For a legal scholar and professor of philosophy, Brian Leiter has a remarkably poor grasp of basic logic. For the past week Leiter has been bashing a defender of Intelligent Design theory using his typical rhetorical style of bullying and bluster. Instead of thinking up creative new ad hominem attacks, though, he should be paying closer attention to his reasoning. He makes a particularly weak attempt to argue that methodological naturalism is based on 'evidence and experience" rather than an a priori adoption of philosophical naturalism:
The difficulty, however, is that science did not "a priori pick a naturalistic methodology"; it adopted, based on evidence and experience (i.e., a posteriori), the methods that worked: it turns out that if you make predictions, test the predictions against experience, refine the hypotheses on which the predictions are based, test them again, and so on, you figure out how to predict and control the world around you. This is what the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment, and a few other ancient events apparently not covered in Mr. VanDyke's education, were about: the a posteriori discovery of the most effective ways to predict and control the world. This, of course, distinguishes the naturalistic worldview of science from the supernatural view of religion, which is genuinely a priori.
There are numerous problems with Leiter’s reasoning but I will point out just three. The first is that his methodology would lead to conclusions that Leiter himself would presumably reject. Take for example the 'anthropic principle." We could predict, post hoc, what type of universe would be required to produce human life, but we'd be unable to test the theory (we aren't able to repeat the Big Bang). We could, however, determine the likelihood that the event could have occurred by pure chance. Since the probability of such a series of events occurring by coincidence would be close to zero, we would be lead, by evidence and experience, to the conclusion that the universe was 'designed." (To conclude otherwise would require taking an a priori prejudice against supernaturalism.)
The second reason is that the 'what works" approach gives us no reason to believe that our conclusions are true. I may believe, for example, that my dryer contains a black hole that causes socks to disappear. Every time I put a load of clothes in the machine I find that I'm missing a sock. The more I repeat this experiment the more socks I lose, thereby providing sufficient evidence to confirm my theory. Leiter, of course, would claim that we should use Occam’s razor and exclude the necessity of the black hole to explain the missing socks. But this would require us to take an a priori position in favor of the principle of parsimony in order to preserve methodological naturalism. My theory would work well enough that I would have no reason to test it further and while it might not be "true", the a posteriori examination of the evidence makes it a plausible explanation. After all, naturalistic methodology doesn’t require us to take a priori assumptions about truth.
The third reason Leiter's argument fails is that he has no justification for excluding other theories or methods that don’t rely on methodological naturalism. Just because a method works doesn’t mean it is infallible. The method provided us with Newtonian physics, a hypothesis that 'worked" well enough…until it didn’t. Do we regard the theory as having always been an implausible scientific hypothesis just because it was replaced by another? Of course not. The same applies to methods. Just because methodological naturalism 'works" (at least sometimes) does not mean that it is the only valid method or that it cannot be replaced. Besides, you can’t (without resorting to an a priori assumption) exclude other methods as invalid without allowing them to be tested.
Leiter’s reasoning shows that his bias against intelligent design theory is not rooted in science but in prejudice. By acknowledging that science does not require an a priori submission to naturalism he inadvertenly undercuts his own argument. He can’t claim that methodological naturalism is the 'most effective ways to predict and control the world" while refusing to allow other methods to be tested. He may have 'faith" in the method but that does not mean that we are also required to subscribe to his belief.
1
okay, i'm going to try again here, as I've done in the past:
-Mr. Carter said: There are numerous problems with Leiter’s reasoning but I will point out just three. The first is that his methodology would lead to conclusions that Leiter himself woudl presumably reject. Take for example the “anthropic principle.” We could predict, post hoc, what type of universe would be required to produce human life, but we'd be unable to test the theory (we aren't able to repeat the Big Bang).
Right. We can't test this theory. Leiter would then say this isn't an example of the scientific method at work in any direction. He would not accept or reject the statements about what's required to produce human life based on this, (though he might have some problems even with the definition of what is meant by "human life" here--what separates human from not human, for means of this question/experiment? )
-We could, however, determine the likelihood that the event could have occurred by pure chance. Since the probability of such a series of events occurring by coincidence would be close to zero, we would be lead, by evidence and experience, to the conclusion that the universe was “designed.” (To conclude otherwise would require taking an a priori prejudice against supernaturalism.)
