After recent discussions on the question of whether naturalism is self-refuting, I’ve developed a bizarre concern: I’m worried my neighbors might be zombies.
Don’t laugh. It’s certain possible. For the zombies I’m talking about aren’t the type found in horror movies like 28 Days Later or Dawn of the Dead and they don’t (at least as far as I know) eat people’s brains. These zombies, as they are defined in the field of philosophy, are beings that behave like us and may share our functional organization and even, perhaps, our neurophysiological makeup without having conscious experiences.
So defined, zombies are rather tricky. You can’t tell by looking at someone whether they are a normal sentient person or an unconscious creature. It also does no good to directly ask them. Some people who are not zombies will claim they are simply because they are eccentric. And some zombies will claim they are people even though they will deny the attributes necessary for consciousness.
There is, however, one reliable feature that might be useful. Zombies appear to have a peculiar attachment to what is often referred to as physicalism or materialism, the idea that everything that exists is, in some sense, physical and that nothing nonphysical exists at all. These odd creatures generally come in two basic forms:
Epiphenomenalist zombies believe that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events.
Eliminativist zombies claim that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist.
The eliminativist perspective is the easiest to dismiss since it is inherently self-refuting. For example, one of the claims made by these types of zombies is that is impossible to make an assertion about anything. This leads to the question of how it is possible to make an assertion that it is impossible to make an assertion? The eliminativist will say that while it is true that they are making such an assertion, it really has no meaning since assertions can’t be made.
As you might imagine, these zombies aren’t taken too seriously. Unfortunately, most other zombies do not realize that when they say that science will one day be able to prove (or at least explain) how consciousness is purely physical this is what they are talking about. This puts them in the rather peculiar position of claiming that science will one day present a hypothesis that hypotheses don’t exist.
The other, more common variety of zombie is the epiphenomenalist. They are the types that claim that emergent properties (such as the mind) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities (the physical body) and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them. In essence their argument is that when the right physical properties are combined just so, a new, completely distinct, nonphysical property emerges. (Think of it as a “God did it” explanation with “matter” filling in for “God.”)
To restate this idea in a another form, we can say that from a complex physical system P (i.e., P is a human body) arises an emergent property or substance M (i.e., M is the human mind). According to the argument, matter alone does not have the ability to produce M unless it is arranged in the form of P. (This is merely a complicated way of saying that matter can’t “think” unless it is formed into a brain.)
So far there’s nothing that most non-zombies would necessarily have to disagree with. The controversial assumption, however, is not so much whether P can cause M but whether events that originate in M can cause events in P.
Let me provide an example of what I mean. Imagine that after touching a red spot on an electric stove and burning my hand, I form a belief that touching a stove will burn me. In the future, this belief causes me to pull back my hand when I get close to a hot stove.
What has happened is that a physical event in P (getting burned) causes an event in M (my mind feels pain). M produces an M event (a belief that anytime I touch a hot stove I will get burned) that causes P* (an automatic reaction in which I pull my hand back anytime I get close to a stove).
We can put this in diagram form as follows:
M--->M*
| |
P P*
The epiphenomenalist, though, will disagree with my claim. Since, in their view, mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events, my belief could not have affected my behavior.
Instead my behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. Or something like that. The important part, in the epiphenomenalist view, is that my mental events played no causal role in this process.
Their position could be diagrammed as follows:
M M*
| |
P --> P*
My brain (P) produces my mind (M) but my reaction (P*) is not caused by a mental event (M*).
In our example, event M* would be considered a supra-natural, preternatural, or even supernatural event. (Because of the connotation associated with supernatural, I recommend we use supra-natural.) But, according to our zombie neighbors, there are no supra-natural events, only physical ones. This leads to what philosopher Todd C. Moody calls “conscious inessentialism”:
Conscious inessentialism clearly entails that any given behaviour could also occur without conscious accompaniments. The only reason why one would suppose that certain behaviours do require conscious accompaniments is that the behaviours in question appear to require mental activity of some sort. Since conscious inessentialism tells us that no mental activity requires conscious accompaniments, it follows that no overt behaviour requires them either. So if conscious inessentialism is true, zombies are possible. Indeed, if conscious inessentialism is true, it is quite possible for an entire world of zombies to evolve, which is the premise of the current thought experiment. It is behaviours, after all, and not subjective states, that are subjected to evolutionary selection pressures. If those behaviours do not require consciousness, then evolution is indifferent to it. That the zombie problem may have significant metaphysical implications is concluded by Robert Kirk in a paper on the topic: `it is hard to see how any intelligible version of Materialism could be reconciled with the logical possibility of Zombies, given that we are sentient'.
