1

I've been in a good number of secular philosophy classes. Often you hear professors make cutting remarks about Christians in academics, apologists, etc. However, I am amazed at the amount reverence given to Dr. Plantinga by all the agnostic and atheistic professors.

2

Not sure what you mean by have "restored the respectability of theism." Please explain.

3

Armando,

Not sure what you mean by have "restored the respectability of theism." Please explain

That was probably a poor choice of words for it fails to clarify that an idea/belief/position can be true and yet not be considered "respectable."

Before Plantinga (and his Calvin College proteges) came along, evangelicals had all but given up on analytic philosophy. Our beliefs and arguments about theism had fallen by the wayside and were considered disreputable because we had no one to champion them. After all, the truth requires a defender to protect it and we had no one who doing that in that area of philosophy. Plantinga was merely able to convince his colleagues about what we evangelicals already knew.

4

Whoop for Plantinga!

@Armando, read his "Advice to Christian Philosophers" (link above in Joe's article) for an example of his work to establish theism as intellectually respectable. Don't be fooled by the title; it's not just for philosophers but applies to all professions.

@Scott, Having been in the same position, I agree wholeheartedly.

5

I wouldn't agree with you about the attitude of philosophers to him and his work. They think his stuff on naturalism is nuts. They think his metaphysical views are really strange (and I mean the ones not having to do with God; I'm primarily thinking of a couple idiosyncratic views on haecceities, names, and other issues non-metaphysicians don't care about). The differences between him and other reliabilists and externalists in epistemology usually leave people siding with the others rather than him. I don't have these attitudes toward him really, but a lot of people I've rubbed shoulders with see him as overrated or at least as having had his time during the 70s-80s.

6

I should say that he was one of the nicest philosophers I've ever met, both times I met him. I was really disappointed when I was an undergrad that he wouldn't hear me out on what I was working on, simply because he didn't like the sound of it from my initial description. When I first met him, I told him I was a Christian, and he said "Well, so am I" as if I should think that was an incredible coincidence! Then I invited him to a Campus Crusade meeting that happened to be in the same building as my dorm, which also housed the hotel he was staying in. He had to go out after the talk with the philosophy faculty and grad students, but when he went back to the hotel he left me a nice note after founding out somehow how to get it to me. I still have it somewhere.

7

Jeremy,

I wouldn't agree with you about the attitude of philosophers to him and his work. They think his stuff on naturalism is nuts.

But can they refute his argument? No, not that I've seen.

8

"Not that I've seen."

You might want to read some epistemology or philosophy of science, then. I can guarantee that your failure to have read serious and damaging critiques hardly amounts to much.

Plantinga is respected, and may in fact be the most influential figure in philosophy of religion over the last 25 years, but with the exception of his concept of "defeat," he's gotten little serious attention outside of that sub-area, especially in the last few years.

9

Spot,

You might want to read some epistemology or philosophy of science, then. I can guarantee that your failure to have read serious and damaging critiques hardly amounts to much.

It's not that I haven't looked. It's that I've not found any. Perhaps you could point out some of these rebuttal arguements.

10

There is a book out there on arguments for Intelligent Design that presents a couple papers critiqing his arguments against naturalism. I forget the name of the book, but someone here probably knows it. He replies to them in the same book. You could read it and decide who comes out ahead. However, the reason it's hard to take you seriously on these matters is that everyone already knows which side you will think came out ahead.

11

Spot,

However, the reason it's hard to take you seriously on these matters is that everyone already knows which side you will think came out ahead.

You are correct, I tend to think that the Truth will come out ahead.

12

Two cheers for Alvin Plantinga! (That would have been three cheers if the style of Anglo-American analytic philosophy did not soooooooo put me to sleep.)

13

To Spot and Joe --

Here is the link to the book: _Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Argument Against Naturalism_. The link is:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0801487633/104-0901737-1231158?v=glance

To the person (forgive for forgetting who said it) who said philosophers consider his argument against naturalism nuts --

Sure, I understand the majority of philosophers disagree with his argument. And I think that is all you meant by your comment. But to say that they think it is nuts, I think is an overstatement. If they didn't take it seriously, then there would not be a book that is a collection of essays on it. The fact that there is a book written on it shows us that his argument is taken seriously and therefore well-respected, despite there being disagreement.

To everyone --

As far as Plantinga's respect is concerned, I think it is undoubted that he is the most respected individual in philosophy of religion. Secular professors grant that all the time.

I am not sure about his views on metaphysics, but it seems that _The Nature of Necessity_ is highly-respected. I've read dissertations and books that have quoted it.