To conclude "designed" would be to take an a priori prejudice. Events close to zero occur. Further, all finite events occur with probability close to zero, or actually, measure 0. We have no more information then about whether this finite event was designed or not.
to conclude "not designed" would ALSO be to take an aprior prejudice, since we can't tell whether measure zero events occur because of design or randomness, and they could occur for both reasons. In fact, ALL finite random events occur with probability 0, as defined by measure theory, so we're no better off than we were before. Having probability close to zero of occurring means we're stuck not knowing how we got there. This does not discredit his reasoning at all; how do you think it possibly does?
-The second reason is that the “what works” approach gives us no reason to believe that our conclusions are true.
not "no reason". It gives us Some Reason, but not perfect reason.
-I may believe, for example, that my dryer contains a black hole that causes socks to disappear. Every time I put a load of clothes in the machine I find that I'm missing a sock. The more I repeat this experiment the more socks I lose, thereby providing sufficient evidence to confirm my theory.
But that theory of black holes would have other characteristics about it. It would deform the washing machine, or steal shorts too, or heat the garage up a WHOLE HECK of a lot, or otherwise have predictable effects. And we could say "we don't observe those effects, and we should. This theory doesn't work."
-Leiter, of course, would claim that we should use Occam’s razor and exclude the necessity of the black hole to explain the missing socks.
I don't know if this is a straw man or not. You don't need occam's razor until you argue that there are two theories that are EXACTLY THE SAME in their effects, and the only difference in the theories is the "simplicity" of one. I know of no testable (i.e. for which some event could disprove each of them) theories that predict PRECISELY THE SAME effects, where one is simpler than the other. Do you? (Don't say ID vs. natural selection, either. because you don't have anything disprovable about ID. I've asked before, and you've failed to say what if ANYTHING would ever be evidence to you that ID was incorrect.)
-My theory would work well enough that I would have no reason to test it further and while it might not be "true", the a posteriori examination of the evidence makes it a plausible explanation.
No, not an examination of ALL of the evidence. It might work well enough for *you personally* not to care for a better explanation. But it wouldn't work well enough to establish that to people interested in the truth, or other scientists. The truth, the honest truth, would require investigating ALL of the possible evidence, not merely what the experimenter Dictates as relevant evidence.
I've said this before; ill say it again. Scientists are pushing back the boundary on 'truth' by looking at EFFECTS. Their goal is to find a 'cause' that explains that effect. They then move onto to ask what caused that 'cause'. Their work is ALWAYS about effects. about seconds. About things that come AFTER something else. Science will not get to the source of the FIRST. It does not claim to. If science ever reaches a point where it considers itself to have answered the question "what came before the big bang", there will THEN be a question "AND WHAT CAME BEFORE THAT" that science will NOT YET be able to answer.
The whole notion of a scientific theory rests on it being able to be possibly disproven: that there exists a circumstance which, if it arose, would show that theory wasn't true. this is known as EVIDENCE. beliefs about God do not have such EVIDENCE. that does not deny God's existence or not. It simply says God cannot be proven to be true or untrue. However, science is about things that CAN be proven to be untrue.
posted on 04.07.2004 4:50 AM2
I'm going to say one part in a slightly different way:
if from two different theories you can deduce PRECISELY THE SAME effects (and precisely the same non-effects), then there IS NO DIFFERENCE between the two theories.