But is our neighbor actually a sentient being or a zombie? If conscious inessentialism is true, then it’s possible that sentient beings could have a zombie twin. Their twin would be exactly like them in every respect (physically and behaviorly) except for one: they would not be conscious. It’s also possible that zombie twins may have a propensity to kill their sentient counterpart, hide their body, and assume their life, without anyone being able to tell the difference.
I have to confess that the idea of non-sentient beings living in my neighborhood kind of creeps me out. No doubt they are decent…creatures, but I’d still like to know. That’s why I’ve devised a test to help determine the probability that a person is a sentient being rather than a physical, behavior-driven drone.
Starting from myself, I can establish a number of relevant criteria. I know that I have a mind because I use it to think (though rather poorly) and to form beliefs. I also know that since my beliefs can affect my behavior, that my mind is distinct from my physical body.
On this point I am either right or I am wrong. If I am wrong then I am unable to tell if I myself am a zombie and the test is moot since everyone could – and most likely would – be zombies also. If I am right, though, I can assume that other minds would function like mine since, as most philosophers concede, the problem of “other minds” can only be solved by analogy.
Other people, who truthfully claim that they believe mental events can cause physical events, would have minds that function much the same as mine. It’s the people that deny this claim, though, that are suspect. If they claim that the only events that can exist are physical events then there is no way to distinguish them from their zombie twins. Their behavior would be identical in every respect and they would both claim to truthfully believe that mental events do not cause physical events. Consistency would also require them to admit that consciousness really wouldn’t matter anyway; they would be, with respect to all relevant functions, just like zombies.
This leads us to conclude that anyone who claims to believe in materialism is either a zombie twin or a person who believes in “zombie functionalism.” We are not only unable to tell the difference, we can’t really know why such a difference would matter. Sure they may not try to eat our brains. But you never know when they might try to eat our qualia.
Note: My use of the term “zombie” is similar to but not exactly the same as the way it is used in the philosophical literature. Most uses of the term refer to the potential existence of such creatures in other worlds. Admittedly, the fact that people with PhD’s write academic papers on whether zombies can exist is quite amusing. But few would go so far as to suggest, as I do, that our neighbors could be zombies.
Some philosophers do use zombies as an argument against materialism:
The general structure of the zombist's argument is, as follows:
(1) Zombies are possible.
(2) If zombies are possible then materialism fails.
(C0) Therefore, materialism fails.
It's that simple. Clearly, the materialist is embarrassed by this argument. It is not that he cannot answer to the zombist’s challenge. He has even more than one objection to it. Still, the zombist has the upper hand in this game: He can offer an easily comprehensible and appealing idea (and we all like simple but powerful ideas) and the only thing the materialist can do is-as it seems-to hover on the details.
1
"But few would go so far as to suggest, as I do, that our neighbors could be zombies."
Indeed. David Chalmers for example, even though he uses zombie arguments all the time, does argue that zombies are not actually possible.
posted on 07.19.2004 1:55 AM2
Macht,
Yes he does and I admit that I can't understand why considering the stretches of imagination that he resorts to. The conclusion he comes to in Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia", for example, is rather odd:
In any case, the conclusion is a strong one. It tells us that systems that duplicate our functional organization will be conscious even if they are made of silicon, constructed out of water-pipes, or instantiated in an entire population. The arguments in this paper can thus be seen as offering support to some of the ambitions of artificial intelligence. The arguments also make progress in constraining the principles in virtue of which consciousness depends on the physical. If successful, they show that biochemical and other non-organizational properties are at best indirectly relevant to the instantiation of experience, relevant only insofar as they play a role in determining functional organization.
The idea that the population of China would become "conscious" if properly arranged is even stranger than believing in zombies.
posted on 07.19.2004 2:06 AM3
"The idea that the population of China would become "conscious" if properly arranged is even stranger than believing in zombies."
