriction of "dignity" to humans is not only arbitrary but simply false.

This second point underscores the real problem with claims about "dignity" or "sanctity" as an arbitrary but morally normative feature of human life: they are merely high-sounding variations on the naturalistic fallacy (the claim that some particular fact of nature by itself justifies some particular moral conclusion). They are especially faulty versions of it, because the relation between the fact in question and the moral conclusion drawn from it is purely arbitrary (normally, the fallacy at least sounds like it might make sense). Here, we are told that humans have "dignity" because they are human. This ought to be a non-starter. (For one thing, "human" and "dignity" do not have similar, or even related, meanings.) When we are told that "dignity" conveys some sort of moral implication about the things that have dignity, we ought to recognize immediately that the claim about human dignity can't be true, or at least can't be true other than accidentally. If "dignity" is a term with moral meaning, then it can't be justified by reference to any natural fact such as membership in the human species. One might try to define "dignity" in relation to moral concepts (such as personhood, consciousness, having interests, etc.) that do relate to natural facts (such as memories, desires, coherent cognitive functining, etc.), but we are told in the definition at top that "dignity" is specifically unrelated to any such concepts. So, by definition "dignity" - a moral term - is applicable only to categories defined by natural facts that themselves are unrelated to any moral concepts. As a parody, that kind of thinking lies at the Monty Python level of subtlety. As an actual, straight-faced piece of moral reasoning, it's idiotic.

You can't resurrect this kind of fallacious thinking by labeling it "first-order" or "properly basic" or by any other non-rationalist special pleading. If you want to make any serious claim about the moral status of human beings, you have to do so on rational grounds that tie facts of identity to moral concepts. Almost inevitably, that argument will give you a moral category that is not co-extensive with human species membership (it is conceivable that, on careful analysis, moral status actually would turn out to be applicable only to human beings - but that would be a contingent fact of the natural world, not an essential fact about humans). At any rate, you can't get anywhere on the subject by simply making empty and suspiciously convenient declarations that just happen to mimic your non-rationalist religious beliefs, and then say "QED".

14

Booton, how 'bout this? You get drunk at a party and start messing around with some guys that take advantage of you. You wake up and realize that by some "Star Trekian" way that these guys have attached someone to you against their will. However, if "doctors" separate that person from you, that person will die. Talking to the experts, they tell you that, yes, it will be uncomfortable and unpleasant and maybe a little expensive, but in 9 months, you can "attach" this person to someone else. Do you opt to disconnect them now and kill them? Should the government prosecute the "doctors" that do the separation, because they would be the ones killing that person?

15

KTK,
Joe is appealing to a metaphysical basis for dignity, and that goes to the Creator. (My criticism was the inclusion of and parallelling of an apparently rational approach.) In that he meets your criteria for the inclusion of a moral concept. In addition, your inclusion of non-human species is a non-sequitur because that inclusion is, as you call it, arbitrary.
Your call for a distinct rationalistic approach would then exclude other approaches and so is in and of itself arbitrary and presumptive. (IOW, the posting is one of the most sophisticated exmaples of begging the question that I've seen in a long time.)

16

What is the most essential principle of a liberal democracy? What concept is so foundational to Western culture that is must be protected at all cost? What, if anything, sets our civilization apart from all those that have come before?

Is the answer "Free Cable"?

OK, I'll read the rest of the post now!

17

Saff, how 'bout this? There are numerous ways readily available to prevent "people attaching" of which you chose not to avail yourself. You knew before attending the party that "people attachers" would be there, and that some of them were likely unscrupulous. Despite this knowledge you got drunk knowing that doing so would lower your inhibitions and impair your judgment. The next day you find yourself "person attached." Do you have any moral obligation to wait the 9 months or are you free to kill it?