His views on epistemology are well respected. I had a professor who was a good friend of mine yet very hostile to Christians in philosophy (especially the ones who he considers philosophers in apologists clothing). Time after time he would tell me not to read anything written by a philosopher who was a Christian unless it was philosophy of religion. Except for epistemology. He highly recommended that I read _Warrant: The Current Debate_ and _Warrant and Proper Function_ to get a detailed analysis and critique of contemporary views on epistemology.

Obviously I want to be careful and not project my little, meandering experience as the universal standard for all, but it just seems to be clear that he recieves a great amount of respect among the secular audience.

14

Jeremy (sorry I forgot your name in the previous section) --

I have a question for you. You mentioned Plantinga's metaphysical views on the following:

"idiosyncratic views on haecceities, names, and other issues non-metaphysicians don't care about"

Do you know if these views would be found in _The Nature of Necessity_ or should I look somewhere else? Just curious.

15

Gideon - did you fall asleep before the third cheer or downgrade it because of your own sloth? My philosophy days were pre-coffee, so I understand completely.

Joe - could you please change his place of employment to University of Notre Dame, its a small thing, but after the years I spent there, it drives me nuts.

He embodies a remarkable, but friendly, boldness for Christian philosophers and Christian scholars.

16

I was privileged to hear his inaugural lecture, "Advice to Christian Philosophers," at Notre Dame 20 years ago, when I was a graduate student there. He and I were members of the same church, so I got to know him there. I last saw him in May at Wheaton College, and he told me of his rather extraordinary travels in Iran, of all places, two years ago to lecture on christian philosophy, of all things. I have a great deal of respect for him for gaining an audience in one of the heartlands of Islam.

17

And, yes, it is indeed University of Notre Dame.

18

Thanks Joe, its a small school, but there are those who love it.

19

Dear Mr. Heinig:

My daughters would applaud you - we have a rule in the house that we may not use the words "boring" or "bored," and I broke it. But no, my dislike of the style of analytical philosophy is not the result of sloth. I concede that philosophy deals with difficult ideas, and that philosophers are sometimes obliged to use a technical language that involves some shorthand jargon, and that the reader of philosophy has the responsibility of learning the language. But I think analytical philosophers too often overdo the shorthand out of an unnecessary mathematician-envy.

20

The fact that there is an essay collection on Plantinga's argument against naturalism is hardly evidence that philosophers in general take him seriously, or don't think he's nuts. I see him mentioned once in a while by philosophers of religion, but if he's mentioned in a paper, talk, or other forum in epistemology, philosophy of science (where his views of naturalism would probably be most relevant), metaphysics, or any other field aside from phil. of religion these days, it is extremely rare, and almost always in passing (e.g. a quick nod to his view of "defeat," or maybe a paragraph on the topic).

Anyone else who keeps up with the literature who's had a different experience can correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think I am.

Joe, we all know you will side with the evangelical, the Christian, and the I.D. side. That is Truth to you, but it is Truth to you prior to any argument, and therefore no argument will sway you. That's why no one takes you seriously on such topics.

21

Spot,

Joe, we all know you will side with the evangelical, the Christian, and the I.D. side. That is Truth to you, but it is Truth to you prior to any argument, and therefore no argument will sway you. That's why no one takes you seriously on such topics.

If you seriously think I always take "the evangelical, the Christian, and the I.D. side" then I would say that you haven't been reading this blog for very long.

But back to the topic. You seem to be unimpressed by Plantinga's arguments against naturalism so I'm curious to hear how you think it fails.

22

Read the book.

23

Heh. "Read the book" is not an argument, Spot. And the entire point of Plantinga's enterprise has been to show, fairly convincingly, that someone having basic presuppositions (as you insist Mr. Carter has) does not exclude the possibility of that someone being onto truth.

24

"Read the book" isn't meant to be an argument. It's meant to say, "read the book." Joe has a habit of posting about topics on which he isn't very well read, and I think it would be good for him if he familiarized himself with the philosophical literature before claiming that Plantinga is anything more than a well-known philosopher of religion, or deciding that his arguments remain unrefuted.

I agree that having presuppositions does not preclude access to the truth. This is certainly not an idea that is new to Plantinga. Philosophers over on the continent have been saying this for about a century (or more, in some cases). However, my criticism of Joe is that, even if the arguments for his positions have been thoroughly refuted, he will not see it, because his acceptance of the position blinds him to that reality. He goes in knowing which argument will win, not because its conclusion is true, but because he agrees with it for reasons that have nothing to do with the arguments.

25

Spot,

Joe has a habit of posting about topics on which he isn't very well read, and I think it would be good for him if he familiarized himself with the philosophical literature before claiming that Plantinga is anything more than a well-known philosopher of religion, or deciding that his arguments remain unrefuted.