I know. Strange. Chalmers believes in something called panpsychism which roughly holds that consciousness is as fundamental to the universe as matter/energy. Check out this article: What is it like to be a thermostat? He basically talks about whether a thermostat could be considered conscious or not. Although he doesn't answer "Yes," he doesn't say "Of course not, that's ridiculous" either.
posted on 07.19.2004 2:55 AM4
Joe, I'm impressed that you've gone out and read some of the literature. Some of us might have been too hard on your last argument, but it really was a bad one. I think you've probably realized that now. However, actually going out and doing the work to better formulate your view shows that I was wrong to assume that your vision was clouded by your preconceptions. These issues are very complex, and there's a library's-worth of literature on them. When attacking a view, it's good to know how the adherents of that view counter such attacks. I'll give you some good starting places here.
You're right that eliminativism isn't widely accepted among philosophers (as far as I can tell), but it is fairly popular among neuroscientists. Patricia and Paul Churchland are the position's torchbearers, and you can read their works for the arguments that lead them to the eliminative materialism perspective. Paul Churchland's Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind is a very good, and even-handed introduction to the issues. I recommend it even if you disagree with his basic view. Eliminativists, by the way, don't claim that you cannot make assertions. Quite the opposite. However, when describing what assertions are, under the eliminativist view, you can't make reference to beliefs or thoughts. Instead, you would describe the physical processes that led to you producing a particular statement. Statements (including assertions) are in, but the mentalistic or folk psychological vocabulary behind them would be out.
Epiphenomenalism is a bit trickier, because there are different formulations. There's the psychologist's formulation, to which research by people like Libet and Dan Wegner (he has several papers online at his website, and see also here) has lended support. Then there's the philosophical version, to which even David Chalmers adheres (at least sometimes). I think it arises out of difficulty in coming up with an adequate materialist or non-materialist account of mental causation. Your old friend Kim, and my personal favorite, Putnam have arguments against the philosophical version of epiphenomenalism (the links for those two are to books in which they present their arguments).
Even trickier than epiphenomenalism are the qualia problem (hence, the hard problem) and zombies. There are plenty who think that qualia are a pseudo-problem (one of those unfortunate linguistic accidents... you know, when language goes on holiday). The most prominent of these is Daniel Dennett, who has argued against their existence in many places. Some examples are here, here (reference only), here, here, and here). I also like Alva Noë's sensorimotor contingency theory, which attempts to do away with qualia in a different way (see also his very good paper here. Many physicalists have dealt extensively with the qualia problem (see, for example, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here). There are plenty of others, but most of those are online, so they make for easy starting places. Each has plenty of references.
Zombies, to me, are silly. Fortunately, I'm not the only one who thinks so. Chalmers' formulation (and his argument for consciousness) rests on some tricky modal logic, as I think you noted, and there have been several counterarguments to his. Unsurprisingly, Dennett (see also here) has been outspoken in his opposition to zombie arguments. So have many others (see examples here, here, here, and here).
Mental causation (papers with many references can be found here, here (a good one), and here, an OK book on the topic, and a better one) is likely to remain a problem for physicalists, be they reductionists or non-reductionists, and non-physicalists alike. That is, at least until people start adopting the sort of natural realism (a form of direct realism) that you get in James, Dewey (sometimes), Austin (the linked book is a great one for those interested in philosophy of mind), or Putnam (and Putnam's version of Wittgenstein), or an ecological or sensorimotor account of the mental All three are, or can be, physicalist/materialist perspectives which may help to do away with things like the hard problem, in addition to mental causation problems, as they avoid Catesianism altogether.