18

Booton, how 'bout this? You get drunk at a party and start messing around with some guys that take advantage of you. You wake up and realize that by some "Star Trekian" way that these guys have attached someone to you against their will. However, if "doctors" separate that person from you, that person will die. Talking to the experts, they tell you that, yes, it will be uncomfortable and unpleasant and maybe a little expensive, but in 9 months, you can "attach" this person to someone else. Do you opt to disconnect them now and kill them? Should the government prosecute the "doctors" that do the separation, because they would be the ones killing that person?

You've just restated the argument with an added twist where you could say I was partially responsible for ending up with a person attached to me. Even there I think it is pretty clear there is a big difference between moral and legal burdens. A Christian may argue I'm morally obligated to donate my blood if there is no other way the person can be saved. I don't think that he could argue the gov't should force me.

To see how this might work imagine you were responsible for the person needing the blood transfusion. Let's say you were Lex Luther and by exposing Superman to kryponite you gave him a terminal cancer. Only a blood transfusion from you (who has built up resistence) can save him. Despite the fact that the law can put you in jail for the rest of your life for killing him with radiation I don't think that even in this case the law can force your to donate your body against your will even though your responsibility for creating this mess if greater than that of the typical young woman seeking an abortion.

19

KTK,

I'm seriously confused by your argument.

You claim to be interested in making moral arguments on "rational grounds that tie facts of identity to moral concepts." What does that mean?

And is there a way of constructing such a moral framework that does not run afoul of the so-called naturalistic fallacy?

And how on earth is "consciousness or personhood" moral concepts?

I'm really at a loss.

While I rarely agree with Joe, I am baffled why a defense of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights gets dismissed as "conservative creed."

Marco

20

I'm not sure where all this "person attaching" is headed, but I'd have to say in my case the answer might depend. Is the person attached to me Kevin T. Keith, or is it perhaps, Jennifer Garner? Somehow I think the latter wouldn't attack my rationality at every turn because I hold different beliefs (from his), and I'm almost certain would be more interesting to look at...

21

Joe – I don’t think people can be convinced of the inherent worth of every human life without having experienced a change of heart in which their own sense worth becomes founded upon a belief in a benevolent Creator. Most people want to be treated with dignity, though, and have an internal sense that they deserve to be even if they don’t believe in a benevolent Creator. The difference is that in some this sense is based upon pride, and in others it is based upon an understanding that they've been created for a purpose by God.

22

I don’t see how it follows that recognizing the inherent dignity of all human beings (a Christian concept) entails supporting “genocidal dictatorships.” You appear to imply that holding this specific moral conviction (that all humans are worthy of dignity) at the individual level inevitably leads to advocating positive rights such as paid vacations. I think that is obviously false.

[ . . . ] What about natural law and common grace?

To take the last point first: natural law is not based on Kantian ethics. That came later, and "dignity" with it. Natural law is based on the notion that, for humanity, "the state of nature is a state of War" (Locke) in which life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes). Thus, some resignation of natural autonomy to some form of collectivized self-defense (Bastiat) is necessary and useful for human survival in society. "Civil society" emerges where such measures are embraced, not enforced despotically.

"Human dignity" is a notion from Kant. It allows him to eschew various specific kinds of valuing the life of another, in favor of an abstraction: dignity is the person regarded as an end in himself.

However, that is neither (a) possible nor (b) desireable. And, in plain fact, it never happens nor can happen.

Instead "dignity" has become the emotive buzzword for every happy fiasco in international human rights since then. And, yes, your unworthily praised Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for all its high-flown abstract nouns, affirms ludicrous 1940s socialistic measures such as, and I quote from the document, "periodic holidays with pay," as fundamental human rights. Under this definition, the "foundation" is so extended as to embrace not only the foundation but the whole edifice, and in a bad building on the wrong block of the neighborhood I moved out of, at that!

So, yes, if you begin from the "foundations" of Kantian ethics (modernist constructions for those who have no foundations for morality) and erect a building after the model of the UDHR on it, you will precisely get what we got from that sort of empty-headed blubbering: the UN. QED.

More or less a case of "if you do what we did, you'll get the results we got." Hardly enlightening, really: more stating the obvious when you seem determined to avoid it.