I would posit that anyone who resorts to Occam's razor is committing a logical error. If the problem is well-defined, then there is no need to do so, because there is some other way of distinguishing between two explanations; if there is no way to distinguish between the two explanations, then there is simply ONE explanation with two different encodings. It is at that point like asking whether the same computer program written in C is more true than the same computer program in Fortran.
so if Leitner would resort to Occam's razor, his argument is broken. But I still don't know if he actually would or does.
posted on 04.07.2004 5:11 AM3
My reaction to the paragraph quoted, (aside from the pejorative "apparently not covered...") is that Mr Leitner is correct. Historically, I think his description exactly covers the evolution of science. I think, though, that the gap in his logic comes from the extension of his (and the philosophers of science?) thought from "this is what is" to "this is why it is". Yes, the scientific process allowed all that to happen, but that's a far cry from "only a methodological naturalism can produce this process". After all, most of the original inventors and practitioners of the scientific method were Christians.
The other way to approach this is that there's a difference between the "naturalistic methodology" Mr Leitner espouses in this paragraph and the "methodological naturalism" Joe decries. I do not think that the first is necessary and sufficient proof of the second. To the extent that Mr. Leitner posits that is the extent of his error.
posted on 04.07.2004 6:58 AM4
At risk of wading too far into something that is quite complex and time consuming, I don't think that Leiter's position is correct historically. The scientific method didn't develop in a vacuum in the way that I read him as implying - at various times it has been seen as being both distinctively Christian or decidedly naturalistic, for instance. The intellectual history of science is complicated, messy, and sometimes contradictory because science is a human endeavor. Concerns and competing claims between metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism play out in the backround of almost every debate during the 19th and early 20th centuries about the methods, theories, facts, and status of science (as they continue to do) and seemingly scientific positions are held and decisions (both intellectual and bureaucratic) made for reasons that extend well beyond 'the scientific method' as held out by scientists and philosophers.
The rather messy historical development of ideas is something that professional philosophers, such as Leiter and even Alvin Plantinga, are prone to overlook as their primary professional and intellectual concerns are with ideas themselves and not the contexts in which those ideas exist.
posted on 04.07.2004 9:54 AM6
Thaxton and Pearcy's history of science would be a very helpful read at this point.
posted on 04.07.2004 10:21 AM7
greifer,
"You don't need occam's razor until you argue that there are two theories that are EXACTLY THE SAME in their effects, and the only difference in the theories is the "simplicity" of one."This isn't exactly correct. Two theories don't have to be the same in their effects (or non-effects) in order to appeal to Occam's Razor. The principle that Joe seems to be refering to is called the under-determination of theories. This is when there are two or more theories that explain the same observations. When this happens, the observations alone - the evidence - cannot determine which theory is correct. Because of this, we have to appeal to metaphysical or epistemological assumptions such as Occam's Razor or pragmatism, in order to decide between the competing theories. The classic example of this is the Ptolematic and Copernican theories about "heavenly bodies."
"The whole notion of a scientific theory rests on it being able to be possibly disproven: that there exists a circumstance which, if it arose, would show that theory wasn't true. this is known as EVIDENCE."Again, this isn't really correct. There are plenty of examples in the history of science in which scientists ignore evidence in favor of a theory. The commonly used example is Dayton Miller's Ether-Drift Experiments that falsified Einstein's theory of special relativity. People ignored Miller's experiments and observations and kept Einstein's theory even though Einstein himself said that the experiments made his theory invalid. It wasn't until about 30 years later that a good reason could be given for thinking Miller's experiments were wrong.
My point is that evidence doesn't always drive theories, sometimes its the other way around. That is, evidence alone can't show a theory to be untrue.
posted on 04.07.2004 10:32 AM8
Quote: He can’t claim that methodological naturalism is the “most effective ways to predict and control the world” while refusing to allow other methods to be tested.
Of course this severely misrepresents Leiter's comments in which he does not refuse to allow other methods to be tested, on the contrary Leiter states it clearly
Leiter: VanDyke could not have included quotes showing that the philosophers among them think methodological naturalism is an a priori dogma—that’s the issue. Evolutionary biologists pursue a research program predicated on the search for naturalistic causal mechanisms because it’s turned out, as an a posteriori matter, that such a research program produces spectacular results. By contrast, there is no research program with any research or results utilizing supernatural causal mechanisms. That is why scientists are methodological naturalists. Their reasons are a posteriori. It really is that simple, VanDyke’s astonishing ignorance notwithstanding.
and he quotes Landau
If so, he might have also noted that Beckwith quotes Laudan [at 25] noting that ID “is inconsistent with methodological naturalism and ontological materialism...[b]ut that fact has no bearing whatsoever on the plausbility of the arguments for ID.” Why does Laudan say that? Because methodological naturalism is an a posteriori doctrine, which means if ID generated any empirical results incompatible with it—it has not, of course—then so much the worse for MN. The problem is purely a posteriori: ID has no research program and no empirical support, so it presents no challenge at all to the reliance on naturalistical explanatory mechanisms.