There are some very good books that provide excellent introductions to philosophy of mind and its problems. `Two are referenced above (under Dennett and Churchland). Here are some others:
Oh, one more clarification: the zombie arguments are usually designed to show that identity or reductionist theories of mind are intractible. This does not mean that materialism or physicalism are intractible. Even Chalmers is still a physicalist, metaphysically. He's often been accused of being a metaphysical dualist (which is not surprising, when you see something like your M--->M over P P, though I think most versions would have causation going upwards and downwards and between P and P, though Kim's argument that you presented in the last post was meant to point out that the downward causation is a big problem for non-reductionists - you were right about that), but Chalmers swears up and down that he's not a metaphysical dualist. There aren't many philosophers of mind who are. Those of Chalmer's ilk, like Ned Block, Colin McGinn, who thinks the mind-body problem is unsolvable, and Thomas Nagel, whose view that qualitative states are impenetrable is famous (and batty!), propose something more like logical dualism (qualia are logically, but not metaphysically, distinct from brain processes, whatever that means) when they propose dualistic views.
posted on 07.19.2004 5:29 AM5
Zombies appear to have a peculiar attachment to what is often referred to as physicalism or materialism, the idea that everything that exists is, in some sense, physical and that nothing nonphysical exists at all.
You outed me, how did you know? I just take exception with trying to squeeze me into your two zombie categories. The closest one is "Epiphenomenalist zombies" where you state they believe, "believe that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events." I do believe mental events have effects upon physical events but not in and of themselves. I can't make the glass of water on my table move with my mind, but I can move my arm, pick it up with my hand and then move it that way. That is the mental event causing physical effects.
Don't all creatures with brains have mental events? Are they not interfacing and influencing the physical world? From your philisophical gymnastics we will therefore conclude their mental states are partially a byproduct of supernatural entangling. No? It's just us humans right? I see...we're soooo special...
posted on 07.19.2004 8:19 AM6
Hunt,
When attacking a view, it's good to know how the adherents of that view counter such attacks. I'll give you some good starting places here.
This is the first time that I’ve seen a comment with more links than the original post. ; )
I appreciate you taking the time and going to all the effort to collect thos references. I’ll definitely check them out.
You're right that eliminativism isn't widely accepted among philosophers (as far as I can tell), but it is fairly popular among neuroscientists.
I didn’t really mean to imply that there were no adherents to the position. Mainly what I meant was that when the average person heard an explanation for what eliminativism actually is they would reject the idea as absurd.
Eliminativists, by the way, don't claim that you cannot make assertions. Quite the opposite. However, when describing what assertions are, under the eliminativist view, you can't make reference to beliefs or thoughts. Instead, you would describe the physical processes that led to you producing a particular statement. Statements (including assertions) are in, but the mentalistic or folk psychological vocabulary behind them would be out.
I still that is a bit suspect. I’m not sure how they think they can make an observation, judge that it is true (corresponds with reality), and form a verbal statement without every forming a belief or thought.
Zombies, to me, are silly. Fortunately, I'm not the only one who thinks so. Chalmers' formulation (and his argument for consciousness) rests on some tricky modal logic, as I think you noted, and there have been several counterarguments to his.
Don’t you think, as Macht pointed out, that Chalmers is relying on a form of panpsychism? If so I imagine that would be almost as offensive to most materialists as dualism.
Oh, one more clarification: the zombie arguments are usually designed to show that identity or reductionist theories of mind are intractible.
Just out of curiosity, which theory would you say that your view most likely aligns with?
posted on 07.19.2004 10:45 AM7
Mr. Moderate,
I do believe mental events have effects upon physical events but not in and of themselves. I can't make the glass of water on my table move with my mind, but I can move my arm, pick it up with my hand and then move it that way. That is the mental event causing physical effects.
But are mentally events physical or supra-natural? If they are physical then they are not really mental at all, just anther physical event.
Don't all creatures with brains have mental events? Are they not interfacing and influencing the physical world? From your philisophical gymnastics we will therefore conclude their mental states are partially a byproduct of supernatural entangling. No? It's just us humans right? I see...we're soooo special...
But are animals self-concious? Can they form a belief (as distinguished from instinct) and act on it? I’m not saying they can’t, by the way, I’m just asking. Are our mental faculties qualitatively different than animals or are we exactly the same?
posted on 07.19.2004 10:49 AM8
But are mentally events physical or supra-natural? If they are physical then they are not really mental at all, just anther physical event.
I'd say they are physical. When we say they are "mental" we are talking about our brains interpretation of these physical events. It's a big loop where one physical process observing another physical process is creating a certain physical result that we are call "interpreting it as a mental process."
But are animals self-concious? Can they form a belief (as distinguished from instinct) and act on it? I’m not saying they can’t, by the way, I’m just asking. Are our mental faculties qualitatively different than animals or are we exactly the same?