Why must you attempt to pretend you are a modernist for the sake of the modernists who hate you? Are you so masochistic as all of that? Modernism is the enemy, has been all along. Never fool yourself into thinking you can make friends with it: it is out to declare you obsolete.

But you mean well, and you're right to defend the sanctity of life, which unlike "dignity" is a Christian doctrine of the first order.

Peace,
PGE

23

Most people want to be treated with dignity, though, and have an internal sense that they deserve to be even if they don’t believe in a benevolent Creator. The difference is that in some this sense is based upon pride, and in others it is based upon an understanding that they've been created for a purpose by God.

Bonnie, you are assuming motives on the part of the unbeliever. I think that the idea that all people are deserving of dignity is derivable from the very basic instinct from which empathy flows. The Golden Rule is the basis for all ethics, and is something that is intuited, not derived from theological presuppositions.

24

Better to start from something a bit more real and less self-gratifying than altruistic moral convictions. How about "the fear of the Lord" for a place to start being wise?

pge, when has the "fear of the Lord" ever prevented anyone from committing the most atrocious crimes upon their fellow man? Did it stop Christian slavehoders? Does it stop Islamist terrorists?

25

Joe,
I applaud your call for a recognition of human dignity and in enunciating this principle in non-religious language. Contrary to what pgepps says, there is no requirement in Christianity for the recognition of inalienable rights, and there are even reservations on the part of some religious conservatives to "rights talk". See my post on the matter at the Daily Duck. Here is a quote from Ross Douthat:

I'm pretty ambivalent about the concept of rights myself, and I certainly didn't mean to suggest that because the concept derives, in some sense, from Christianity that Christianity itself requires such a concept. Rights are, as Noah says, "the reciprocal of duties," which is why it was a relatively easy leap for first Protestant and then later Catholic Christianity to accept the political move from "thou shalt not kill, because human beings are made in the image of God," to "human beings have a right not to be killed, because they are made in the image of God." But rights-talk ultimately opens up a whole language of choice and autonomy (in which God and Nature get thrown out, and people "claim" rights as a means to self-fulfillment) that is ultimately alien to monotheism, and that explains the widening fissure between liberalism and Christianity.

I can't say that I'm getting warm fuzzies about the Christian commitment to our Constitutional order based on statements like these.

26

Robert Duquette,

"pge, when has the "fear of the Lord" ever prevented anyone from committing the most atrocious crimes upon their fellow man? Did it stop Christian slavehoders? Does it stop Islamist terrorists?"

Has the intuited Golden Rule achieved this, and I just have figured it out yet? It seems that the Militant Islamists intuit that anyone who does not convert is dignified only as meat for their swords to cut to ribbons. If intuition were the answer, seems like we'd all have it and it would be globally evident. Show me how you prove your intuitions are better than mine, or better than the people in the deep jungles who still eat each other for supper...

27

PGE,

"Human Dignity is a notion from Kant."

Ummm.... No.

Semnotes (my greek may be off) appears in the Nicomachean ethics as well as the New Testament. In 1 Timothy, St. Paul, ironically enough, urges Timothy to pray for those in positions of authority so as to allow believers to lead lives of dignity. So God wants the government to preserve a zone of autonomy for individuals so as to protect human dignity? That would be blasphemous if it had not been written by St. Paul himself.

Dignitas appears in the Summa dozens of times. Aquinas clearly believed that human beings, qua human, possessed an intrinsic value or worth. We possess a value greater than the animals but obviously lesser than God.

"It allows him to eschew various specific kinds of valuing the life of another."

What on earth does this mean? It sounds awful, whatever it is.

Why on earth do you want to distinguish your beliefs from Kant's on the point of basic human egalitarianism in matters of worth or value? God certainly is an egalitarian in matters of grace, is He not?

The only reason I can come up with is that you want to distinguish yourself from Kant simply because he's Kant.

If he said that the world was round, would you insist that the world was flat?