Your position would be stregthened if you would stop resorting to hand-waving and ad hominems and simply lay out the arguments that refute Plantinga's arguments against naturalism. You appear to be implying that you are aware of such a refutation that I have missed. Other than knowing about a book written on the subject, though, I haven't seen even a hint that you are aware of such a devastating refutation.

You seem to take the position that since you disagree with me that I must obviously not be "very well read." I'll readily admit that you could have a valid point. But around here you are expected to present a counter-argument when you make such a claim. Are you willing to do that or not?

26

This was the book to which I was referring. I had to look through my library records to find the title. See, I do actual work for my comments?

One of the articles in the book to which I was referring is online. You can find it here. Read the argument in full, and we can discuss it. In essence, it shows that Plantinga's use of probability is seriously flawed.

Plantinga's primary claim is that it is unlikely that our cognitive abilities evolved in such a way that they are reliable (usually described as P(R|N&E) is low or impossible to estimate, where R is reliable cognitive faculties, N is naturalism, and E is evolution). In essence, what he does here is produce an argument similar to that used for intelligent design. There is an explanatory gap, namely between the truth-directedness of our consciously experienced beliefs, and evolution, and this explanatory gap can never be filled by naturalism. Therefore, we should adopt a non-naturalistic explanation, namely the Christian God. This "explanatory gap" rests largely on the epiphenomenal character of consciously experienced beliefs (a character that many naturalists still deny), and on Plantinga's firm belief that nothing in current evolutionary theory and cognitive science leads us to believe that the prior probability of R is high.

The primary arguments against Plantinga relate to different parts of this. First of all, Plantinga presents no real reasons for his thinking that the prior probability of R is low. In fact, we have reasons for thinking it is quite high. These reasons relate to the "explanatory gap," and the epiphenomenal character of beliefs. Philosophers like Ruth Millikan, and neuroscientists like Edelman and Damasio, present strong reasons for thinking that our conscious beliefs are causally efficacious. Furthermore, even if our conscious experience of those beliefs is not causally efficacious, that experience, under most naturalistic views of mind, supervene (in a one-to-one fashion) on functional/neurological content of the non-conscious structures. Any biologist or evolutionary psychologist can tell you that accurate functional/neurological contents are adaptive, while inaccurate ones are not. If consciousness plays an adaptive role (as it does in Edelman and Damasio - e.g., as a bridge between the body and the world), it is causally efficacious (as it is if Millikan's conditions hold), and even if the conscious experience of those beliefs is not causally efficacious, the content on which it supervenes must be (note also that the vast majority of our cognition is unconsciuos, and therefore Plantinga's defeater's scope is so narrow as to make it pretty much irrelevant for naturalists).

Plantinga's main reply to this only touches one of the criticisms of his view. He argues that it is extremely unlikely that the supervening beliefs must be true. If we accept non-supervenience accounts, like those of Edelman, Damasio, or Millikan, this argument holds no water. However, if we adopt supervenience views, we have to wonder why we should accept Plantinga's incredulity. What does he mean by "truth," here? Presumably, a correspondence with reality. Supervenening beliefs may very well not contain the only content that corresponds completely with the functional/neural or environmental structures on which they supervene, but this is hardly problematic for a sophisticated theory of truth. The variations in this content are trivial, based on linguistic and other cultural conventions, and would be a problem for any theory of belief if truth required these conventions to be the only ones that could possibly correspond (only one language would be able to present the entire truth, or all languages that could present the entire truth would be perfectly translatable - i.e., every word in each language would have a perfectly corresponding word in every other... these are lessons the logical positivists learned the hard way). If we accept that variations in this content are trivial, in relation to truth, in that they are completely constrained by the functional/neurological content on which they supervene, and if we further accept the obvious position that the more accurate these latter contents are, the more adaptive our cognitive faculties will be, Plantinga's argument is done for.

In short, then, Plantinga's argument only works if we accept his incredulity, and ignore non-supervenience accounts of the causal role of beliefs, the limited role of consciousness in cognition, and the fact that even if we adopt a supervenience account of conscious beliefs, a view of truth that doesn't require a single corresponding mental vocabulary in which we might represent the content of conscious beliefs allows us to get "truth" through supervenience on adaptively accurate cognitive structures.

27

Spot,

One of the articles in the book to which I was referring is online. You can find it here. Read the argument in full, and we can discuss it.

I had read that article before but wasn’t aware that it was part of the collection of essays in that book.

In essence, it shows that Plantinga's use of probability is seriously flawed.