Is there a finite break in the operations of brains at the point of self-consciousness? High level animals show that they are capable of learning things. That is not instinct. You can teach a dog to respond to certain verbal commands to do certain things. There is nothing instinctual about it. It is the result of the same process that we have, qualitatively. If you don't believe it is the same thing, then you are saying that the brain of a self-aware human functions with different mechanisms than one who is not self-aware. While I'd agree that the bumbling vegetable is certainly operating at a different level quantitatively, I don't think you can argue that the mechanisms within the brain are qualitatively any different.
posted on 07.19.2004 11:15 AM9
Mr. Moderate,
I'd say they are physical.
So why do you take exception with being in the zombie category? How would I be able to distinguish you from your zombie twin?
Is there a finite break in the operations of brains at the point of self-consciousness?
I don’t know, but it wouldn’t certainly appear so. Except for PETA and Peter Singer (and even he probably wouldn’t disagree), I don’t think too many people believe that animals are capable of the same abilities (i.e., abstract thought) that humans are.
You can teach a dog to respond to certain verbal commands to do certain things.
But those are only behaviorally developed responses.
posted on 07.19.2004 11:38 AM10
So why do you take exception with being in the zombie category? How would I be able to distinguish you from your zombie twin?
There is no zombie twin. I guess we're all zombies if you force me to use your dichotomy. Of course as I've said before, your two zombie categories do not comprise the whole of range of all us zombies.
I don’t think too many people believe that animals are capable of the same abilities (i.e., abstract thought) that humans are.
That's quantitative not qualitative in my mind. The same underlying neurological processes that fire off in our "abstract thought" process are the same in the problem solving characteristics of these non-self aware creatures.
But those are only behaviorally developed responses.
They therefore are not instinctual. They are, dare we say, thoughts. Are these not all physical? Do you believe a spirit is animating these creatures as well? Which sort of zombie is a dog according to your breakdown above? I'd again say none of them but the closest being Epiphenomenalist zombies with again the flaw in that description being that it is demonstratable that thoughts (neuron firings at a low level) do have effects on physical events.
posted on 07.19.2004 11:44 AM11
Here's a "common-sense" law of human behavior for you to contemplate.
Whenever a human being runs across another human being who doesn't agree with them, or is someone whom they don't approve of, the first thing they will attempt to do is to take away the humanity of that other person.
They make every logical-sounding argument that the other person is an "infidel", or "sub-human", or "immoral" or "deviant" or "criminal" or --a *zombie*.
This way, if they can create enough disdain or fear, or prejudice towards the other person, then they can hurt them or even kill them with the justification in the back of their mind that they weren't "real" people after all.
Of course, the Nazi's did this to great effect with the Jews. Hitler had very logical, reasonable sounding arguments for his actions. Or for a more modern example, you can look to the Republicans, who are currently doing this with great effect with homosexuals, especially regarding "defending marriage".
On the face of it, it seems an odd thing to me that a website with the title of "Evangelical Outpost" would encourage this kind of despicable and immoral de-humanizing behavior.
I have to wonder, exactly what message it is you think you are evangelizing.
And for whom? Are you so sure that it's on the behalf of God? Or could it be coming from somewhere a little darker? Or is it just your own petty prejudices, which may or may not have anything to do with what God thinks?
If you do Evil in the name of Good is it still Good? Maybe you should take another look at that Book that I'm told people who call themselves "Evangelicals" are always reading.
Not that I'm trying to de-humanize you, but after all, "Evangelical" is a title you have given yourself.
posted on 07.19.2004 12:16 PM12
Ah, Patrick, but I'm sure Joe is only "joking" (you know, like Riordan was recently when he called that kid a "stupid dirty little girl," or Arnold was when he called the Democrats "girlie men" -- hahahahah, gawd those guys bring tears to my eyes, they are so darn funny).
For a real good time, you might want to check out The Pandas Thumb where Joe's hero, Philip Johnson, is being humanized "big time."
http://www.pandasthumb.org/pt-archives/000361.html
posted on 07.19.2004 12:34 PM13
Patrick,
Whenever a human being runs across another human being who doesn't agree with them, or is someone whom they don't approve of, the first thing they will attempt to do is to take away the humanity of that other person.