Marco

28

Collin:

The inclusion of a non-human species is not a non-sequitur, but it it somewhat arbitrary. It's just that arbitrary isn't a bad thing in this context. He could have chosen any example to disprove Gushee's formulation; he arbitrarily chose this one, but there are doubtless others.

Marco:

I am baffled why a defense of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights gets dismissed as "conservative creed."

I don't think KTK was calling that a "conservative creed." He was calling Gushee's definition of the "sanctity of life" a "conservative creed." Big difference.

29

Kant's argument is not merely egalitarian, as in "equity is a desireable feature of any government." He specifically attempts to achieve his end by rendering ethics a strictly aprioristic exercise, abstracted from all the phenomenal features of our real existence as real human beings.

I'm using Kant as a focal point for my opposition to any such abstraction from real humanity to abstract nouns. The ridiculous faith in wordy pronouncements propounded by advocates of the UN's ethical point of view is exactly the sort of thing which popular reception (I'm aware there are layers of technical interpretation) of Kant has led to.

The "dignity" of semnotes is a manner of living, not a foundation for the recognition of human beings as such, nor a foundation for entitlement. It is a desideratum of the good life, something to be achieved, not something to be aprioristically assumed. It parallels "quietness" in structure and sense.

Kant abstracted that notion and moved it into the nothing-space of abstract ideals where it has resided ever since in the popular and political imagination, a chimerical dispenser of "values" bereft of any real relations.

Real relationships among real persons, first and foremost each person's relation to God and then to other people, are the real "first order" concepts. Personal relationships, not abstractions and lofty ideals, are the basis for valuing people sensibly.

What we need are fewer essays on dignity and more people who befriend those who they find undignified. We need fewer NGOs and more people who live in the places where they find needs.

Joe's argument tended to point us exactly the wrong way, and to put Christianity inside the box of modernistic philosophies, and until he breaks that bad habit (shared by many evangelical Christians), I'll continue to have to disagree with him on these matters.

Again, I entirely approve the defense of the sanctity of life, but I think appeals to abstract nouns are a bit silly.

Cheers,
PGE

30

Collin:

Joe is appealing to a metaphysical basis for dignity, and that goes to the Creator.

I have no idea what this means, other than that Joe thinks "dignity" is granted by God. That much I already knew. There's nothing especially metaphysical about this. There are certainly metaphysical questions about whether there is such a god, and how it goes about bestowing "dignity" on things, but the fact of and the moral significance of human dignity - whatever that is - are moral questions, or, if you like, questions of moral epistemology, not metaphysical ones.

My dispute with Joe is over whether there are any good grounds for believing that there is such a thing as "dignity" and that it belongs only to humans. A rational person will want convincing grounds for believing such a thing. More importantly, a rational person will give, and demand, convincing grounds when asking someone else to believe it, or when someone else asks them to believe it. (Thus, moral epistemology: the search for reasons to believe moral claims.)

The problem with asserting that "the Creator makes everyone dignified" is that that cannot be a convincing ground for accepting someone else's word on the matter, or for them to accept yours. (I presume someone is just about to reply "But it's God's word!" Please don't.)

If you can give evidence that the "Creator" imposed dignity on human beings uniquely, then there is reason to believe it - but, if you can give evidence, then we no longer need "faith" on this matter. For one thing, we have evidence! Secondly, by giving evidence, you are behaving rationally, and not on faith alone. The evidence you offer gives people a reason to believe you (if it's good enough evidence). Giving no evidence besides your faith alone gives people no reason to agree with you - they can only observe that you believe what you are saying, not that there is any reason for them to.

The problem with the Gushee statement I quoted is that it appears to be entirely a religiously-motivated statement of faith; it rests on no evidence. Thus, there is no reason to believe it, and no reason for those who do not already believe it to accept the word of those who do.

. . . In that he meets your criteria for the inclusion of a moral concept.