Naturally, I beg to differ. ; )

Plantinga's primary claim is that it is unlikely that our cognitive abilities evolved in such a way that they are reliable (usually described as P(R|N&E) is low or impossible to estimate, where R is reliable cognitive faculties, N is naturalism, and E is evolution). In essence, what he does here is produce an argument similar to that used for intelligent design. There is an explanatory gap, namely between the truth-directedness of our consciously experienced beliefs, and evolution, and this explanatory gap can never be filled by naturalism. Therefore, we should adopt a non-naturalistic explanation, namely the Christian God.

You have to admit that you are misrepresenting Plantinga’s argument. First of all, there is no “explanatory gap” since, if naturalism is correct, it doesn’t matter whether our beliefs are “true” or not. Plantinga is simply arguing that if you do believe that we can form true beliefs you cannot justify such a belief based on naturalism. Also, he only provides a defeater for naturalism, he doesn’t offer any non-naturalistic explanation, much less imply that the solution requires a Christian God.
This "explanatory gap" rests largely on the epiphenomenal character of consciously experienced beliefs (a character that many naturalists still deny), and on Plantinga's firm belief that nothing in current evolutionary theory and cognitive science leads us to believe that the prior probability of R is high.
Yes, and Plantinga is right. There is nothing that leads us to belief that the prior probability of R is high because it is not needed to explain our beliefs from an evolutionary standpoint.

The primary arguments against Plantinga relate to different parts of this. First of all, Plantinga presents no real reasons for his thinking that the prior probability of R is low. In fact, we have reasons for thinking it is quite high.

Nonsense. Imagine that if you were standing outdoors and threw a basketball into the air. What is the probability that you would sink a shot through a basketball hoop? Considering that you were throwing the ball randomly and your objective was not to make a basket, it would be pretty low. Unless true beliefs are required for survival then there is no reason at all to assume the probability is anything other than miniscule.

These reasons relate to the "explanatory gap," and the epiphenomenal character of beliefs. Philosophers like Ruth Millikan, and neuroscientists like Edelman and Damasio, present strong reasons for thinking that our conscious beliefs are causally efficacious.

Millikan, though, is only able to lead to that connection by circular reasoning. She defines “proper function” as “what is adapted for.” That doesn’t tell us anything about whether we can have true beliefs.

Furthermore, even if our conscious experience of those beliefs is not causally efficacious, that experience, under most naturalistic views of mind, supervene (in a one-to-one fashion) on functional/neurological content of the non-conscious structures.

I’m not sure of your point here.

Any biologist or evolutionary psychologist can tell you that accurate functional/neurological contents are adaptive, while inaccurate ones are not.

I must say that I’m rather skeptical of that claim. It is a begging the question to assume that because a function has “adapted” that is it must have been functioning in an “accurate” manner. Even if that is true it doesn’t tell us anything about correspondence with truth.
If consciousness plays an adaptive role (as it does in Edelman and Damasio - e.g., as a bridge between the body and the world), it is causally efficacious (as it is if Millikan's conditions hold), and even if the conscious experience of those beliefs is not causally efficacious, the content on which it supervenes must be.

Consciousness can play an adaptive role without leading to true beliefs. Causal efficiciency, re Millikan, is simply an assumption that adaptation must have occurred because of a corresponding true belief. And there is no reason to think that the conscious experience must supervene on reality. Mentally ill people have conscious experiences that don’t supervene on the what is true or real.

(note also that the vast majority of our cognition is unconsciuos, and therefore Plantinga's defeater's scope is so narrow as to make it pretty much irrelevant for naturalists).

Eh? Is that some sort of Freud-of-the-Gaps theory? How can we empirically detect the unconscious?

Plantinga's main reply to this only touches one of the criticisms of his view. He argues that it is extremely unlikely that the supervening beliefs must be true. If we accept non-supervenience accounts, like those of Edelman, Damasio, or Millikan, this argument holds no water.

That’s because Millikan’s arguments hold now water.

However, if we adopt supervenience views, we have to wonder why we should accept Plantinga's incredulity. What does he mean by "truth," here? Presumably, a correspondence with reality. Supervenening beliefs may very well not contain the only content that corresponds completely with the functional/neural or environmental structures on which they supervene, but this is hardly problematic for a sophisticated theory of truth.

This “sophisticated theory of truth” would simply be a claim that because our beliefs lead to R, they must correspond to reality. Reality being that which lead us to adapt R.
In short, then, Plantinga's argument only works if we accept his incredulity, and ignore non-supervenience accounts of the causal role of beliefs, the limited role of consciousness in cognition, and the fact that even if we adopt a supervenience account of conscious beliefs, a view of truth that doesn't require a single corresponding mental vocabulary in which we might represent the content of conscious beliefs allows us to get "truth" through supervenience on adaptively accurate cognitive structures.
I guess if, as you seem to imply, we throw out any common definitions of truth, reality, and reason then Plantinga’s argument may very well fail.