ID fails because it has nothing new to add to scientific inquiry, because it is based on faulty approaches. Simple...
posted on 04.07.2004 12:13 PM9
ID fails because it has nothing new to add to scientific inquiry, because it is based on faulty approaches. Simple...
Of course it does. It provides a way to detect for design. What other theory currently offers that? (Or do you you simply take the a priori assumption that nothing in nature is "designed?")
posted on 04.07.2004 12:36 PM10
Joe,
[Of course it does, it gives us a way to test for design]
No it doesn't give us a test for design at all and you can easily show me wrong.
Many of the PT folks hvae offered objects and phenomena to Demsbki's EF for example. The Nambia Fairy Circles...etc.
EG: Demsbki doesn't explain HOW to test things. He won't tell us what the 'answers' of the tests are on various objects...
This EF does not as far as we can tell, actually even exist.
Try it yourself. Ask him or nayone else. Is a spider web intelligently designed? A Termite Mound? The Nambia Fairy Circles? Yes, or no, and why?
~DS~
posted on 04.07.2004 12:49 PM11
Name one way that ID describes how to detect design.
I've read both Behe and Dembski; there's nothing there that I could actually apply, for instance, to a rock, a chair, or an egg to get a reliable or even believable value for "designed" or "not designed". Yet all the ID creationists insist that the methods are there, and that they have the Answer. And all the creationists who berate scientists for their poor grasp of the scientific method simultaneously demonstrate their own ignorance of the subject every time they say something.
posted on 04.07.2004 4:20 PM12
P.Z.,
Name one way that ID describes how to detect design.
See here.
posted on 04.07.2004 5:54 PM14
P.Z.,
Um...did you plan on giving us a rebuttal of Dembski's methodology or are you just going to leave it at that?
posted on 04.07.2004 8:44 PM15
I'm confused. If there is no way to test for intelligent design, why do we spend money on the SETI program?
posted on 04.07.2004 8:51 PM16
OK, I have a question, for the people from PT who are over here, as well as for Joe, or anyone else who wants to respond. My question, which may have been addressed elsewhere by some of you, is would it be possible for someone who had all of the knowledge which Joe clearly lacks to construct a viable ID theory? For instance, if someone understood the scientific method; knew what it mean for a hypothesis/theory/model to be testable; knew the meanings of words like a priori and a posteriori; understood concepts like probability, the "anthropic principle," and "methodological naturalism," as well as their relevance to and implications for the issues at hand; had knowledge of the history of science, and could grasp the meaning of its various eventsm, particularly as they relate to his or her arguments; and could form cogent, valid, and sound arguments that actually addressed the points of critics, could he or she actually come up with an ID theory worthy of careful consideration (rather than forced upon you brave souls by political exigencies)?
And if someone who knew all of these things (and possessed other relevant knowledge), rather than none of them (e.g. Joe and Van Dyke), or only some of them (Dembski, Behe, and presumably the other IDers who have been trained as scientists), what would such a theory look like? Would it come out as a mathematical model of the sort that Dembski seems to be working towards? Or perhaps would it be a model that produced predictions that were in direct opposition to predictions that evolutionary theories must make (to retain their naturalistic perspective) but which have yet to have been supported empirically (I'm sure this isn't mutually exclusive of Dembski's direction, but it's not entirely the same thing either)? Someone over on PT has probably posted on what sorts of predictions those would be (I think I recall someone mentioning horses with wings somewhere). If so, I'd be interested in reading it. I'm sure it would be edifying for Joe, Van Dyke, and the rest of this perverse crowd, as well.
posted on 04.07.2004 11:20 PM17
Joe invites: Um...did you plan on giving us a rebuttal of Dembski's methodology or are you just going to leave it at that?