Um, no. "Creator" is not a moral concept no matter how many capital letters you use. I know well that Christians are inclined to do the things they believe God has told them to do and call that moral, but it's really not. (That is, some of them may happen to be moral, many of them clearly are immoral, but none is moral simply because God says so.) Even if "the Creator" packed oodles of "dignity" into each and every human body and nowhere else, we would still need to know what "dignity" means and why it conveys moral status or has some sort of moral significance. And for that, again, we need a reason - an argument, an explanation, some convincing evidence - not just the assertion that it's true. In particular, we need a rational link between having "dignity" and having moral status. We also need a definition of "dignity", as well as factual evidence that, whatever it is, humans have it and nothing else does. Gushee asserts the latter and ignores all the former - leaving the rest of us no reason to think he's right.

In addition, your inclusion of non-human species is a non-sequitur because that inclusion is, as you call it, arbitrary.

It's hardly arbitrary - the entire debate is over whether "dignity" is a property of all and only humans, as Joe asserts on Gushee's authority. To examine that claim, we must consider whether all humans have that property (or whether some might not), and whether only humans have that property (or whether some non-humans might also).

I realized after posting that my objection to the first part of the claim was rather thin (but nobody noticed, so I'll let it go); my objection to the second was the suggestion that there are reasons to think that non-humans could and should be regarded as having "dignity", or moral standing, if in fact there are any such aliens with the right kind of psychology.

Thus, the example I gave cannot be arbitrary - it's directly on the point of the central claim. You may have meant "implausible", but that's not really the point either. As I noted, whether or not there are any aliens, I suspect that almost everyone would feel that if there were, they would want those aliens to treat them (i.e., us) decently. If that is true, then it implicitly acknowledges that not only humans are subject to the moral law, and if that, in turn, is true, then Gushee's (and Joe's) claim about human "dignity" is false.

Your call for a distinct rationalistic approach would then exclude other approaches and so is in and of itself arbitrary and presumptive.

Um, no. Being rational is never an arbitrary act. It's like breathing, but with your mind - you can't do without it, and if you try, just to be stubborn, things go very badly. The "other" approach, leaving out rationality, is stupidity. Not a good choice.

To make that clearer, there's nothing negligible about "rationality", no matter how rare it may be. It's not a matter of choice, or a personal value, or something that is merely a matter of personal preference. Rationality is merely thinking and talking about things in rational ways, and by "rational ways" I mean simply by acknowledgment of the internal logic of the subject and the actual relations among the things discussed.

The earth does orbit the sun and not the other way around. Admitting it is to acquiesce in rationally-determined belief; to deny it is to be irrational. We have good reason for believing that claim is true, and so we do believe it because we cannot assert the truth of any alternative claim without also asserting obvious falsehoods as well.

Rationality just means acknowledging clear and coherent sets of beliefs grounded on reliable evidence. Rejecting the only coherent beliefs about the true relations between things, as defined by the internal logic of the system they're found in, is irrational because it rejects possible explanations in favor of impossible contradictions. Asserting claims not grounded on evidence or logic, in the face of claims that are, is irrational because it privileges claims for which there is no good reason in favor of those for which there are good reasons. In short, rationality is simply the insistence upon good reasons to believe things - and thus being rational is not an arbitrary preference, it is the only way to ensure that there is a good reason to believe what you believe.

That good reason also gives others good reason to believe it (reasons only you can see are not good reasons), so rationality is not merely a reason to believe things, it is a method of convincing others to do so as well. (Contrast with "Creator", above.)

(IOW, the posting is one of the most sophisticated exmaples of begging the question that I've seen in a long time.)

I don't mean to be rude, but I keep getting the feeling you don't really understand the words you're using. "Begging the question" means making a circular argument - offering what you already believe as evidence that that belief itself is true. Many arguments invoking the "Creator" are grossly guilty in this respect. Asking for (non-circular) reasons for a belief is not, however; it's precisely the opposite of begging the question.

31

Marco:

You claim to be interested in making moral arguments on "rational grounds that tie facts of identity to moral concepts." What does that mean?