You have completely missed point, Patrick. I am not attempting to “de-humanize” anyone. All I did was follow their thinking to it conclusion. I realize that some people would prefer to ignore the logical outcome of their worldviews but I don’t think that pointing out such flaws is an illegitimate enterprise.
Of course, the Nazi's did this to great effect with the Jews. Hitler had very logical, reasonable sounding arguments for his actions.
Um, no he didn’t. His reasons were rooted in emotion, not logic.
Or for a more modern example, you can look to the Republicans, who are currently doing this with great effect with homosexuals, especially regarding "defending marriage".
No one is taking the “humanity away” from homosexuals. To even imply such is to show that you don’t intend to be taken seriously. Same-sex marriage advocates are simply trying to define a word in a way that has never been used before. That would be like me trying to redefine the word “majority” so that I could take advantage of affirmative action programs. By your logic, the people who would deny me doing so would be making me “sub-human.”
On the face of it, it seems an odd thing to me that a website with the title of "Evangelical Outpost" would encourage this kind of despicable and immoral de-humanizing behavior.
Yes, it would if I were doing that. But, as just about anyone but you would concede, I am not.
And for whom? Are you so sure that it's on the behalf of God? Or could it be coming from somewhere a little darker? Or is it just your own petty prejudices, which may or may not have anything to do with what God thinks?
While I can’t claim to know all the thoughts of God, one of them I am pretty sure he is clear on is that He exists.
If you do Evil in the name of Good is it still Good? Maybe you should take another look at that Book that I'm told people who call themselves "Evangelicals" are always reading.
Set aside the hype for a moment and read the post again. If you really think that I was attempting to de-humanize someone rather than pointing out the absurdity of their worldview then there is really no pointing in discussing the issue further. Obviously, you have some misguided notion about my motives and that no amount of evidence are argument would could convince you otherwise.
14
Larry,
Ah, Patrick, but I'm sure Joe is only "joking" (you know, like Riordan was recently when he called that kid a "stupid dirty little girl," or Arnold was when he called the Democrats "girlie men" -- hahahahah, gawd those guys bring tears to my eyes, they are so darn funny).
The only people that I could see being offended by Arnold’s remarks would be men who self-identify as “girlie men.” Are you saying that you fall into that category Larry?
For a real good time, you might want to check out The Pandas Thumb where Joe's hero, Philip Johnson, is being humanized "big time."
As usual Larry, the Big Brains at Panda’s Thumb are trying to latch onto the most trivial of points because they can’t explain the underlying inconsistencies in their own views.
But to spare people the trouble of having to wade through that drivel, let me summarize their point:
Philip Johnson was asked whether he believed the age of the earth was 4000 million years or closer to 100,000 years. He said that it was the former but that he had not investigated the subject because is was irrelevant to his complaints against Darwinism. The earth could be 460 billion years old and it wouldn’t change anything.
Next, Johnson made the statement (without being asked) that he takes no position on the age of the earth. That shouldn’t be surprising, of course, since he said earlier that, for the purposes of his argument, that he didn't have a firm position nor did it really matter.
They mention all this as evidence that Johnson might be reaching out to Young Earth Creationists. Shocking and scandalous!
And, as usual, a typical lack of logic by the Panda boys. That style of thinking is typical, which is why I don’t bother to read that blog anymore.
When they explain how "consciousness" evolved through purely evolutionary processes, then I’ll be impressed.
posted on 07.19.2004 12:56 PM15
"The earth could be 460 billion years old and it wouldn’t change anything. "
That's the whole point, isn't it? That Johnson's view is that life on earth couldn't have evolved, period, no matter whether the Earth is 4000 years old or whether it's "460 billion" years old.
It certainly matters to evolutionary biologists, however. If the earth is only 4000 years old, then evolutionary biology is mostly BOGUS and an alternative explanation needs to be proposed.
For Philip Johnson (or any other would-be basher of modern biology) to assert that he has "no position" on the Earth's age or that it is "irrelevant" is just absurd.
Similarly absurd (from a scientific point of view) are Philip's contentions that he has no clue as to whether the Grand Canyon was created within the last several thousand years or not.