I’ll address more arguments from reason next week. I think then it will become apparent to everyone that naturalism gives us no reason to think that beliefs can be true. A committed naturalist would simply shrug and say, “So what, truth isn’t required for survival” and move on. But I don’t think most people (even you) are willing to accept that conclusion.

28

Mr. Strauss,

I was only teasing with my 'sloth' comment and agree with your point. 'Clarity sacrificed in pursuit of precision' was the way I used to think of it.

29

Naturally, I beg to differ

How? What are your criticisms of the linked article? Remember, we require arguments here.

You have to admit that you are misrepresenting Plantinga’s argument. First of all, there is no “explanatory gap” since, if naturalism is correct, it doesn’t matter whether our beliefs are “true” or not. Plantinga is simply arguing that if you do believe that we can form true beliefs you cannot justify such a belief based on naturalism. Also, he only provides a defeater for naturalism, he doesn’t offer any non-naturalistic explanation, much less imply that the solution requires a Christian God.

No, I'm not misrepresenting Plantinga's argument, as he formulates it to get around the major objections. He argues that there are two gaps. The first is the one between supervenience and truth, and the second is the one between behavior and conscious experience. Without them, his argument fails. Again, this is another case where reading the book is all I can say.

Nonsense. Imagine that if you were standing outdoors and threw a basketball into the air. What is the probability that you would sink a shot through a basketball hoop? Considering that you were throwing the ball randomly and your objective was not to make a basket, it would be pretty low. Unless true beliefs are required for survival then there is no reason at all to assume the probability is anything other than miniscule.

This is just a terrible analogy. Evolution isn't about throwing basketballs in the air randomly, and since its adaptive to have accurate representations (beliefs), at least at the neural/functional level, and since we have reasons (Millikan's, Damasio;'s, Edelman's, etc.) to believe that beliefs are in fact causally efficacious, there's nothing random about it.

Millikan, though, is only able to lead to that connection by circular reasoning. She defines “proper function” as “what is adapted for.” That doesn’t tell us anything about whether we can have true beliefs.

Which of Millikan's arguments are you addressing? This seems irrelevant to Millikan's points.

I must say that I’m rather skeptical of that claim. It is a begging the question to assume that because a function has “adapted” that is it must have been functioning in an “accurate” manner. Even if that is true it doesn’t tell us anything about correspondence with truth.

Begging the question? Not at all. Again, read the book, or some evolutionary biology or neuroscience (I recommend Bayesian models of perceptual evolution, as an example of the importance of accuracy).

Consciousness can play an adaptive role without leading to true beliefs. Causal efficiciency, re Millikan, is simply an assumption that adaptation must have occurred because of a corresponding true belief. And there is no reason to think that the conscious experience must supervene on reality. Mentally ill people have conscious experiences that don’t supervene on the what is true or real.

Umm... no. Read Millikan. This isn't the argument for causal efficacy at all.

Eh? Is that some sort of Freud-of-the-Gaps theory? How can we empirically detect the unconscious?

No, the "cognitive unconscious" is nothing like Freud's version of the unconscious. And yes, we can empirically detect unconscious process, we have, and we continue to do so. Dan Wegner's work is a good place to start, but you can also find unconscious processes in the research on everything from attention to memory to analogical reasoning.

That’s because Millikan’s arguments hold now water.

Again, we require arguments here. And I mean arguments against Millikan's actual position. Are you familiar with it?

This “sophisticated theory of truth” would simply be a claim that because our beliefs lead to R, they must correspond to reality. Reality being that which lead us to adapt R.

No, the argument would be that our neural/functional representations are reliable, and that the supervenience of beliefs on those reliable representations causes them to be reliable as well.

I guess if, as you seem to imply, we throw out any common definitions of truth, reality, and reason then Plantinga’s argument may very well fail.

Ummm... this isn't an uncommon post-positivist view of truth. In fact, Plantinga requires a currently uncommon one for his argument to work.

Before you offer further comments, I beg you, plead with you, actually read the arguments! You should definitely read Millikan, but also the actual papers in the two books, including Plantinga's responses. Arguing that naturalists don't offer reasons without actually reading the full expression of their reasons is disingenuous at best.

30

Mr. Heinig: No offense taken. I should practice my sense of humour a little more easily, though, shouldn't I! I like that phrase: "Clarity sacrificed in pursuit of precision." But I don't know that I can agree with it.