Just that Joe's (and Gushee's) claim is essentially a description of a category of beings in moral terms, grounded on non-moral facts about those beings, which makes no sense. Joe claims that all human beings (a reference to the identity of the creatures he is discussing - members of the category "human") have "dignity" (a moral term in his usage), because they are human beings and for no other reason (a reference to natural facts about those beings - i.e., that they have an identity as members of the group "human" - not a reference to their moral status). You can't do this. If you want to conclude that all the members of a certain group have a certain quality, then you have to show how that quality is linked to being a member of that group - you can't just say that members of a group do have a certain characteristic, and then cite that fact for an explanation of why the group members have that characteristic.

Imagine you knew nothing whatsoever of baseball, or sports in general. If someone said to you "Pedro Martinez is a World Champion", you might ask why they believed that. If they gave you the answer "He's a member of the Boston Red Sox", that still wouldn't be an explanation. Even if you know what all those words mean, but don't know about baseball in detail, you couldn't figure out why the speaker thinks identity (being a member of a certain group) and other characteristics (being a champion) are logically linked. In fact, they're not. They're linked only by the fact that the group "Boston Red Sox" is also characterized by all its members being World Champions (for now). You can't tell if the stranger is right or wrong simply by listening to the incomplete explanation "Martinez is on the Red Sox team"; you must have the added fact that "being on the BoSox makes you a champion". Then it becomes a straightforward logical argument: "Pedro Martinez is a member of the Boston Red Sox. If you are a member of the Boston Red Sox, you are a World Champion. Therefore, Pedro Martinez is a World Champion." And notice that the first issue (who is Pedro Martinez) is a question of identity, or group membership, while the second (the BoSox are champions) is merely a fact we can discover by investigation. If anyone asked us "how do you know being on the Red Sox makes you a champion", we can simply point out that the Red Sox won the last World Championship (and the members of the Championship winning team are regarded as champions); this fact is amply recorded in newspapers and so forth. Thus, this conclusion ties identity to facts about the physical world, which in turn are confirmed by reliable evidence - all perfectly reasonable.

Joe and Gushee have a similar argument, but theirs does not rest on reliable evidence. They claim that being a member of the group "human" means you have "dignity" because "the Creator" gave all humans and nobody else "dignity". Here we have a question of group identity (who is or is not a human), and a claim of fact (all and only humans have dignity). But in this case the fact in question - God gave all and only humans "dignity" - is not a natural fact about the world; it is not something we can discover by investigation or referring to historical archives. It is merely a moral claim some people believe on the basis of their religion. To convince others, who do not already believe it, to accept Joe's conclusion, we must have some discoverable, objective fact that this moral claim is true. That is, we must have some sort of evidence or argument that makes "having moral dignity" a part of "being human" in the same way that "being a champion" is linked to "being a member of the Red Sox". But, in this case, there is no such tie - there is nothing we can point to and say "this is the reason human identity is tied to facts about moral status". We are given nothing more than Joe's and Gushee's word for this, when what we really need is evidence.

And is there a way of constructing such a moral framework that does not run afoul of the so-called naturalistic fallacy?

I think so, and most moral philosphers have thought so.

The standard approaches usually start by asserting that there is, in fact, something that is fundamentally good, aside from any natural facts. (For Kant, it was the good will - because it seeks the good in essence, not just by reference to the way the world happens to be. For the Utilitarians, it was whatever was seen as good by whoever was pursuing it - "good", for them, merely meant "desirable", and thus anything that was desired was good, to the person desiring it. For the social-contract theorists, lawless and violent life was clearly worse than civilized life, simply because it prevents any goals or ambitions humans might have. And so on.) Once granting this claim, a moral theory can be grounded on this objectively good thing. (This is left as an exercise for the reader. You may use both sides of the page.)

And how on earth is "consciousness or personhood" moral concepts?