Left unsaid by Johnson is whether he believes that minature angels live in the earpieces of phones and whether different species of animals speak to each other whenever humans aren't listening.
posted on 07.19.2004 1:45 PM16
When they explain how "consciousness" evolved through purely evolutionary processes, then I’ll be impressed.
You know this statement is a setup Joe. Let's imagine an ideal scenario where each ancestor of each species was perfectly preserved. With this ideal baseline set we would be able to show the entire evolutionary process. Would that be good enough? In that case you would say that there is no proof that it happened spontaneously therefore you can't claim it was an evolutionary mechanism. In a more real world scenario we cannot have this kind of collection of data. Fossilization proves too fickle a process. You therefore will always claim that there will always be gaps and regardless of how fine grained we fill in the gaps you refuse to accept any argument that potentially takes god out of the picutre.
Let's take a different scenario. For the sake of argument I've designed an experiment that allows for the development from nothing to complex intelligent life in the matter of a few years. I chronical all stages of development and show that these creatures are in fact self aware. Would this be proof of you that our consciousness developed through evolutionary mechanisms? You're argument then would be that just because it worked in this experiment doesn't mean that's what happened to us.
I know these are the arguments because these parallel the arguments already given to very similar theories and levels of evidence. The threshold for acceptance is always notched higher than the present bar. That's great, and advised, if you are pushing for further research into the field. The problem is when you won't accept the general trends of the data. ID'ers are better at this than YEC's and OEC's.
As an atheist/agnostic I'm willing to accept possibility in the ID position that if there is a god that he could have a hand in guiding evolution and thus spawning consciousness in man. As a Christian can you accept the possibility that purely physical evolutionary processes could have formed human intelligence?
posted on 07.19.2004 1:59 PM17
Joe:
All I did was follow their thinking to it conclusion. I realize that some people would prefer to ignore the logical outcome of their worldviews but I don’t think that pointing out such flaws is an illegitimate enterprise.And yet you refuse to follow your world view to its logical conclusion, which is that your fate has already been decided, since God knew what it would be long before He ever created you. Since God cannot be wrong about such things, your fate is sealed, and any illusion of free choice you might have in the matter is precisely that -- an illusion.
You are merely an actor in a play whose ending has already been written in the mind of God. Much like the zombies you describe, who are slaves to their physiological impulses, you are a slave to the script that God has imagined in His mind.
Now I'm sure you have all sorts of "explanations" as to how this logical impossibility can truly be possible; I'm equally sure that the naturalists/materialists are about as likely to find them compelling as you are to find naturalistic explanations of higher consciousness compelling.
Are there logical problems with the naturalistic world view? Of course there are. Are they egregious enough to rule out the world view in its entirety? Obviously not. As I've argued here many times before, our minds are limited, and none of us (not you, not me, not anyone) can come up with an ironclad defense of our particular philosophies. Being pragmatic, my worldview works well enough for me, even with any logical problems it may have, and I haven't yet found any other worldview that's more compelling, so it's this one for now.
I do tend to wonder why you spend so much time pondering these things, as it matters not at all. If we truly are automata (or "zombies," as you describe us), devoid of free will, then it doesn't matter, because we can't "choose" to overcome this. And people naturally act as though they have free will, so even if they are right, and we do truly have free will, there's no need to convince them of that which they are already convinced. And if your perspective is the evangelical one, as advertised, there shouldn't be any "convincing" about it. Faith alone, not reason or logic, should be guiding you.
You could solve these problems beyond all reasonable doubt, and outside of hardcore philosophical circles, you would remain virtually unheard of. So with no real point, no implications for faith, and no potential for fame and fortune, and very little potential for ever making a significant impact on at-large opinion, why the seeming obsession with this?
posted on 07.19.2004 2:05 PM18
Whilst stumbling around the web looking for a cheap source of bullets for my firearm, I ran into this bizarre site:
http://users.adelphia.net/~lilavois/Seven/bible.html#Consciousness
Among other bizarre statements, the website purports to explain the symbolic relationship between the "seven churches" (whatever that means) and different "cell assemblies" essential to the functioning of the human central nervous system. The point has something to do with Artificial Intelligence and the end of the world but I couldn't stomach that part.
What I did see that was interesting was a section entitled, "Science and Consciousness," which included passages which smelled very familiar:
posted on 07.19.2004 4:17 PM