Sure, Dembski uses the set theoretic complement of regularity and/or chance to infer design, that is if we do not know how something may arise through natural law or chance we are forced to infer design. Not only is such an approach fraught with difficulties of false positives (Del Ratzsch provides for a good example) but it also bases its arguments on ignorance rather than knowledge and negative evidence. Notice that the design inference does not even provide for its own hypothesis other than 'Not X, thus Y', the trademark of an argument from ignorance.
As Del Ratsch showed, the design inference is unsuitable in either initial recognition or identification of design.
So typically, patterns that are likely candidates for design are first identified as such by some unspecified ("mysterious") means, then with the pattern in hand S picks out side information identified (by unspecified means) as relevant to the particular pattern, then sees whether the pattern in question is among the various patterns that could have been constructed from that side information. What this means, of course, is that Dembski's design inference will not be particularly useful either in initial recognition or identification of design.
p. 159 Del Ratzsch Nature design and science
And this from a design proponent...
What else has Del to say about Dembski's design inference?
"I do not wish to play down or denigrate what Dembski has done. There is much of value in the Design Inference. But I think that some aspects of even the limited task Dembski set for himself still remains to be tamed." "That Dembski is not employing the robust, standard, agency-derived conception of design that most of his supporters and many of his critics have assumed seems clear."
For some good rebuttals of Dembski see
Wein, or various authors on Talkreasons.org or The advantages of theft over toil: the design inference and arguing from ignorance by John S. Wilkins, Wesley R. Elsberry
18
Look, science has been done by fallible people. We make mistakes. But that doesn't invalidate the point that science is supposed to be about evidence.
if all of the IDers arguments boil down to "well, those scientists didn't act scientifically"-- that's like arguing that people who made square wheels can't roll--Well, OBVIOUSLY. And SO WHAT does that have to do with science when it Does Go Forth?
my point is that yet again, Mr. Carter's arguments aren't getting at the point of what science claims to say. He seems to think that putting up straw men of prior poor science demonstrates something.
even in your einstein example, you see that the whole point is when scientific validation says something can't happen. Later, we keep probing to see if That was accurate too. but again, it's about separating causes from effects.
let me rephrase my Occam's razor argument: occam's razor is a fine method for starting to determine which theories should be created/invented. It is not a method for determining their truth value. it is a useful tool, but it does not answer scientific questions. If a scientist resorts to it, he's not doing science.
posted on 04.08.2004 2:13 AM19
Mr. Carter,
you put up a gigantic paper that you don't explain the details of, and expect us to answer immediately?
Could you try being reasonable?
I will get around to reading it and dissecting it. But for now, I ask you AGAIN, what events or evidence could EVER cause you to disbelieve in ID?
if the answer is "none", then it's not a scientific theory. Scientific theories are testable. Bad scientists may claims unreasonable theories in re: to evolution--fine. But i'm asking you, what evidence, event, or data would ever show you that ID is wrong?
I have said in posts before what evidence would convince me that natural selection isn't true. I've said before what evidence could convince me that genetic mutation doesn't explain certain evolutionary changes in species. You have not yet said what evidence would lead you to think ID is wrong.
and lastly, why don't you ever address the issue that science is about things other than "firsts"?
posted on 04.08.2004 2:18 AM20
If a scientist resorts to using Occam's razor, he isn't doing science? I'm sorry, but that's just wrong. There are a variety of metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that are made by scientists all the time and parsimony is one of them. Occam's razor has been used for hundred's of years in science and I have no doubt it will be used for hundreds of years to come.