They are the seats of (all, or much of) what is of moral value in human life. No matter what you think the grounding of morality is, you have to agree that what people think, feel, want, and experience has moral value. It matters morally how people feel, how they are treated, and what they want and whether or not they get it. Consciousness is a preliminary to having any such thoughts or feelings. Personhood is largely defined by our patterns of thought and feeling; the loss of the mental states that make up personhood (such as in advanced dementia) is often taken to mean loss of personhood. Thus, the presence of personhood or consciousness does have moral significance.

While I rarely agree with Joe, I am baffled why a defense of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights gets dismissed as "conservative creed."

As tgirsch pointed out, my reaction was to the Gushee quote, not the UN Declaration.

32

KTK:

Not to pick a nit, but the BoSox are not the world champions. That distinction belongs to the other Sox.

33

Robert, I’m basing my statement on an understanding of human nature as well as my own and others’ experience. It is both a priori and a posteriori knowledge rather than an assumption. This is not to say, however, that believers always operate under a trust in God and never under selfish pride. But I’ve named two possible sources of a sense of human dignity. Anyone can test/examine to see whether these sources are true.

It cannot be said that empathy is a given as a source of the concept of human dignity; if it is, and if all people can be said to derive dignity from the basic instinct you claim as its source, then the only way to explain lack of empathy or undignified treatment of people (by either themselves or other people) is to say that not everyone possesses this basic instinct, or that the instinct is not operative at all times, or that it is in some other way cancellable.

Even if the Golden Rule is intuited, which to a degree I do not dispute, it must have a source. If the source is human nature, then how do you explain violations of the Golden Rule? Is their source human nature also, and, if, so, how can and why do two opposing forces both originate in human nature?

I won’t dispute that theological presuppositions exist, but truth is not derived from them. Theology is an attempt to articulate actual truths as received and understood, not presupposed ones. You yourself are presupposing a basic instinct from which empathy flows, as well as presupposing that the Golden Rule is intuited.

KTK – you say that consciousness and personhood “are the seats of (all, or much of) what is of moral value in human life.” What objective, reliable evidence do you have of this?

You also say,
No matter what you think the grounding of morality is, you have to agree that what people think, feel, want, and experience has moral value. It matters morally how people feel, how they are treated, and what they want and whether or not they get it.

Why? Why do what people think, feel, want and experience have moral value? On what do you base this statement, and how can you prove that those grounds are reliable? What reason can you give for someone to accept and believe this statement?

On what do you base your definition of “moral?”

34

KTK – you say that consciousness and personhood “are the seats of (all, or much of) what is of moral value in human life.” What objective, reliable evidence do you have of this?

As I noted when I said it, consciousness and personhood are required to be able to experience and appreciate the events in one's life - and that matters morally. One can be biologically alive without consciousness or personhood, and some would claim that this carries great moral weight. But no one argues that mere biological life is the only thing that is of moral significance. If there is anything besides cellular metabolism that matters morally - and everyone believes that there is - then consciousness and personhood matter morally because they are pre-requisites to experiencing and benefiting from those other moral aspects to life. As for "objective, reliable evidence", ask someone who is not conscious and lacks personhood if they think I'm wrong. We'll wait for your answer.

Why do what people think, feel, want and experience have moral value? On what do you base this statement, and how can you prove that those grounds are reliable? What reason can you give for someone to accept and believe this statement?

Do you deny any of this? Do you really think there's reason to believe otherwise? Feel free to explain why nothing that people think, fee, want, or experience has moral value.

But, just to indulge you: people's experiences and values are morally significant because it is by way of those experiences and values that we partake of the "good" in life. (See my previous comment.) Whatever that good is, we can only experience it and benefit from incorporating it into our lives by way of our feelings and experiences, and we can only pursue it and build a moral life around it by way of our values and choices. If we had no feelings or values, we would be unable to pursue the moral good, and we wouldn't be aware of it when we did experience it - it wouldn't be possible to live a moral life at all.

As to the "grounds" for this claim, they are simply that all the events in our lives come to us by way of feelings and experiences. If you deny this, see a neurologist.

On what do you base your definition of “moral?”