And the point of my Einstein example was that sometimes scientists ignore data that shows a theory to be wrong. Miller's experiment falsified Einstein's theory of relativity. Einstein himself said this. But Einstein and others ignored the results of Miller's experiments for non-empirical reasons. It seems to be that Einstein's theory was just so elegant and beautiful that they couldn't imagine that the theory could be wrong. Therefore, they concluded that the empirical evidence was wrong. And remember, this was some 30 years before the empirical evidence was shown wrong.
And that is just one example. There is also the example of how Aristotelians used to drop objects from high places and said that those types of experiments provided evidence that the earth wasn't moving. They figured that if one dropped an object and the earth was moving, the object wouldn't land directly beneath where it was dropped from. But we know today that this doesn't provide evidence for a stationary earth. Newton's theories tell us why this is. In other words, new theories can make us re-interpret evidence.
My point is that saying "science is supposed to be about evidence" doesn't mean much. I totally agree that science needs evidence. But evidence is not the be-all and end-all of science. Evidence is often ignored in science (often for good reason) and evidence has to be interpretted from within a theoretical framework. Non-empirical assumptions and beliefs play important roles in science.
posted on 04.08.2004 3:34 AM21
Quote: Joe invites: Um...did you plan on giving us a rebuttal of Dembski's methodology or are you just going to leave it at that?
I read the link that you posted. The one of the three parts of the EF is a major problem. EF uses law and chance as the test part of the filter. The problem is that it assumes that all laws that could be used to explain a thing are known. It is possible that a new law could be discovered that could explain a thing so design is not a necessary inference. It is a Design (cough..God...cough) of the Gaps argument. Since we don't of a law that can explain this and chance can't it must be Designed. The logic simply doesn't follow.
Second,from the article: The first is a straightforward inductive argument: in every instance where the Explanatory Filter attributes design, and where the underlying causal story is known, it turns out design actually is present; therefore, design actually is present whenever the Explanatory Filter attributes design.
I want the ID guys to win this debate but this is REALLY bad reasoning. Just because in every known case EF has corresponded 100% with design it doesn't follow that EF will correspond 100% with design for every possible future case.
Her are my closing thoughts on this issue. I am a not fan of naturalism or Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory but a better design detecting model is necessary to take that giant down. Dembski's basic goal of finding an empirical way to test for the presence of design is something that scientists shouldn't afraid of but rather welcome as it would be very useful. I find no reason to believe that idea that there could be a way to emprically test for design is inheirently flawed but some anti-ID people seem to believe that idea is inheirently flawed. But they do so due to prior philosophical commitments not because science as a process requires the rejection of such notion. Dembski is going in the right direction but on the wrong path.
posted on 04.08.2004 3:44 AM23
Wow, Joe, now this is what I would call "getting taken behind the woodshed."
http://www.pandasthumb.org/pt-archives/000118.html
posted on 04.11.2004 11:58 AM24
Abhishiktananda,
As one who has been "taken behind the woodshed" many times I can assure you that this isn't the case this time. For starters, Ed Brayton is intellectually dishonest and has continued to repeat (about three times if I remember correctly) the same misrepresentations of my argument. It is impossible to carry on an honest debate with someone who refuses to argue what is being presented despite the fact that it is open for everyone to see (perhaps he just assumes his readers will be too lazy to do their homework for themselves).
Also, many of the commenters seem to be completely able to understand a simple ad hominem fallacy even when it has been repeatedly pointed out to them by myself and others. When they can't comprehend such basics in logic and reasoning it doesn't inspire much confidence that they will be able to follow a more detailed philosophical discussion.
You are free to think what you wish, of course, but if you take off your idealogical blinders you might be able to see the truth of the matter. Of course, at Panda's Thumb, the truth seems to be subordinate to the overheated rhetoric.
posted on 04.11.2004 12:47 PM25
It seems to me that design goes to intent. Intent must be inferred by determining whether it is probable at the time of an event that causing the event will produce a desirable result.
An intelligently designed system will have a genesis in multiple, low probability events that, when taken together, are objectively likely to produce the system being observed.
Restated, design is evidenced by:
1) Multiple, unlikely events
2) That when taken together, are likely to produce the observed result.