Um, pretty much the normal one most people use:

mor·al
Pronunciation (môrl, mr-)
adj.
1. Of or concerned with the judgment of the goodness or badness of human action and character: moral scrutiny; a moral quandary.
2. Teaching or exhibiting goodness or correctness of character and behavior: a moral lesson.
3. Conforming to standards of what is right or just in behavior; virtuous: a moral life.

moral
Concerned with principles of right and wrong or conforming to standards of behavior and character based on those principles; "moral sense"; "a moral scrutiny"; "a moral lesson"; "a moral quandary"; "moral convictions"; "a moral life"

35

Kevin, I’m merely holding you to the same criterion you are requiring of Joe in regards to a convincing argument. You are making claims such as consciousness and personhood are required to be able to experience and appreciate the events in one's life - and that matters morally
and
One can be biologically alive without consciousness or personhood without offering proof. There is plenty of empirical evidence that a person can be biologically alive without being conscious, due to the definitions of what consciousness and being biologically alive are. But as to whether one can be biologically alive without having personhood is a matter of great debate, since different people accept different empirical factors as proof of personhood. There must be some criterion beyond the empirical, then, that determines which empirical factors qualify a human organism for personhood.

If everyone believes that there are things besides cellular metabolism that matter morally, which I don’t dispute, then my question is, “why? Upon what is this morality based? You say that morality matters because consciousness and personhood are pre-requisites for experiencing and benefitting from the moral aspects of life (which I do dispute, but that’s beside the point), but this does not explain why consciousness and personhood are pre-requisites, nor whether they really are.

(me:)Why do what people think, feel, want and experience have moral value? On what do you base this statement, and how can you prove that those grounds are reliable? What reason can you give for someone to accept and believe this statement?

(KTK:)Do you deny any of this? Do you really think there's reason to believe otherwise?

No, of course not. But I’m not looking for proof as to whether I or anyone else think that what matters or happens to people does or doesn’t have moral significance, I’m interested in your proof as to why. You offer that people’s experiences and values are the conduit by which they understand moral significance because they are the only way to know the good in life but this is an insufficient explanation. Experience and value have different properties. You do not explain what is entailed in experiencing or valuing moral good (or bad), nor do you give a basis for deciding what is a benefit and what is not, or for judging what is good. Neither does your explanation of the way that we apprehend morality (by way of feelings and experiences) explain where morality comes from.

Joe’s post is not about whether a non-sentient person can live a moral life; his argument is aimed toward sentient persons, whose thoughts and actions are of moral import toward both the sentient and the non-. The debate is about what constitutes human dignity outside of being sentient (a priori) but is morally incumbent upon those who are sentient. It is also about the sacredness of that state of being that no human being can produce that makes a person biologically alive and which lends the biologically alive person dignity because of its source.

36

Bonnie

You say that morality matters because consciousness and personhood are pre-requisites for experiencing and benefitting from the moral aspects of life (which I do dispute, but that’s beside the point), but this does not explain why consciousness and personhood are pre-requisites, nor whether they really are.

Bonnie you're asking a bogus question. It's like asking "why are we here"? Or "why do live in the third dimension and not the fourth"? Or "why do we call squirrels "squirrels" and cats "cats"?

There is no "why" associated with KTK's answer and explanation. Or, if you prefer, there is no answer to your question re "why" that is better than any other answer that you or I could make up on the spot, i.e.

"Why?" "Because the aboriginal diety Morgaborg, god of morality, made a deal with Zarkod, god of flowers, and he lost and their agreement was that Morgaborg would make consciousness and personhood pre-requisites for experiencing and benefitting from the moral aspects of life."

Satisfied? I'm not either but I only spent five seconds coming up with explanation. You probably can dream up a better one.

37

Reason is only a tool to be used by Man to understand what is true.

This is where Calvinism fails: instead of using Reason to understand the Word of God the way the Author intended it to be understood, it makes Reason greater than His revelation and "reasons" away what it finds distasteful.