Take a hypothetical system. It's probability is the product of the probabilities of the events that created it, such that the probabilities e1
*e2*e3...= ef (probability of the resultant system). Take a screw in a hole. The probability of the screw being formed without design is e1. The probability of the screw then being screwed into the hole without design is e2. e1*e2=ef. The system is low probability without design.
Now go count screws and holes. Real world observations to estimate ef show that the system is of higher probability than e1*e2 without design. Real world tests also show that when screws and holes come together, they are likely to end up as described in the system ef (i.e. screwed in).
The discrepancy in ef(calculated w/o design) and ef(real world) is a measure of the effect of design on the probability of a system's occurrence if all other factors in causation are taken into account. One interesting measure might be the square root of the difference in realworld and calculated non-design probabilities divided by calculated non-design difference, or sqrt[(EFrw-EFcalc)/EFcalc] to get the average factor by which the subevents were made more likely due to design.
posted on 04.12.2004 8:46 AM26
That last "non-design difference" should have been "non-design probability".
posted on 04.12.2004 8:51 AM27
For square root, the actual root should be equal to the number of subevents. Square root for e1*e2=ef, cubed root for e1*e2*e3=ef, etc., to calculate the average multiplier by which the subevents were made more likely due to design.
posted on 04.12.2004 9:04 AM28
Macht wrote:
"They figured that if one dropped an object and the earth was moving, the object wouldn't land directly beneath where it was dropped from. "
Um, if the measurements are accurately made and the air resistance is taken into account, I would hope that the object does NOT land directly beneath where it is dropped. Could you explain why it wouldn't, Macht?
Septeus writes:
" .... some anti-ID people seem to believe that idea is inheirently flawed. But they do so due to prior philosophical commitments . . ."
That is fascinating, Septeus. Please tell us more about these unnamed "anti-ID" people and their unnamed "prior philosophical commitments."
And then explain why you are "not a fan of naturalism or Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory."
I can't wait.
posted on 04.12.2004 6:56 PM29
Alan asked an interesting question: "If there is no way to test for intelligent design, why do we spend money on the SETI program?"
One possible answer is that there is a reliable way to detect design in some cases, including cases involving communication from one sentient being to another. That is why SETI research seems reasonable, even while ID looks ID-iotic. The problem for ID-iots is that the methods used to detect design in communication are not necessarily useful in all other cases. (Dembski’s own book, No Free Lunch, could be used as evidence that no method works in all cases. Perhaps Dembski ought to actually read his book!) In any case, Dembski, et al., assume that his method works in all cases, but assumptions aren't evidence.
The basic problem in comparing SETI and biology is that Dembski and other ID-iots are comparing apples and oranges. Biological evolution involves reproduction, random mutation, and selection; but all of the design examples used by Dembski and other ID-iots involve things -- like messages -- which do NOT involve reproduction, mutation, and selection. It is painfully obvious that just because design accounts for one set of circumstances, there’s still no logical reason to believe that it necessarily accounts for a completely different set of circumstances.
Nor is Dembski’s problem purely logical. Since the reproduction-mutation-selection process is known to be capable of producing functional, complex designs -- engineers use genetic algorithms every day in designing cool new stuff -- there is actual, empirical proof that complex, specified information can be produced by evolutionary processes.
Dembski’s anti-evolution argument is ID-iotic for another reason. Even assuming that the design inference were correct -- and for all I know, it may well be -- that would have no impact on evolutionary theory at all. Evolution is entirely consistent with belief in a Designer (cough - DOG - cough). Darwin himself indicated as much. ID-iots who reject evolution simply because they have (allegedly) found evidence of design are committing a glaring non sequitur.
Regarding Occam’s Razor, that’s a guiding principle of natural philosophy. It has nothing to say about supernatural agents. Supernatural agents, pretty much by definition, are not bound by merely natural laws, including Occam’s Razor.
Finally, even in the area of natural philosophy, Occam’s Razor is a guide only. It does not absolutely rule out the possibility of multiple agents. A bank hold-up, for example, may involve a gang, not just one robber.
posted on 06.30.2004 4:35 AM